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Abstract
Credit unions represent an institutional response to economic problems 
of information asymmetry. This thesis develops an economic theory of 
credit union behaviour that explains institutional characteristics 
including mutuality and the common bond of association. This theory is 
used to analyse the impact of uniform State-based regulation of credit 
unions -  the Australian Financial Institutions Scheme. This analysis is 
tested through an empirical study of a sample of New South Wales credit 
unions over the period 1987 to 1997.
The nonprofit organisational literature is critically examined, and the 
proposition that the nondistribution constraint is the essential feature in 
overcoming information problems is rejected. Instead, it is argued that 
nonprofit organisations have comparative advantages in the use of non- 
market mechanisms to address agency problems, using altruism, 
relationships of trust, and manager screening and socialisation. The 
mutual structure can be explained in terms of addressing information 
asymmetry between producers and consumers by creating a coalition of 
interest. This argument is also supported within a transaction cost 
economics framework, by analogy to the concept of a peer group.
In examining intermediaries and insurers, financial economics generally 
finds that mutual institutions are inherently inefficient, relative to 
shareholder-owned corporations, based on lack of clarity in the definition 
of property rights and access to market discipline. The advantage of 
mutual financial institutions is, however, in the lower agency costs of 
debt through the alignment of depositor/policyholder interests. This 
reduces the incentive for owners to engage in wealth transfer through 
increasing portfolio risk. More importantly, mutual institutions should
i i i
have comparative advantages in credit and insurance markets, where 
severe problems of adverse selection and moral hazard exist. The 
development of mutual forms of intermediary supports this perspective. 
An economic model of credit union behaviour is proposed, based on the 
importance of the common bond of association in ameliorating manager 
self-interest.
An examination of Australian credit union regulation is conducted, 
revealing a trend away from institutional forms of regulation in favour of 
a policy of competitive neutrality. The major legislative development in 
the 1992 uniform Scheme is the imposition of a risk-weighted capital 
adequacy requirement, drawn from international banking practice, but 
arguably inappropriate to the mutual organisation structure of credit 
unions, reflecting a failure by regulators to appreciate important 
institutional differences. Likely consequences of this measure include: 
profitability as the principal operating objective; accumulation of 
surpluses; increased preference for residential mortgage lending; 
constraints of growth; demutualisation and merger behaviour to address 
capital problems; and increased compliance costs for smaller credit 
unions.
These predictions are assessed empirically, using a sample of 150 credit 
unions over the period 1987 to 1997. Box-Tiao style intervention and 
trend analyses are performed on each of the institutions, together with 
cross-sectional regressions of the estimated responses. The results show  
that credit unions typically responded to the capital requirement by 
emphasising lower-risk housing loans, reducing profitability (from 
reduced interest margins and greater competition from other 
institutions). Consistent with theoretical expectations, the response of 
credit unions is found to be a function of initial capital levels, the 
common bond, and institution size (a proxy for member bonding).
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C hapter One -  Introduction
Chapter One 
Overview
Credit unions are not "banks in disguise" (Bundt, Chiesa and Keating, 
1989). They traditionally represent a cooperative form of organisation 
steeped in the history of the credit union "movement" and principles of 
self-helpT The social aspect of these institutions supports an important 
economic advantage -  addressing severe problems of information 
asymmetry through non-market mechanisms. In particular, the 
characteristics of mutuality and the common bond of association provide 
comparative institutional advantages in dealing with adverse selection 
and moral hazard facing credit markets, and ameliorating manager self- 
interest in the absence of market incentives. Recent regulatory changes to 
the Australian industry, through the Financial Institutions Scheme, 
assume that mutuality is outdated. The impact of the Scheme on credit 
unions is studied within an economic theory explaining their 
institutional differences, and assessed using empirical evidence.
For detailed histories of the credit union movement, see Wolff, 1910; Giles, 1951; 
Dublin, 1966; and Moody and Fite, 1971.
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1.1 Objectives_________________________
There are three principal objectives. The first is to develop an economic 
theory of credit unions2 that explains the importance of the institutional 
differences of mutuality and the common bond of association. Part of this 
theoretical development involves a critical analysis of the literature on  
nonprofit organisations, and an application of transaction cost economics 
in explaining the role of mutuality in overcoming information 
asymmetry and promoting altruistic behaviour. It is argued that a credit 
union can be explained in terms of comparative institutional advantage 
in dealing with problems of adverse selection and moral hazard within  
financial intermediation.
The second objective is to analyse the regulatory changes introduced by 
the Financial Institutions Scheme within the context of this economic 
model, in order to assess the likely impact of the Scheme on credit 
unions. This is based on a detailed comparison of credit union legislation 
prior to the Scheme against the new regulatory framework. The 
imposition of a capital adequacy requirement, reflecting the extension of 
Reserve Bank style prudential mechanisms, is identified as the major 
source of conflict with credit union operating principles, challenging the 
mutuality characteristic and eroding the usefulness of the common bond.
2 A useful definition is: "A democratically-controlled voluntary co-operative society of 
individuals, bound together by a common bond for the pursuit of the economic welfare 
of members through the receipt of funds from members and others, and the provision of 
loans and other forms of credit and financial services to members" (Crapp and Skully, 
1985).
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The imposition is explained as a failure by regulators to appreciate 
institutional differences, in the pursuit of a policy of com petitive 
neutrality.
The third objective is to test the predicted effects of the Scheme on credit 
union behaviour. Statistical analysis is conducted on a sample of 150 
credit unions in New South Wales using quarterly financial data over the 
period 1987 to 1997. Intervention analysis, trend analysis and cross- 
sectional regression models are used. The results demonstrate that the 
regulation produced changes in credit union behaviour consistent w ith  
theoretical expectations.
1.2 Structure___________________________
Chapter Two critically reviews the economic literature on nonprofit 
organisations, to assess whether the nonprofit characteristic of the credit 
union is its im portant feature. The organisation is understood to emerge 
in response to contract failure from information asymmetries. A 
common assum ption that the nondistribution constraint overcom es 
these inform ation problems is disputed. Agency theory would view the 
constraint as an insulation of the organisation from the effect of m arket 
discipline, leading to inefficiencies. Instead, it is argued that nonprofit 
organisations have comparative advantages in the use of non-m arket 
mechanisms to address agency problems, using altruism, relationships of 
trust, and manager screening and socialisation. Information asymmetry 
problems are reduced by the coalition of producer and consumer interests
Chapter One -  Introduction
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through mutuality. This analysis is supported by transaction cost
economics, where internal organisation of transactions is a rational
response to information problems.
Chapter Three critically reviews the literature dealing with mutual 
financial institutions. Agency theory finds such organisations inherently 
inefficient due to the difficulties in using market mechanisms to 
discipline managers. This literature speculates that favourable regulation, 
separation of decision management and control through hierarchies and 
outside directors, and particularly redeemable member claims, support 
the continued existence of mutual institutions. A better perspective of 
principal-agent conflicts is found in the identity between owners and 
depositors/policyholders within a mutual, reducing the incentive of 
owners to increase risk at the expense of debtholders. In addition, the 
insulation of managers from market discipline implies risk-averse 
behaviour and prudence in adoption of an investment portfolio. As an 
alternative to agency theory, an informational perspective argues that 
financial mutuals have comparative advantages in credit and insurance 
markets due to the presence of severe problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Screening and monitoring to address such information 
asymmetries is enhanced within mutual organisations, where 
relationships of trust promote information flows and social sanctions for 
delinquency. The history of German banking cooperatives, mutual banks 
and savings and loan associations in the Untied States demonstrates this 
informational role. This suggests an economic model of credit union
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behaviour based on the importance of the common bond of association in
ameliorating manager utility maximisation.
Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of the legislative changes 
introduced by the Financial Institutions Scheme, arguing that credit 
union regulation is driven principally by the policy objective of 
competitive neutrality. Public policy since the Campbell Inquiry 
increasingly emphasises the similarities between financial institutions, 
w ith the consequence that prudential rules applicable to banks are 
extended to all forms of deposit-taking institutions. While the State-based 
uniform  system eliminates previous interstate distortions and 
emphasises a num ber of m utual and cooperative principles, the m ajor 
regulatory developm ent is the imposition of a risk-weighted capital 
adequacy requirement, adapted from the supervision strategy7 of the 
Reserve Bank.
Chapter Five assesses the theoretical impact of the Scheme within the 
context of the model of credit union behaviour developed earlier. Capital 
adequacy rules are incompatible with the institutional structure of a credit 
union, failing to appreciate im portant institutional differences. In 
particular, assumptions of excessive risk-taking behaviour and the ability 
to issue perm anent equity, underlying the use of regulatory capital, are 
inappropriate. The mandate to increase reserves through profitability is 
also likely to underm ine the cooperative foundations of the credit un ion . 
The Scheme is expected to result in changed institutional behaviour. 
Credit unions m ust seek a target rate of return to m aintain capital
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adequacy when faced with growth opportunities, potentially shifting
m anagem ent emphasis from maximising member benefits to m axim ising
surpluses. Incentives to judge performance by corporate sector m easures
may also underm ine the common bond's ability to address agency
problems. The continued accumulation of surpluses w ith vague
ownership rights will prom pt moves to dem utualisation to expropriate
the com m unal wealth for the benefit of the current stakeholders.
Pressure to meet capital requirements is also likely to result in an
increased preference for residential mortgage lending in portfolio choices,
given their lower risk weighting. Personal loans are, however, the
traditional area of activity for credit unions which draws upon their
com parative inform ational advantages. Smaller credit unions may be
affected adversely by cost increases through supervision levies, and the
complexities of addressing banking style prudential requirements. The
traditional adm inistration of small cooperatives by the m em bers
themselves would be discouraged. Merger activity is expected, as a
mechanism to address growth, liquidity and compliance problems.
Chapter Six provides a review of the empirical literature on credit unions, 
which can broadly be classified into studies on industry structure, scale 
economies, and organisational behaviour. The common bond is shown to 
be an im portant com ponent of some studies in each of these areas. 
Intervention analysis, particularly in terms of a Box-Tiao time series 
approach, is introduced. The usefulness of this technique, adopted in part 
by the empirical analysis in Chapter Seven, is in assessing the impact of
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regulatory changes. The literature on regulatory changes using various
forms of intervention analysis is also reviewed.
Chapter Seven presents the results of an empirical investigation of the 
impact of the Financial Institutions Scheme on credit union behaviour. 
The impact is assessed using quarterly financial inform ation on a sam ple 
of 150 credit unions in New South Wales over the period 1987 to 1997. 
Three sets of analyses are conducted. First is an intervention analysis of 
the tim e series of accumulated reserves for each institution, to assess the 
hypothesis of an increased emphasis on profitability to meet capital 
requirements. The second is a post-intervention trend analysis of the 
proportion of housing loans to evaluate the prediction that residential 
mortgage lending would be emphasised given its lower risk weighting. 
Finally, the institutional responses are explained by a cross-sectional 
regression including levels of regulatory capital, common bond and size 
(a proxy for common bond effectiveness). The results show that the 
Scheme did have an impact on credit union behaviour consistent w ith 
the theoretical expectations.
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by reviewing its content, identifying 
the significant contributions, and considering the future of credit un ions 
given the recent Wallis Inquiry, and the future transfer of the Scheme to a 
single national prudential regulator for all financial institutions.
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Chapter Two 
Nonprofit Organisations
The focus of this thesis is the economic nature of credit unions as an 
institutional form and the impact of regulation on credit unions within  
this context. Credit unions are a type of nonprofit organisation. An  
initial question is whether the nonprofit characteristic of the credit union  
is the essential institutional feature. A nonprofit organisation is defined 
as one that is prohibited, either by legislation or by its own corporate 
constitution, from distributing its net surplus to its members. This is 
known as the "nondistribution constraint" (Hansmann, 1980, p. 838). 
This chapter critically reviews the economic literature on nonprofit 
organisations, and rejects the widespread assumption that the 
nondistribution constraint overcomes information asymmetry problems. 
Rather, the feature of interest is the integration of producer and consumer 
interests within a single organisation, capturing positive information 
externalities. The conclusion is that mutual organisations have a 
comparative advantage in effecting transactions that are subject to 
significant problems of information asymmetry between producer and 
consumer.
The chapter begins with an overview of the information asymmetry 
explanation for nonprofit organisations. It then disputes, as misplaced,
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the emphasis on the nondistribution constraint as the critical element in  
generating trust between producer and consumer. Moreover, the 
nondistribution constraint suggests serious agency problems due to the 
absence of market-based disciplining mechanisms. These agency 
problems are addressed by altruistic behaviour, which is based either on  
the ideological nature of the nonprofit organisation or in the integration 
of producer and consumer interests through mutuality.
It is suggested that the institutional structure of a mutual organisation 
reduces information asymmetries by encouraging information flows, and 
attenuating opportunism through altruistic social pressures. This 
argument is supported by transaction cost economics, in that internal 
rather than market governance of transactions in the presence of 
information impactedness is desirable.
2.1 Information Asymmetry_______________
Nonprofit organisational literature cites information asymmetry between 
producers and consumers as the principal reason for the emergence of 
such an institution. Assumptions representing the conditions for an 
efficient market include assumed abilities of consumers to choose 
rationally between products and prices offered by different firms, then to 
negotiate and to monitor a contract with the chosen firm (Hansmann, 
1980, p. 843). For common physical goods such food and household  
products this assumption will be justified. In more specialised situations 
it will be inappropriate, due to the nature of the product itself, or the
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related contract bargaining process and enforcement mechanisms.
2.1.1 Adverse selection and moral hazard
The problems of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard are 
im portant. Both these concepts can be illustrated by the insurance 
contract. The premium quoted by an insurance company will be based on 
an estimate of the probability of the particular event occurring -  the 
"insured risk". The inform ation used by an insurer to calculate this risk 
is limited and therefore the insurer is unable to distinguish between 
degrees of risk. The adverse selection problem is manifest in the terms of 
an insurance contract being more attractive, for example, to those of poor 
health who are therefore more likely to apply for cover. Moral hazard 
arises where the effect of the insurance is to induce the actor to take fewer 
precautions (Arrow, 1962; Demsetz, 1969). There will be less incentive, for 
example, for a householder to ensure doors are locked and a security 
system activated.
2.1.2 Contract failure
In some commercial contracts other than insurance, potential adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems favour profit-seeking firms. These 
inform ation asymmetries are compounded with dishonesty, difficult to 
observe quality variations and informationally weak consumers (Akerlof, 
1970; Leland, 1979; Stuart, 1981; Ben-Ner, 1986, p. 96). The producer then  
has a degree of m arket power that can be exercised for the benefit of the
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producer and the detriment of the consumer. Hansmann (1980) argues 
that in such a situation consumer welfare is increased by dealing with a 
producer who does not have the same incentives to maximise profit (p. 
844):
The nonprofit producer, like its for-profit counterpart, has the 
capacity to raise prices and cut quality . . . without much fear of 
consumer reprisal; however, it lacks the incentive to do so 
because those in charge are barred from taking home any 
resulting profits.
On this basis, contract failure is the essential factor in the role of nonprofit 
enterprise. Nonprofit organisations can be "trusted" not to exploit their 
advantage over consumers, due to legal constraints (Thompson, 1980; 
Ellman, 1982; Hansmann, 1987). Weisbrod states (1988, p. 23, emphasis in  
original):
[J]ust as there is often an advantage to doing business with a 
specific individual seller, so there can be an advantage to 
dealing with a specific kind of seller. Relationships of trust -  
"loyalty" -  are central to many of our social and economic 
relations.
This "contract failure" argument explains nonprofit organisations as a 
response to information asymmetry: the nondistribution constraint 
provides an effective means to prevent exploitation of information 
advantage (Weisbrod, 1988). Consumers "trust" the nonprofit producer 
where quality of output is difficult or costly to observe.
This information asymmetry analysis has been applied to blood banks, 
nursing homes, medicare payments, and religious organisations. 
Frequently cited are services such as education and health care (Arrow,
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1963) where the customers have inadequate information about the 
product with which to measure quality. Supporting the development of 
nonprofit service organisations is dissatisfaction with government 
provision of collective goods (Weisbrod, 1977). Government may also be 
seen as a "trustworthy" supplier of services as it shares a nonprofit 
motive, but informational problems between politicians and consumers, 
or simply incompatible political objectives, may lead to an undersupply of 
some services. This provides a niche for nonprofit organisations to 
develop alternative or additional supplies. Indeed, Badelt (1990, p. 57) 
describes the interplay of an "institutional triangle" of private market 
organisations, government organisations, and private nonprofit 
organisations. Nonprofit organisations supplement the public provision  
of collective consumption goods, and provide an alternative for private 
sector substitutes (Weisbrod, 1986, p. 30).
Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) provide evidence in a study of nursing 
homes in Wisconsin supporting the contract failure hypothesis. Under 
contract failure theory, private sector firms provide superior delivery of 
outputs which are readily monitored and enforced within a contract 
("Type I attributes"), while nonprofit organisations deviate less from 
promised quality in respect of outputs which are costly to monitor ("Type 
II attributes"). Deviations from Type I attributes are measured by 
regulatory violations, on the basis that the administrative requirements 
are formal and readily monitored minimum standards. Complaints 
lodged with regulators (other than in respect of regulatory violations) are
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taken as a proxy for deviations from Type II attributes. This proxy is 
justified on the basis that breaches of performance too costly to monitor 
would not be found in the regulations but would be detected by patients 
and family members. The results of regression analysis indicated that 
nonprofit homes have significantly fewer complaints than did the for- 
profit homes. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that for- 
profit firms do take more advantage of information asymmetry.
2.1.3 The nondistribution constraint
While the role of information asymmetry in the formation of nonprofit 
organisations is clear, reliance on the nondistribution constraint as the 
essential feature in addressing the information problems is 
unconvincing. Statements such as the following are typical (Hansmann, 
1980, p. 896):
[NJonprofits can be trusted not to exploit the advantage over 
the consumer resulting from contract failure. This trust 
derives its rational basis from the nondistribution constraint 
that characterises the nonprofit form.
Hence, nonprofit producers lack incentives to raise prices or reduce 
quality "because" of the nondistribution constraint. The nondistribution 
constraint automatically translates into a normative mandate of an 
altruistic kind, such as a "legal commitment to devote its entire earnings 
to the production of services" (Hansmann, 1980, p. 844). Easley and 
O'Hara (1983, 1986) argue, for example, that nonprofit organisations are a 
superior contracting solution to for-profit firms where the quality of the
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output cannot be costlessly observed. They view society and the firm as 
playing a non-cooperative game in which the manager maximises 
personal utility while society maximises social welfare. The 
nondistribution constraint within nonprofit organisations is consistent 
with the achievement of an optimal contract, if output cannot costlessly 
be observed (Harris and Townsend, 1981; Easley and O'Hara, 1986, pp. 89- 
90). The problem, however, is that their analysis formalises the 
nondistribution constraint by fixing the level of managerial reward to be 
independent of the state of nature. Given this definition, the absence of 
an incentive to distort information is an assumption, not a conclusion 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1986, p. 6).
The argument that the comparative advantage of nonprofit organisations 
lies in the nondistribution constraint is unsatisfactory. One problem is 
that the nondistribution constraint implies isolation from market forces, 
leading to a comparative disadvantage in terms of operating efficiency. 
Young (1986) notes that while theories explaining the existence of 
nonprofits attribute "a selfless, public spirited quality" to them (p. 161), 
economic models of nonprofit behaviour instead suggest revenue 
enhancing or other self-seeking objectives on the part of management 
(James, 1983; Pauly and Redisch, 1973; Rose-Ackerman, 1980). This is a 
problem of agency costs, discussed in section 2.2. Another difficulty is a 
confusion of cause and effect -  altruistic behaviour is assumed to derive 
from the nondistribution constraint. It is more likely, however, that the 
nondistribution constraint is a product of altruistic behaviour, which
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flows from other institutional features. The issue of altruistic behaviour 
is discussed in section 2.3.
2.2 Agency Problems____________________
In the absence of disciplining market-based incentives, financial 
economics suggests that a nonprofit organisation will suffer from 
significant shirking behaviour by managers. The nondistribution 
constraint, together with other features of nonprofit governance, insulate 
the nonprofit organisation from market forces. The governance 
structures of nonprofit organisations encourage shirking or permit 
managers to cross-subsidise goods by various ploys, deteriorating the 
quality of another (James, 1978, 1986b; James and Neuberger, 1981). 
Nonprofit operations are therefore likely to be less efficient than are for- 
profit firms (James, 1990, p. 22; Leibenstein, 1966; Steinberg, 1986).
2.2.1 Agency costs of equity and debt
A major development within the financial economics literature has been
labelled "agency theory". It examines the rights of contracting parties
within an organisation and the effects on manager and owner behaviour
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). The foundation for much agency literature
derives from Jensen and Meckling (1976), who integrate elements of
economic theories of principal-agent (Berhold, 1971; Heckerman, 1975
Ross, 1973, 1974; Wilson, 1968), property rights (Demsetz, 1967; Alchian,
1969; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and finance to develop a theory of firm
ownership structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) analyse the agency costs
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of outside equity starting with the owner-manager scenario where all of 
the firm's equity is held by a single individual. Maximising personal 
utility implies an objective other than value maximisation of the firm, 
since part of the utility flows from the consumption of "perquisites".3 If 
equity is sold to third parties, the incentive of the owner-manager would 
be to increase the consumption of perquisites since the owner-manager 
no longer bears the full cost of its impact on firm value. This incentive 
increases with the proportion of equity sold to third parties. Yet, 
assuming an efficient equity market characterised by rational expectations 
regarding the owner-manager's behaviour, potential purchasers of equity 
in the firm apply a discount. This discount is based on an expectation of 
the changed owner-manager's incentives to consume perquisites or 
otherwise shirk. This "price protection" mechanism ensures that the 
owner-manager (the agent) bears the full cost of divergence from the 
value maximisation objectives of the shareholders (the principals). In 
this situation, the owner-manager would have an incentive to restrict 
shirking behaviour, aligning personal objectives to value maximisation.
Extending this analysis to the agency costs of debt, there is a potential 
divergence between the interests of the shareholders (including the
3 Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 312) "perquisites" might indude "the physical 
appointments of the office, the attractiveness of the secretarial staff, the level of 
employee discipline, the kind and amount of charitable donations, personal relations 
with employees [and] a larger than optimal computer to play with," or as Rasmussen 
(1988, p. 399) more concisely stated, "fringe benefits, pleasant working conditions, 
nepotism, and a low managerial effort".
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manager-shareholder) and debtholders, principally arising from the legal 
privilege of limited liability. At worst, the shareholders could directly 
expropriate the wealth of the company through excessive dividend 
payments, leaving creditors with an "empty shell". The value of debt can 
also be eroded by issue of new debt at equal or higher priority (Galai and 
Masulis, 1976). Generally, an incentive of the manager-shareholder 
issuing debt is to engage in more risky investments with potentially large 
returns. The manager-shareholder would capture the benefits of a 
successful venture (since the debtholder is limited to an interest rate 
return) while the debtholder would bear most of the cost of failure. 
Shareholders can therefore be viewed as holding a European call option 
(Black and Scholes, 1973) over the value of the firm exercisable at the face 
value of the debt. Increasing the risk (variance) of the firm's investments 
leads to a higher value for this option (Merton, 1973, 1974). This can lead 
to "asset substitution" and "underinvestment" behaviour. Shareholders 
might substitute high risk for low risk projects (Myers, 1977) or reject 
positive net present value investments whose benefits would accrue 
principally to debtholders (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1985).
Again, the rational expectations of the lenders and an efficient market can 
facilitate price protection mechanisms. Potential lenders (the principals) 
will raise the price of the debt (e.g. by higher interest rates) according to 
the changed incentives of the shareholders (the agents) with respect to the 
risk and return of the firm's investments. This ensures that the 
shareholders bear the cost of a divergence from the interests of the
page 17
Chapter Two -  Nonprofit Organisations
lenders. The agents then have an incentive to write contracts that to align 
their interests with the debtholders, such as voluntarily imposing 
dividend constraints, limits on future debt issues of equal or higher 
priority, and maintenance of working capital. Smith and Warner (1979) 
demonstrate that debt covenants restrict management7s financing, 
dividend and investment decisions, consistent with an intention to lim it 
the opportunity for wealth transfers.
2.2.2 Disciplining mechanisms
While the Berle and Means (1932) thesis suggests a serious divergence 
between shareholders and management, agency theory literature 
extending Jensen and Meckling (1976) finds that the actions of 
shareholders exercising their limited rights, in conjunction with the 
sharemarket and the market for corporate control align their interests 
(Hetherington, 1969a). These disciplining mechanisms rely for their 
effectiveness on the operation of an efficient market for equity, labour, or 
corporate control. This efficiency is typically assumed (Fama, 1976). 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1983, p. 397) state:
Shareholders' interests are protected not by voting but by the 
market for stock (and the managers' need to raise new capital), 
the market for goods, and the market for managers' services. It 
would make little difference if shareholders, like bondholders, 
could not vote at all.
The disciplining effect of price protection from an efficient equity market 
on the actions of an owner-manager is analysed in Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Where, however, the manager is no longer a part owner but
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simply a professional manager with limited financial interest in the firm, 
this price protection mechanism no longer applies directly. Instead, 
management compensation plans will substitute for this discipline. Such 
plans are contracts which reward the manager based on market-related 
measures of performance, including accounting income and share 
options (Smith and Watts, 1982). Evidence of share price reactions to 
announcement of such packages suggests that they help align managers' 
and shareholders' interests (Jensen and Zimmerman, 1985). The 
incentives of managers are thereby indirectly related to the price 
protection mechanism due to the indirect relationships between bonuses, 
and accounting performance to firm value (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 
p. 203; Wong, 1988, p. 24).
Another disciplining mechanism to align managers' and shareholders' 
interests is a competitive labour market. Information on managers' 
opportunistic behaviour affects their reputation (Fama, 1980). This is 
partly based on a process of mutual monitoring of managers by other 
managers within a firm's hierarchy. The manager's future salary w ill 
reflect past performance and create an ex post settling up opportunity. 
Some argue that this scenario and that of compensation plans are 
incompatible (Holthausen, 1981; Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith, 1982). 
Others believe disciplining mechanisms can act in a complementary 
fashion (Wong, 1988, p. 25).
The market for corporate control -  the threat of a takeover or merger
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(Manne, 1965) -  acts as a disciplining mechanism "of last resort" (Fama, 
1980, p. 295). W hen alternative m anagem ent teams actively compete for 
the rights to manage corporate resources, managers have incentives to 
adhere to value-maximising strategies (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
2.2.3 Nonprofit organisations
Applying agency theory to the nonprofit organisation, the  
nondistribution constraint is inefficient since property rights are n o t 
clearly defined in respect of organisational surpluses (Weisbrod and 
Schlesinger, 1986, p. 134; De Alessi, 1980). Due to the institu tional 
restriction on profit seeking, nonprofit managers cannot capture the  
value of any improved efficiencies, so lack the incentive to ensure a level 
of efficiency comparable to the private sector (Newhouse, 1970). This 
m ight also be reflected in a general lack of sensitivity to the economic 
environm ent (Young and Finch, 1977). According to Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972):
[I]n nonprofit corporations, colleges, churches, country clubs, 
m utual savings banks, m utual insurance companies, and 
"coops', the future consequences of improved m anagem ent are 
not capitalized . . . One should, therefore, find greater shirking 
in nonprofit, mutually owned enterprises.
Nicols (1972) believes that, given the lack of supervision by shareholders, 
managers of m utual banks are unlikely to minimise costs of banking 
services. This is exacerbated where the governance structure of the  
nonprofit organisation is based on democratic principles of one-m em ber- 
one-vote and the equity is represented by the membership of natural
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persons rather than by shares. Without a tradeable share capital, 
nonprofit organisations cannot be monitored by the operation of the 
capital markets, whether by institutional investors, significant 
blockholders or by analysts. This characteristic implies that access to 
instruments for the discipline of managers that rely on a public equity, 
such as monitoring by institutional shareholders, managerial equity 
ownership, incentive contracts, share options and takeovers, is 
considerably restricted. The formation of competing control coalitions 
within nonprofit organisations is also less likely since the takeover 
mechanism is often unavailable, and a proxy fight would be more 
expensive. In many nonprofit organisations, additional voting power 
cannot be aggregated by purchase of shares, and is dispersed widely among 
individuals. On this basis, managers of nonprofit associations are said to 
be effectively self-controlling, limited only by government intervention  
(Rasmusen, 1988). Hetherington (1969b, p. 1083) states:
The practice in both property-liability and life companies 
plainly reflects the almost total nonparticipation of
policyholders in the selection of management.
These findings are supported by Kreider (1972) in respect of mutual 
insurance and banking, although disputed by Anderson (1973). Nicols 
(1967, p. 337) describes the management of one mutual savings and loan 
association as "a self-perpetuating autocracy" and documents evidence of 
widespread nepotism within the industry.
The agency problems discussed in this section provide a counter­
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argument to the assertion that the nondistribution constraint creates a 
comparative advantage for nonprofit organisations. In contrast, financial 
economics suggests that the constraint is a disadvantage in terms of 
operating efficiency. This reinforces the argument that other institutional 
features are responsible for dealing with information asymmetry, and 
with the problems of managerial motivation where the organisation is 
insulated from market forces. This leads to the issue of observed altruistic 
behaviour in nonprofit organisations, discussed in the following section.
2.3 Altruism_____________________________
The serious efficiency concerns in respect of nonprofit organisations 
outlined above prompts the question: how do nonprofit organisations 
survive in a competitive economy (Eggertsson, 1990, p. 142)? Information 
asymmetry alone provides an unsatisfying explanation for the continued 
survival of nonprofit organisations given significant problems of 
management control in some nonprofit firms (Easley and O'Hara, 1983; 
Hansmann, 1980). If market discipline is one mechanism by which 
principal-agent problems can be overcome, the issue is then which non- 
market mechanisms are suitable for the same purpose. In this section, it 
is argued that emergent within nonprofit institutions are non-market 
mechanisms to reduce shirking and promote efficiency.
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2.3.1 Social cooperation
Concepts of trust and altruism do not sit easily w ithin the self-interested 
assum ptions of the preceding agency framework. Yet as James and Rose- 
Ackerman (1986, p. 92) observe:
As in the analysis of bureaucracies and for-profit firms, agency- 
principal problems are at the heart of the analysis of NPO 
behaviour and one's evaluation of the performance of the 
sector frequently depends on whose point of view one takes. 
W hat one person views as inefficient, self-indulgent or diverse 
behaviour by NPO managers, another views as socially 
beneficial, admirably generous or a reflection of the ideological 
diversity of the population.
The argum ent that the social interactions within nonprofit organisations 
prom ote cooperative behaviour is supported by some economists. Arrow 
(1971, 1973, 1974) has consistently argued that trust has an im portant 
bearing on economic organisation. "Invisible institutions" of ethics and 
morality support collective action and the allocation of resources through 
non-m arket methods. The fact that individuals cannot mediate all their 
interactions with others through prices makes it essential that they have a 
"conscience", or a feeling of responsibility for the effect of their actions on 
others (Arrow, 1974, pp. 26-27). Altruism is therefore inherent w ith in  
much observed economic behaviour (Collard, 1978), such as through 
widespread traits of pride in work and organisational loyalty (Simon, 
1991). Behavioural norms or ethical rules are essential in constraining 
opportunism  and "lubricating" social and economic systems (Noreen, 
1988).
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One theory of altruistic behaviour is that of social distance. Altruistic 
behaviour is more likely between "kin" than others in society, suggesting 
a genetic imperative or "selfish gene" explanation (Dawkins, 1976; 
Trivers, 1971; Kropotkin, 1972). More generally it has been recognised that 
beyond families, human beings develop complex social relationships with  
colleagues and neighbours such that allowances are made for how their 
own economic behaviour will affect these others and affect the state of the 
social relationship (Becker, 1974, 1976; Hirshleifer, 1977). Collard (1978, pp. 
13-15) argues that altruism facilitates cooperative or collective economic 
behaviour. Based on a prisoner's dilemma analysis, spontaneous 
cooperation is found to be more likely: the more altruistic the players; the 
smaller the number of players (Schumacher, 1974); the greater the 
advantage of cooperation relative to defection; and the greater the 
marginal impact of the individual (Collard, 1978, pp. 36-45). Importantly, 
it is more likely that voluntary social cooperation will exist in a smaller 
community than a larger community, supported by social relationships 
and the scope for applying the "stick" of social pressure (Weisbrod, 1988, p. 
28; McKean, 1975, p. 35; Buchanan, 1965). Continuing exchanges are 
overlaid with social content, generating strong expectations of trust and 
attenuating opportunism (Granovetter, 1985, p. 490).
Social learning provides an understanding of both skills and "proper 
behaviours". Nurturing of these behaviours and the cultivation of an 
acceptance of social norms leads to an exploitation of altruism which can 
be manifest in loyalties to organisations and organisational goals wholly
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disproportionate to the material rewards individuals receive (Simon, 
1990). Such social norms, however, do not "reinforce" (Hansmann, 1980, 
p. 875) the nondistribution constraint. Instead, the absence of a profit 
making incentive flows from the social norms otherwise embedded in  
the institution. Altruism also explains apparently "inefficient" forms of 
governance within a range of nonprofit organisations. Collard (1978) 
notes that a feature of altruistic behaviour is the development of a social 
contract to compel adoption of cooperative strategies, typically based on 
majority voting within a democratic system of community governance 
(pp. 15-16). This social contract can be seen as based on widespread 
agreement on the desirability of everyday decisions using this decision 
process, given an expectation of the preference patterns of other 
individuals (Arrow, 1951, pp. 90-91).
2.3.2 M anagerial m otivation
The social norms generated within the nonprofit organisation are also 
important in motivating management in the absence of pecuniary forms 
of reward linked, for example, to capital markets. Instead, non-market 
mechanisms can be used as alternative sources of incentives and 
sanctions for members of nonprofit organisations. Where workers in a 
nonprofit organisation can participate in the successful achievement of 
charitable or public objectives, they will be motivated by a mutual interest 
in the collective result (Ricketts, 1994, pp. 308-309).
If managers of nonprofit organisations derive relatively greater personal
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satisfaction than private sector counterparts from the achievement of 
social objectives, there may be sufficient incentive to pursue efficiencies 
in the absence of market-based economic rewards and disciplining 
mechanisms comparable to the private sector (Weisbrod, 1988, p. 23). 
Indeed, a nonprofit organisation will have a comparative advantage in 
provision of nonpecuniary rewards; it may place a higher value on  
embedded characteristics, such as honesty, than a for-profit firm. This 
assumes a heterogeneous distribution of motivating preferences amongst 
potential managers, with some placing a higher value on nonpecuniary 
rewards than others (Weisbrod and Schlesinger, 1986).
On this basis, nonprofit organisations will screen for a particular type of 
person ("managerial sorting": Weisbrod, 1988) who gains satisfaction 
from the achievement of the organisation's objectives and the provision  
of services of high quality. Support for this hypothesis is found in  
psychological studies of graduates of Vanderbilt University entering the 
for-profit and nonprofit sectors (Rawls, Ullrich and Nelson, 1975). 
Significant differences were consistently found in personality traits, 
values and behaviour, but not in problem solving ability, intelligence or 
creativity. Similar evidence of screening is found in studies of law school 
graduates entering proprietary or "public interest" firms. Those working 
for the public interest firms were earning less than they would in private 
practice (and were aware of it), yet were significantly more satisfied with  
their career choices than private sector counterparts. Their satisfaction 
was based on the attractiveness of the social objectives within their work
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(Weisbrod, 1983).
2.3.3 Ethical and mutual nonprofit organisations
Altruistic social norms within nonprofit organisations, in preference to 
the nondistribution constraint, directly address information asymmetries 
and provide scope for nonpecuniary forms of reward to motivate 
managers in the absence of market-based incentives. The institutional 
features by which these social norms, or relationships of trust, are created 
vary across different types of nonprofit organisation. An attempt, 
however, to apply a general rule to all forms of nonprofit organisation 
would be inappropriate, given the wide range of organisations which  
might be identified under this heading. Part of the problem is an undue 
emphasis on the nondistribution constraint as the essential feature.
At this point, it is useful to divide nonprofit institutions into two broad 
categories that, for the sake of convenience, are labelled "ethical" and 
"mutual". The former category is characterised by a membership with  
strongly embedded social norms or the explicit founding of the 
organisation to serve particular social objectives. James and Rose- 
Ackerman (1986, pp. 50-62) emphasise that one factor crucial to the 
formation and existence of nonprofit organisations was "ideology", beliefs 
motivating behaviour in the absence of pecuniary rewards. Studies of 
social service industry managers in the United States suggest that 
nonprofit organisations are founded to pursue nonpecuniary goals, such 
as the provision of services rather than profitability (Young, 1983;
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Legoretta and Young, 1986). International studies conclude that nonprofit 
organisations are typically "ideological" organisations, in the sense of 
religious or political groups (James, 1982, 1984, 1987). Religious groups in 
particular often provide organisational ability, venture capital, and 
volunteer labour. The ethics underpinning these organisations provide a 
comparative advantage in the provision of services where for-profit firms 
might exploit informationally weak consumers, such as in the case of 
nursing homes. The belief system embedded in the institution's values 
also provides nonpecuniary rewards to individuals who identify with the 
organisation's objectives. Empirical findings that religious and 
government affiliated nursing homes had fewer regulatory violations 
than other nonprofit providers, and no more violations than for-profit 
counterparts, suggest that religious and government managers are less 
motivated by financial incentives (Weisbrod and Schlesinger, 1986, 
pp. 142-143).
The latter category of "mutual" nonprofit organisations is of principal 
interest to the issue of credit unions. Mutual institutions can be 
identified more closely with problems of information asymmetry, given  
the explicit integration of producer and consumer interests. In this 
situation, the "trust" between consumer and nonprofit producer does not 
flow from a nondistribution constraint or directly from an embedded 
ethical system, but by a coalition of interest (Ben-Ner, 1986, p. 94):
If the [producer and consumer] are integrated . . . the
antagonistic relations between them will be eliminated, all
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gains are internalized, and the incentives to withhold  
information and exploit special advantages disappear. The 
integrating party obtains information that cannot be
transmitted on the anonymous market and requires the 
organization to maximise joint surplus.
As Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986, p. 147) observe, trust is an 
informational phenomenon. Trust between organisational members is 
likely to yield significant informational benefits both to individuals and 
to an organisation as a whole (Ross, 1994). Ben-Ner (1986) argues that the 
benefit of mutual nonprofit organisations can be found in the 
inducement of consumer demand revelation and the elimination of the 
incentive to exploit informational advantage. This implies a comparative 
advantage for the mutual nonprofit organisation where information 
asymmetry problems are severe. The consumer forms a social 
relationship with the producer through the nonprofit institution, which 
prevents the destruction of community through the intervention of the 
market.
The costs of formation and operation of a mutual nonprofit organisation
are reduced by a correlation between the consumers' interest in the
institution and their residential, cultural, ethnic, religious or political
backgrounds. In turn, this affinity generates social cohesion, which
enhances demand revelation and voluntary contributions (Ben-Ner, 1986,
p. 108). The smaller the size of this group the more feasible this
mechanism becomes (Olson, 1971; Groves and Ledyard, 1977). Mutual
nonprofit organisations are therefore more likely to be formed where the
output has public good characteristics, and where the output is localised
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within a community. This reinforces the community of interest between 
the potential members of the organisation, consistent with the earlier 
discussion of voluntary social cooperation. Managerial motivation  
derives from the enhancement of the interests of this local community, 
based on the expectation that managers are more likely to be selected from 
this same group of consumers.
The following section draws on transaction cost economics to support this 
theoretical interpretation of mutual nonprofit organisations, using the 
analogy of non-market governance arrangements as a mechanism for 
dealing with questions of information asymmetry.
2.4 Transaction Cost Economics__________
The previous section argues that mutuality, rather than a nondistribution 
constraint, is the essential characteristic of nonprofit organisations where 
the organisation emerges in response to information asymmetries 
between producer and consumer. Mutual organisations, such as a credit 
union, integrate producer and consumer interests. Credit unions as 
mutual financial institutions are discussed in Chapter Three. This section 
analyses mutual nonprofit organisations from the perspective of 
transaction costs economics, a subset of "neoinstitutionalism" or the 
"New Institutional Economics", and finds support for the arguments 
presented in the section 2.3.
Neoinstitutionalism draws on microeconomic theory, economic history, 
property rights theory and a focus on transactions as the basic unit of
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analysis to study organisations (Williamson, 1975, 1985; see also A lchian 
and Demsetz, 1972, 1973; Arrow, 1974; Davis and North, 1971; Ward, 1971), 
and has its origins in pioneering work by Commons (1934), Coase (1937) 
and Hayek (1945). These authors emphasise the facilitation of collective 
action through institutions, the substitution of m arket contracts w ith  
em ploym ent relationships, and the effect of bounded rationality -  lim its 
on hum an decision making due to lack of complete information. In 
particular, economic man acts "w ithin constraints imposed by real 
institutions" (Coase, 1984, p. 231).
2.4.1 Transaction costs and contracting
Transaction costs are regarded as the economic equivalence of friction in  
physical systems (Williamson, 1985, p. 19). Transaction costs include costs 
that are incurred in preparing and monitoring economic transactions. 
Differences in these transaction costs determine institutional choices. 
W here there are no transaction costs, there is no need for a form of 
organisation. Ex ante contracting costs include drafting, negotiating, and 
safeguarding an agreement. Ex post contracting costs include costs of 
haggling over bilateral negotiations to correct m isalignments of interest; 
set-up and maintenance costs of a governance structure; and bonding 
costs of effecting secure commitments. These ex post costs are seen by 
Williamson (1985, p. 21, fn. 12) as related to, but distinct from, agency costs 
in the Jensen and Meckling (1976) sense. W illiamson (1985, p. 27) notes 
that the assumptions of price protection within agency theory suggest a
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contracting view which emphasises ex ante incentive alignments with  
little uncertainty about future contingencies. Uncertainty generates costs 
in contracting due to the need to provide for complex factual 
contingencies and due to the scope of opportunistic behaviour w hen  
unplanned contingencies occur. Both kinds of costs are interrelated and 
need to be addressed simultaneously within any contracting situation, 
and are compared on the basis of relative costs of institutional forms. 
Transaction cost economics adds to ownership (property rights) and 
incentive alignment (agency) perspectives the proposition that ex post  
support institutions of contract matter (Williamson, 1985, p. 29).
Williamson (1985, pp. 30-32) discusses three essential factors from which  
an optimal contracting approach can be derived. These are bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity. Bounded rationality refers 
to human behaviour that is "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" 
(Williamson, 1975, p. 21; Simon, 1957, 1961, p. xxiv). Bounded rationality 
includes biological limits on human understanding and language 
difficulties, which becomes important under conditions of uncertainty or 
complexity (Ricketts, 1991). The implication for contracting is that, where 
bounded rationality is combined with uncertainty or complexity, a set of 
contingent expectations cannot be specified ex ante. One implication is 
that using internal organisation to deal with uncertainty allows for 
adaptive, sequential decision processes which economise on bounded 
rationality (Williamson, 1975, p. 25).
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Opportunism is self-interested behaviour with guile, in making "false or 
empty, that is, self-disbelieved, threats and promises" in the expectation of 
individual advantage (Williamson, 1975, p. 26; Goffman, 1969, p. 105). 
Combined with small numbers relationships (the absence of a set of 
competitive bidders) the problem of bilateral monopoly negotiations is 
confronted. While it is in the interests of each party to seek favourable 
terms through representations and negotiation, the interests of the system 
as a whole are promoted if the parties can be joined to avoid the 
bargaining costs generated (Williamson, 1975, p. 27).
Asset specificity relates to idiosyncratic attributes of transactions such as 
investments in durable, transaction-specific assets which generate "lock 
in" effects by geographical location or dependence of demand by particular 
customers (Williamson, 1991, p. 281). Assets are seen as specific if they 
exhibit non-redeploy able or non-salvageable characteristics. Such 
idiosyncratic exchange is, however, not limited to specific physical assets, 
but includes investments in human capital or embedded skills developed 
from personal knowledge generated through learning-by-doing (Polanyi, 
1969; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The importance of asset specificity is that, 
while there may be a large number of bidders at the initial contract stage, 
the winner of the original contract obtains an advantage which upsets 
bidding parity at the contract renewal stage, leading to ex post contracting 
strains (Williamson, 1971, p. 116). The implication is that the identity of 
the parties to a particular transaction matters due to the continuity of the 
relationship implied by specificity (Williamson, 1985, p. 55).
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Given a situation of uncertainty, the presence or absence of these three 
factors indicates a particular form of contracting. The absence of bounded 
rationality permits a contract to be struck which ex ante resolves all 
contingencies and for which court adjudication will be efficacious 
(Baiman, 1982, p. 168). The absence of opportunism facilitates reliance on 
contractual promises that prohibit strategic behaviour. The absence of 
asset specificity implies that parties have no continuing interest in the 
identity of each other, and competitive forces permit discrete market 
based contracting. Where all three factors are present, these devices fail 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 32):
Planning is necessarily incomplete (because of bounded 
rationality), promise predictably breaks down (because of 
opportunism), and the pairwise identity of the parties now  
matters (because of asset specificity).
Based on this framework, Williamson (1985, p. 32) believes that the 
organisational imperative for governance is to:
Organize transactions so as to economize on bounded 
rationality while simultaneously safeguarding them against the 
hazards of opportunism.
2.4.2 Information impactedness
When bounded rationality and opportunism are combined with  
environmental conditions of complexity, uncertainty, recurrence of 
transactions and asset specificity, a degree of market failure results. In the 
presence of severe transaction costs, markets may be less effective than 
alternative contractual arrangements including forms of internal non­
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market governance, such as vertical integration or a bureaucratic 
hierarchy. This contracting framework is a useful context in which to 
analyse mutual nonprofit organisations. Transaction costs essentially 
represent information asymmetry problems, which are overcome by 
shifting institutional arrangements in favour of non-market 
mechanisms. Transaction cost economics has affinity to questions of 
information asymmetry posed by the nonprofit literature, although the 
former considers information problems within transactions more 
broadly. The nonprofit literature, by contrast, emphasises informational 
uncertainty in respect of the characteristics of commodities (Badelt, 1990, 
p. 59).
Williamson (1975) describes the Arrow (1969) and Akerlof (1970) concerns 
regarding adverse selection and moral hazard as an "information 
impactedness" problem. In particular, the adverse selection problem 
corresponds to ex ante information impactedness, while moral hazard 
constitutes ex -post information impactedness (Williamson, 1975, p. 34). 
The problem of opportunism is posed not by asymmetry alone but by 
asymmetry combined with a high cost for obtaining information parity, 
and the scope of opportunism. The distribution of information becomes 
important in a small numbers bargaining situation. Even where initial 
information sets are equal, an opportunistic representation of fact poses 
information problems if the other party must bear a significant cost to 
confirm the veracity of the representation. Opportunism therefore 
requires assumptions both of information asymmetry and of bounded
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rationality.
The question of institutional form is resolved by the development of an 
appropriate internal organisation (governance structure) which  
attenuates incentives for opportunism. A consequence of increasingly 
severe information impactedness is the emergence of a unified structure 
that removes the governance of the transaction from the market and 
places it within one organisation. This aspect of Williamson's analysis 
accords with the argument that information asymmetry prompts the 
formation of nonprofit organisations, consistent with the approach of 
Ben-Ner (1986, pp. 14-20), who described nonprofit organisations as a form 
of "backwards integration" by consumers. Such behaviour is akin to 
producers who engage in vertical integration to overcome transaction 
costs. Nonprofit firms reduce the tensions between producer and 
consumer otherwise found in the marketplace. Successive repetition and 
adaptation of contracts between buyer and seller fosters development of 
institutional and personal trust relationships. Individuals involved at 
the interface of an unfolding contractual relationship can hold a personal 
and organisational stake in the joint outcome. Idiosyncratic exchange 
relations will survive stress and display adaptability where personal trust 
is a feature (Williamson, 1985, pp. 62-63):
Where personal integrity is believed to be optimal, individuals 
located at the interfaces may refuse to be part of opportunistic 
efforts to take advantage of (rely on) the letter of the contract 
when the spirit of the exchange is emasculated.
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Krashinsky4 (1986, pp. 166-117) notes that transaction costs also exist 
among consumers wishing to monitor producer output quality, since this 
inform ation has public good characteristics, leading to "free rider" 
problems. Nonprofit firms address transaction costs by encouraging direct 
participation by customers in decision-making and overview, and by 
gathering consumers into organisations emphasising com m unity and 
responsibility. These social pressures reduce free rider problems.
2.4.3 Advantages of internal organisation
Internal organisation, such as exists in the case of m utual nonprofit 
organisations, can be seen as advantageous in attenuating incentives to 
behave opportunistically, and in facilitating internal audit and dispute 
resolution. The formation of a m utual nonprofit organisation is sim ilar 
to the form ation of a "peer group" in W illiamson's (1975) analysis. In 
particular, a peer group will provide an advantage over the m arket 
through lim itation of membership in a discriminating way. This 
mitigates ex ante adverse selection problems and provides scope for 
application of social pressures and experience rating to attenuate ex post 
opportunism  (Williamson, 1975, p. 43). Benefits of association accrue 
through increased productivity among members of a group w ith a sense 
of responsibility, engendered by an involvem ent with other members of
4 Krashinsky (1986) also suggests that a blanket prohibition against distribution of 
profits reduces transaction costs by providing a “standard form contract" enforceable 
by the state. This explanation relies on the nondistribution constraint, hence is
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the group. Relationships characterised by confidence, proximity and 
friendship imply low transaction costs.
The importance of "trust" to nonprofit organisations, as discussed in 
section 2.3.1, is analogous to the role of "atmosphere" highlighted by 
Williamson (1975, pp. 37-39). The social contexts in which transactions 
are embedded have a bearing on transaction costs. Individuals' concern 
for a "satisfying exchange relation" becomes part of the economic problem 
where the exchange process itself is regarded as valuable. Market 
exchange encourages calculative relationships with respect to 
transactions, while internal organisation makes allowance for "quasi­
moral involvements" (p. 38) among the parties, such as through 
perceived reciprocity (Gouldner, 1961). Altruism therefore economises on  
the transaction costs involved in policing and enforcing agreements 
(Hirshleifer, 1977, p. 28).
Altruism is important for relationships within the group and the 
mitigation of information asymmetry problems. Williamson (1974, pp. 
149-150) notes the importance of obtaining a value consensus from social 
interaction within groups. This value consensus is due to the combined 
effects of a screening-selection procedure with a socialisation process. The 
screening-selection process occurs bilaterally given the search by 
organisations for compatible members and members for organisations 
with compatible values. Groups engaged in common or integrated tasks
unsatisfactory for the same reasons presented in earlier discussion.
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will know the requisite attributes to screen for and monitor, as an 
associated activity to their work. Screening suggests that internal 
organisation will be superior to markets in experience rating behaviour, 
which addresses ex ante information impactedness (Williamson, 1975, p. 
36). Socialisation is a process by which the major values of the group are 
internalised by its individual members. Socialisation, particularly in 
respect of organisational goals, values and history, plays a central role in 
the social learning process (Chao et al., 1994; Schein, 1968; Fischer, 1986; 
Feldman, 1981). This also addresses ex post information impactedness by 
reducing the incentive for opportunism. The inculcation of social norms 
will enhance the strength of organisational loyalty and identification with 
group values (Simon, 1991, p. 36). While property rights and agency 
theorists focus on post-contractual monitoring and pre-contractual 
incentives (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b), this analysis stresses the search for and 
screening of potential agents, and expenditure by the principal on 
socialising the agent so that the agent's personal preferences are closer to 
the principal's. This is consistent with new institutional economists, who 
have stressed the importance of screening, selection and socialisation 
mechanisms in the explanation of institutional forms (Stephen and 
Gillanders, 1993).
Screening and selection processes imply heterogenous distribution of 
preferences for non-market forms of reward. Generally, this suggests that 
cooperative arrangements and more market-oriented organisations will
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co-exist due to the diversity in values held by individuals th roughou t 
society (Williamson, 1975, p. 45):
Other things being equal, peer groups (or other internal modes) 
will presumably be organized by those individuals who find 
m arket transactions less satisfying than a nonm arket 
relationship, while markets will be favoured by those w ho 
prefer a more exacting, transaction-specific correspondence 
between rewards and deeds. Thus, given diversity of tastes for 
involvem ent relations, neither mode need fully displace the 
other, but both modes will coexist and each will appeal 
selectively to that part of the population to whose in v o lv em en t 
tastes it most nearly corresponds, ceteris paribus.
Value consensus within the organisation is a means by w hich 
inform ational problems are overcome. The socialised value systems are 
means by which uncertainty is reduced, inform ation flows are 
encouraged, and economic coordination enhanced. Boland (1979) states 
that one of the roles institutions play is to create knowledge and 
information for the individual decision-maker. In particular, institu tions 
generate social knowledge needed for interaction with other ind iv iduals 
(p. 963). Social institutions serve to solve social problems by
circumscribing the expectations of the behaviour of others, in particular 
by discouraging undesirable behaviour. The m utual nonprofit
institution, by engaging in both ex ante selection and ex post socialisation, 
addresses information asymmetry and attenuates potential opportunism.
Nilsson (1996) argues that transaction costs decrease in the presence of 
cooperative principles and values. The importance of these values, or 
ethical norms held by the members, is in the coordination of otherw ise 
incompatible interests and goals amongst the membership. The presence
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of these values indicates a commonality of purpose acquired through 
history, recruitment and socialisation. A specific cooperative 
organisational culture is therefore valuable in operating the enterprise for 
the benefit of the membership. The values of the organisation and their 
entrenchment and selection processes provide a degree of homogeneity, 
which facilitates information flows through the organisation. Members' 
values should be homogeneous in respect of matters leading to easier 
communication and coordination (Nilsson, 1996, p. 639):
Communications between members will be better, the goal- 
formulation process will run more smoothly, management of 
the business will be improved, goals will become more precise, 
and so on.
Newman (1976) discusses the supply of information through institutional 
structures themselves, and the potential for institutional information to 
substitute for market supplied information, in his view, institutional 
structures generate information by limiting individuals in their decision 
making. This follows from the sociological constraints and behavioural 
expectations of a particular institutional arrangement (p. 476).
Institutional information might be more attractive than market 
information since it is normally cheaper and specifies behaviour directly. 
Market information requires transformation through rational decision 
processes. Indeed, information carried by non-market, informal channels, 
such as within the labour market (Rees, 1966), or institutional 
information may be regarded as more reliable by the recipient. According 
to Newman (1976, p. 485), this perspective permits a variety of
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purportedly irrational decision making behaviour (from the neoclassical 
tradition) to be explained as a rational choice between institutional and 
market-based information.
2.5 Summary____________________________
The major issue discussed in this chapter is whether the essential feature 
of the credit union is its status as a nonprofit organisation. The literature 
on nonprofit organisations asserts that the nondistribution constraint is 
the important institutional feature to overcome problems of asymmetric 
information between producer and consumer. Nonprofits can be 
"trusted" not to exploit their advantage over consumers. This approach is 
unsatisfactory, particularly given the lack of a theoretical elaboration on  
the connection between this constitutional limitation and the assumed 
altruistic behaviour by members of the organisation. By way of contrast, 
agency theory suggests that, due to the nondistribution constraint and 
other governance features of nonprofit organisations, market-based 
disciplining mechanisms are ineffective. Nonprofit organisations would  
therefore be less efficient and suffer from significant problems of 
managerial motivation.
The more important aspects of nonprofit organisations lie in altruistic 
social norms, and the development of trust relationships amongst 
members of the organisation. These social norms provide informational 
advantages through encouragement of cooperation and the basis for 
nonpecuniary forms of reward for managers. This implies a pattern of
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screening and socialisation as an element of m embership structure and 
m anager selection. In turn, the institutional basis for the social norm s 
can be divided into two categories of organisation -  "ethical" and 
"m utual", where embedded ideologies or integration of producer and 
consum er interests, respectively, are dominant. Of importance to this 
thesis is the comparative advantage of m utual nonprofit organisations 
(such as credit unions) in the community of interest between producers 
and consumers that addresses information asymmetries. This analysis is 
supported by analogy to transaction cost economics, which argues that 
non-m arket contractual arrangements, such as internal organisation of 
transactions, are rational responses to information impactedness. 
Adverse selection (ex ante impactedness) and moral hazard (ex post  
impactedness) problems are addressed within the m utual nonprofit 
organisation by, respectively, screening-selection and socialisation 
processes in respect of both members and managers.
The essential feature of the credit union is unlikely to be its nonprofit 
status, but its m utual membership and governance structure, for w hich 
any nondistribution constraint will be incidental. M utual nonprofit 
organisations will be more likely to have a comparative advantage over 
for-profit firms under the following conditions:
• significant problems of information asymmetry w ould 
otherwise exist between producer and consumer;
• the product generates positive externalities, which are m ore
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likely to be localised within a community;
• members of the organisation have a social connection th rough  
residential, cultural, religious or other affiliation;
• the organisation engages in screening-selection and 
socialisation processes for its members and managers;
• the organisation is small; and
• the organisation subscribes to cooperative social norms.
The following chapter applies this framework to the phenom enon of 
m utual financial institutions, of which credit unions are a dom inan t 
subset, to analyse the areas of comparative advantage for these 
organisations in executing financial intermediation.
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Chapter Three 
Financial Mutuals
In analysing the economics of credit unions, the previous chapter 
examined whether the nondistribution constraint is the essential 
institutional feature. It was argued, however, that mutuality is the more 
important element of the structure of nonprofit organisations, emerging 
in response to information asymmetries between producer and 
consumer. Such organisations have comparative informational 
advantages over private producers under certain conditions.
This chapter critically reviews the economic literature in respect of 
mutual financial institutions or "financial mutuals" -  a term used widely 
to describe mutual organisations that specialise in financial
intermediation and provision of insurance services. Mutual associations 
are significant within the insurance and banking industries (Hansmann, 
1985). In Australia, credit unions form a dominant subset of financial 
mutuals. The United States has a broader range of mutual financial 
institutions including mutual savings banks, savings and loans, and 
insurance funds. Most of the economic literature, particularly empirical 
studies, has analysed these American institutions.
One conventional approach is to view financial mutuals, prima facie, as
inefficient relative to shareholder-owned companies. Mutual ownership
and governance structures impede a specialisation in risk bearing and the
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harnessing of market forces to align managers' interests with those of the
members to promote efficiency. These arguments are similar to the
agency problems discussed in section 2.2. Under this view, mutual
institutions survive in a competitive market only due to special
privileges and exemptions provided by government, or by agency control
mechanisms in the form of redeemable member claims (Fama and
Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). As a policy matter, conversion from m utual
ownership to shareholder ownership is seen as inherently desirable to
promote risk-bearing efficiency.
This conventional approach is unsatisfactory. This chapter argues that 
financial mutuals principally address severe information asymmetry 
problems within financial intermediation and insurance markets. This 
claim is presented from two perspectives. One is based on agency theory, 
in which the mutual form of ownership eliminates conflicts between 
depositors/policyholders and shareholders, addressing shareholder- 
debtholder agency problems. The other perspective is informational. 
Within insurance and credit markets, the mutual ownership structure 
ameliorates problems of adverse selection and moral hazard through 
screening and monitoring mechanisms.
The economic literature specifically dealing with credit unions is 
appraised within the context of this informational perspective. A 
problem with studies of credit union behaviour has been vagueness about 
organisational objectives. This ignorance of what credit unions do, or 
should, maximise, leads to crude empirical approaches. Benefits of credit
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union membership, for example, are seen merely as differential rates of
return on saving and borrowing relative to private financial institutions.
An alternative approach is presented which focuses on the institutional
characteristics of mutuality, and particularly the common bond of
association.
3.1 Agency Perspective__________________
Given the absence of market disciplinary mechanisms, manager-member 
agency problems are likely to be severe, creating inefficiencies. Although  
alternative mechanisms to address agency problems are proposed by Fama 
and Jensen (1983a, 1983b), particularly redeemable member claims, this 
explanation of the existence of mutual organisations is unconvincing. 
More important, from an agency perspective, is the amelioration of the 
agency problems of debt, through integration of owner and depositor 
interests. A related argument is that manager risk-aversion, a serious 
agency "problem" for profit-oriented corporations, may be appropriate for 
prudent management of a financial mutual.
3.1.1 Assumed inefficiencies
Managers of shareholder-owned organisations are expected to have  
"highly efficient" incentives given the disciplining effects of the market 
for financial services, the firm's internal labour market and ultimately the 
takeover mechanism. As discussed in Chapter Two, the manager of a 
mutual organisation is unlikely to be disciplined in this way. The 
consumption of perquisites by mutual managers was not limited by
page 47
Chapter Three -  Financial Mutuals 
market-based disciplinary processes. Mutuals are unable to use the share
price as a means to contract with the manager to align incentives. Instead,
depositors may only have access to accounting information to instruct
them on past performance. This information might be unreliable,
deliberately misleading, or simply too difficult to understand.
The failure to define property rights with clarity is assumed to lead to 
economic inefficiencies (O'Hara, 1981). Rasmusen (1988) argues that 
managers of mutual banks (credit unions and savings and loan 
associations) are effectively self-controlling, limited only by government 
intervention. The conclusion is that these organisations are inevitably 
inefficient (p. 396):
Since the managers of a mutual cannot be punished by 
stockholders, they are unlikely to minimise the cost of banking 
services.
Under this view, mutual institutions should not survive in a 
competitive market, given assumed processes of natural selection. Som e 
property rights literature speculates that, given these inefficiencies, 
nonprofits can survive only under privileges from the state, such as tax 
exemptions and subsidies (direct and indirect), or statutory restrictions 
against free entry and exit (O'Hara, 1981, pp. 331-332). Removal of these 
privileges would lead to the demise of mutual organisation in particular 
sectors (Hansmann, 1990, p. 66). More pertinent is the observation that 
mutuals may have an advantage in that services can be provided more 
cheaply than comparable private or public organisations, due to 
contributions of volunteer workers (Rudney, 1987)
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and lower paid labour (Borjas, Freeh and Ginsberg, 1983). These latter
explanations are also consistent with the cooperative nature of the
mutual and the existence of embedded social norms.
3.1.2 Separation of management and control
Agency theory has been extended to organisational forms beyond that of 
the shareholder-centred corporation. Assuming a competitive 
environment, only those organisations that are able to address agency 
problems at lower cost should survive. Agency theory seeks to explain 
the survival of organisations other than market-disciplined shareholder 
corporations, through the effectiveness of internal decision structures in  
ameliorating agency divergences between managers and owners. Special 
features of different organisational forms emerge as efficient approaches 
to controlling agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983b, p. 328).
Fama and Jensen (1983a) draw a distinction between decision 
management  (the initiation and implementation of decisions) and 
decision control (the ratification and monitoring of decisions and decision 
agents). Control of agency problems implies that separation of residual 
risk from decision management leads to decision systems that separate 
decision management from decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, pp. 
303-304). This characteristic is not restricted to companies with a share 
capital and clear specialisation of risk bearing functions, but to all 
organisations where the decision-makers do not bear a major share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions. These include open corporations, large
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professional partnerships, financial mutuals and nonprofit organisations.
This separation explains the survival of these organisations in
competitive markets.
According to Fama and Jensen (1983a, pp. 310-311) three major 
mechanisms exist for implementing this separation. One type of 
mechanism is a decision hierarchy, where higher level agents ratify and 
monitor the decisions of lower level agents, making it difficult for 
individuals to take advantage of the residual claimants. Such hierarchies 
are supported by control devices such as accounting and budgeting 
systems. This mechanism is related to Williamson's (1975) concept of 
governance through bureaucratic hierarchy. A second mechanism is 
mutual monitoring. This draws upon less formal sources of information 
by agents whose interests lie in use of the information to enhance the 
value of their own human capital. Mutual monitoring represents an 
internal labour market (Fama, 1980). Agents have an incentive to 
enhance the internal reward system as it reduces the uncertainty of 
returns from their efforts. Incentive structures encourage mutual 
monitoring by decision agents.
A third mechanism is the board of directors, acting at the apex of the 
decision control system. Exercise of powers in respect of the most senior 
managers ensures a separation of decision management and control. 
Agency literature argues that outside directors perform an important 
monitoring function (Fama, 1980). This is consistently confirmed by a 
number of empirical studies (e.g. Weisbach, 1988; Rosenstein and Wyatt,
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1990; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan and Davidson,
1992; Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994).
3.1.3 Advantages of the financial mutual
One important aspect of the financial mutual in terms of separating 
decision management and control is that member claims are redeemable 
on demand for an amount of compensation based on a predetermined 
valuation rule. The member of a mutual savings bank may redeem a 
membership interest by withdrawing deposited funds together with  
accumulated interest or dividends. (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p. 317):
The decision of the claim holder to withdraw resources is a 
form of partial takeover or liquidation which deprives 
management of control over assets.
The redeemable claim is described as fulfilling a "control function" (1983b, 
p. 337) analogous to the market for corporate control. This "control 
right", however, can be exercised without a proxy fight, a tender offer, or 
other form of takeover bid (1983a, p. 317). This suggests a self-help device 
available to discipline management through the product market -  the 
right of a customer to purchase services elsewhere.
The other important element is the board of directors. The argument is 
that the use of outside directors is a substitute control mechanism in  
mutual organisations. Combined with Williamson's (1983) hypothesis 
that board composition in part will be determined by the presence (or 
absence) of other governance mechanisms, studies have been made of a 
"substitution hypothesis" that the relative importance of outside directors
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is greater for mutuals. Ownership structure and board composition are 
therefore strategic complements (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Mutuals 
will appoint more outside directors than shareholder companies. This is 
confirmed empirically by Mayers, Shivdasani and Smith (1997) in a study 
of the insurance industry. They find that: mutual insurance firms 
employ more outside directors than shareholder companies; firms 
changing between shareholder and mutual characteristics adjust board 
composition; mutual by-laws more frequently stipulate participation of 
outside directors; and mutuals with more outside directors incur 
relatively lower expenses.
The monitoring role of outside directors, however, appears in Fama and 
Jensen's analysis to be less important than the control right found in the 
liquidation of member claims (1983a, p. 318, emphasis added):
Because of the strong form of diffuse decision control inherent 
in the redeemable residual claims of financial mutuals, 
however, their boards are less important in the control process 
than the boards of open nonfinancial corporations.
It follows that the role of the board is principally for monitoring of agency 
problems against which liquidation of member claims are little protection 
such as "fraud or outright theft of assets by internal agents" (1983a, p. 318).
Fama and Jensen believe that specialisation of ownership structures can 
also be explained by portfolio considerations. Redeemable claims, if based 
on a marketable portfolio, can rely on capital markets for valuation. 
Organisation-specific assets with problems of valuation need to rely on a 
secondary market, such as the sharemarket, for valuation of residual
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claims. According to Fama and Jensen, this explains why some financial
organisations are mutuals and others are open corporations. Mutual
organisations will manage portfolios of financial assets whereas corporate
financial organisations require organisation-specific assets that are
expensive to trade, generate uncertain future net cash flows, and are not
easily priced. This requires residual claims to be defined and vested in
specialist risk bearing capital (1983b, p. 339):
The primary assets of commercial banks are short-term loans. 
Granting and renewing these loans involves monitoring the 
borrowers and certifying credit worthiness -  a service for which 
the borrowers pay. The capital value of the stochastic net cash 
flows from services to depositors and borrowers would not 
easily be captured in the internal pricing rule of a redeemable 
residual claim.
Under this view, commercial banking survives with an open corporation 
structure since redemption of depositor claims can be met by purchases 
and sales of bonds. Importantly, it is assumed that the residual claim 
holders are not depositors, since internal valuation of the uncertain cash 
flows from intermediation activities would be difficult. Instead, the 
residual rights are assigned to shareholders, whose claims are not 
redeemable. This leads to development of a secondary market for shares 
as the means of valuation (Fama and Jensen, 1983b, p. 347):
Redeemable claims are a high cost mechanism for control in 
activities that involve large amounts of assets not traded in 
secondary markets.
This "mixed" structure between fixed value redeemable claims (deposits 
or policies) and non-redeemable residual claims (stock or shares)
page 53
characterise open corporations specialising in financial services. Fama
and Jensen conclude that open corporations will be more involved in
"business activities" which (implicitly) rely on nonfinancial assets. The
Fama and Jensen arguments suggest that there is a trade-off between
relatively low agency costs within a mutual organisation and the
potential efficiency gains from separation and specialisation of the
decision and risk-bearing functions (Williams, 1986, p. 272).
3.1.4 Problems with Fama and Jensen
These explanations of the agency cost advantages of financial mutuals put 
forward by Fama and Jensen are unsatisfactory. One reason is an 
inappropriate focus on property rights and residual risk bearing which 
overlooks the informational advantages of mutuality. Williamson (1983) 
disagrees with Fama and Jensen's (1983a; 1983b) emphasis on the 
allocation of residual risk bearing as the determinative factor of 
organisational form. Rather, the decomposition of decision management 
and control functions with an organisation is based on strategic 
considerations and the recognition of limits on human information 
processing, or bounded rationality. This implies that the survival value 
of organisations with decomposed decision structures is principally to be 
found in informational advantages. The separation of functions noted by 
Fama and Jensen therefore results from complexity of the organisation, 
not simply the allocation of residual claim rights. Klein (1983) also 
believes that the correlation of the separation of residual claimant and
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management with the size of the organisation suggests that the
hypothesised risk-sharing benefits are not the principal reason for
separation (p. 371).
The argument that a "control right" allegedly exists in the ability to 
liquidate membership claims is unconvincing. In particular Fama and 
Jensen fail to explain how this "special form of control" can be 
distinguished from the effect of competitive market forces on open 
financial corporations, such as banks and shareholder-owned insurance 
companies. Particularly within insurance markets, the opportunity to 
redeem member claims may itself be limited and impractical 
(Hetherington, 1969b, p. 1087). Even if the impact on management of 
claim redemption is significant, the device would operate negatively 
through withdrawal of funds where management is inefficient or 
incompetent.
The characterisation of mutual organisations as merely managing 
marketable portfolios is also too restrictive. Incongruously, savings and 
loan associations, many of which have mutual ownership structures, 
appear not to be treated as "mutual" in Fama and Jensen's analysis of 
statistical evidence (1983b). Savings and loans and credit unions, like 
commercial banks, hold loans as their principal assets. This suggests the 
use of nonfinancial assets engaged in "monitoring the borrowers and 
certifying credit worthiness" (1983b, p. 339). According to Fama and 
Jensen, the capital value of the financial intermediation services provided 
by these organisation cannot be captured easily within the parameters of a
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redeemable claim. This implies (as quoted above) a high cost in the use of
redeemable claims to control agency problems. In their analysis, credit
union operations should be unsustainable in a competitive environment.
In sum m ary, agency theory fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for 
the existence of financial mutuals from the view of m em ber-m anager 
divergence and a limited or absent market disciplining m echanism . 
Better argum ents are that the m utual form has a comparative advantage 
in addressing the agency costs of debt, which outweigh these 
disadvantages, and that manager risk-aversion is an advantage in term s 
of prudence for financial institutions. These arguments are presented in  
the following sections.
3.1.5 Agency costs of debt
Agency theory suggests that the choice between shareholder and m u tu a l 
forms of ownership is based on the relative costs of controlling incentive 
conflicts between owners and managers as against owners and 
debtholders. In contrast to the potential m anager-shareholder agency 
problems, mutuality tends to reduce shareholder-debtholder conflicts. As 
discussed in section 2.2.1, divergent behaviour by shareholders against the 
interests of creditors include: excessive dividends, asset substitution, 
underinvestm ent and claim dilution (Smith and W arner, 1979). 
Shareholders have an incentive to increase the riskiness of investm ents 
after debtholders have invested. Whereas the depositors of a bank are 
almost exclusively customers, the depositors (and borrowers) w ithin a
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m utual financial institution, in a legal sense, own the organisation.
Hence, an incentive to increase risk to transfer wealth from depositors to
shareholders is inconsistent with the organisational structure. For banks
and insurance companies, mutuality removes the incentives for
shareholders to take risks which might impair the integrity of an
insurance or deposit fund (Alchian and Woodward, 1987, p. 133). The
major usefulness of a m utual form of organisation is the avoidance of
agency costs of debt, which can place credit unions at a com petitive
advantage over some profit oriented institutions (Davis, 1994).
Mayers and Smith (1986) suggest a similar explanation for m u tual 
associations in the insurance industry. Policyholders in insurance firms 
face incentive problems analogous to debtholders. Shareholders of an 
insurance company have incentives to increase the value of the firm after 
policies have been issued, by changing dividend policy or by asset 
substitution (Mayers and Smith, 1986, p. 75). In respect of m u tual 
insurance, it has been asserted that, given the single class of capital 
provider, a mutual firm only faces agency conflict between managers and 
owners (Hansmann, 1985). Mayers and Smith (1981, 1986, 1988 and 1992) 
argue that the major benefit of the mutual form of organisation was in  
the reduced agency costs imposed on insurance policyholders over the 
lives of their policies. The net cost advantage to the m utual is to be found 
in the relative benefits in controlling debtholder-shareholder costs over 
the relative disadvantage in controlling managerial incentives (Mayers 
and Smith, 1986, p. 77).
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3.1.6 Risk aversion and prudence
The manager's undiversified investment in the financial mutual implies 
aversity to firm-specific risk. As discussed in section 2.2.3, agency theory 
argues that managers who are insulated from the discipline of 
shareholder voting, share prices, or the market for corporate control, are 
unlikely to be highly motivated, aggressive and innovative. This 
environment suggests an approach to management that is instead based 
on stability and conservatism. While such managerial incentives may be 
undesirable from the perspective of specialised risk bearers, it may be a 
desirable role for the manager of an insurance company or financial 
institution. Prudence accords with a public interest in avoiding 
institutional failure and potential contagion effects (Hetherington, 1969b, 
p. 1091). For example, Rasmusen (1988, p. 407) believes that a manager's 
independence from outside control guarantees a cautious investm ent 
policy. The argument is that a mutual manager, in seeking to protect 
their own position and consumption of perquisites, will always choose a 
less risky investment project. If depositors are informed about the risks of 
the intended investments by shareholder and mutual banks, the former 
can offer a higher interest rate to depositors commensurate with the risk 
and level of capital reserves. The mutual banks cannot compete with this 
interest rate unless they too engage in risky investments and refrain from 
consumption of perquisites. In contrast, where depositors are 
uninformed about the risk of investment projects and levels of capital 
reserves, they will choose the mutual bank. This argument is similar to
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the justification for high wages put by Klein and Leffler (1981). A
manager does not wish to lose a stream of quasi-rents so will be risk
averse to avoid bankruptcy. Since the manager will be unwilling to
assume risk, the safe project will always be selected. This will benefit
uninformed investors seeking lower risk and enhance the stability of the
financial system (Rasmusen, 1988, p. 405):
The advantages of stability and safety outweigh the
disadvantages of poor management and high expenses.
On similar reasoning, Mayers and Smith (1986, 1992), and Smith and 
Stutzer (1990) predict that mutual insurers are associated with less risky 
activities. This hypothesis is tested by Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993), 
using a sample of 79 stock and 91 mutual insurers in the United States 
from 1980 to 1987. A logistic regression model attributed more risk to the 
stock insurers than the mutuals. This result is supported by disaggregated 
tests based on product line and geographic area.
In a study of aggregate data of savings and loans associations from 1973 to 
1977, O'Hara (1981) finds that shareholder-owned associations exhibit a 
higher risk profile than did the mutual associations. In particular, 
shareholder-owned associations hold greater proportions of real estate 
related investments and use borrowings as a substitute for deposits more 
frequently (p. 327). Given the foregoing, it is arguable that depositors 
unwilling or unable to monitor the investment portfolio choose a 
mutual on the basis that managers have stronger incentives to adopt a 
safe portfolio (Rasmusen, 1988, p. 396).
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Overcoming agency costs of debt and of the role of risk aversion in
ensuring prudence is an important element in the explanation of the
comparative advantage of financial mutuals. Reliance on the agency
arguments alone would be inadequate. Some assert, for example, that the
comparative advantage in respect of elimination of depositor-shareholder
problems is removed once deposit insurance is available (Masulis, 1987, p.
32). The inability to raise capital by issue of shares is also perceived as a
"financial weakness" of the mutual organisation (p. 33). Even given these
comparative advantages in addressing some agency problems, the mutual
form of organisation is regarded as inadequate where access to capital,
efficiencies of operation, and growth are seen as important objectives
(Hansmann, 1980, p. 879). An alternative perspective, based on the
informational advantages of mutuals in financial markets, is presented in
the following section.
3.2 Informational Perspective____________
The previous section reviewed the economic literature on financial 
mutuals, emphasising the agency perspective. In this context, a mutual 
ownership structure fails to define property rights in residual claims with  
sufficient clarity, impeding objectives of efficiency and the use of market- 
based incentives and discipline. This suggests severe shareholder- 
manager agency costs. Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) argue that 
alternative mechanisms arise to deal with these agency costs through 
separation of management and control, by internal hierarchies and labour 
markets, as well as the role of the board of directors in monitoring
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management. In the particular case of financial mutuals, they believe the
redemptive nature of member capital contributions creates a specialised
form of agency control mechanism. This hypothesis is, however,
unconvincing. A better explanation is in the amelioration of agency costs
of debt, by creating an identity between depositors/policyholders and
owners. In addition, the conventional view of manager risk aversion as
an agency "problem" is inappropriate for the case of the financial mutual.
As a public policy question, the prudence, stability and conservatism
implied by manager risk aversion may be more appropriate for financial
institutions as a question of public policy.
The agency perspective provides, however, only part of the explanation 
for the financial mutual. This section proposes an informational 
perspective -  that mutuals have comparative advantages in markets 
characterised by severe information asymmetries. Financial mutuals 
have comparative advantages since financial markets have this 
characteristic. This section begins with an examination of information 
asymmetry issue for financial intermediation, then outlines the 
evolution of mutual forms of financial institutions in developing 
economies, nineteenth century Germany and the United States. It is 
argued that these institutions emerged principally in response to 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets.
3.2.1 Information asymmetry
Alchian and Woodward (1987) state that mutual ownership is
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advantageous where (p. 133):
. . . information is expensive, expropriation is possible, and 
long-term relations between producers and consumers prevail.
It is argued that financial intermediation, like insurance markets, is 
characterised by significant problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Intermediation itself is profitable due to imperfect information 
flows between potential borrowers and lenders (Davis, 1995, pp. 43-44). 
Overcoming these information difficulties requires monitoring, 
screening, and mechanisms for aligning of incentives, such as property 
security. The adverse selection and moral hazard problems of insurance 
are well documented. These issues have been canvassed in section 2.2.
There are two principal areas where information asymmetry creates 
problems. One is in the customer's relationship with a financial 
intermediary as saver, and the other is in the relationship as borrower. 
As to the former, one information problem is the moral hazard 
illustrated by the agency costs of debt. Owners have an incentive, once 
savers have invested, to increase the risk of investments. The financial 
mutual is unlikely to have such an incentive, providing a low risk 
vehicle for savings, as discussed in section 3.1.5. Another information 
problem is in delegated monitoring. Diamond (1984) discusses a model of 
financial intermediation based on minimum cost production of 
information resolving incentive problems between borrowers and 
lenders. A financial intermediary obtains funds from depositors and 
lends them to third parties. The financial institution, as intermediary, is
Chapter Three -  Financial Mutuals
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delegated the task of monitoring loan contracts on behalf of the
depositors. The institution has a comparative advantage in monitoring
due to its observation of private information and experience in lending.
This issue is also closely linked to agency problems. Davis (1995) points
out that delegated monitoring is only one aspect of a more complex set of
agency problems, between the stakeholders of a financial institution.
Of significant interest from an informational perspective are potential 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems within the credit market. 
The theoretical understanding of credit markets has evolved from an 
information paradigm, which emphasises the problems of imperfect 
screening, incentives and enforcement. Lenders exchange money today 
for money in the future. Lenders will attempt to insure against default 
risk, to acquire information regarding the characteristics of borrowers, and 
to develop enforcement mechanisms to increase the likelihood of 
repayment (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990, p. 237). The credit market is therefore 
subject to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Borrowers 
differ in the likelihood that they will default, and poor risk borrowers will 
have incentives to disguise their true characteristics. This suggests a 
serious adverse selection problem, which is imperfectly addressed by 
costly screening processes. Moral hazard arises where the borrower fails 
to act to improve the likelihood of repayment. This results from a 
misalignment of incentives between borrower and lender analogous to 
the shareholder-debtholder agency problem discussed earlier. This 
incentives problem is exacerbated in circumstances where legal and other
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enforcement m echanisms are inadequate.
3.2.2 Screening and monitoring
The credit m arket has unusual features in contrast to physical product 
markets. Interest rates do not always act as a rationing mechanism w ith in  
credit markets. An increase in interest rate signals a greater degree of risk 
involved in the project to be undertaken with the loan. Thus, the interest 
rate is a price as well as an instrument for regulating the risk com position 
of the lender's portfolio (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Stigler, 1987). Credit is 
likely to be rationed through direct means such as screening of borrowers 
rather than by rises in price (interest rate) reducing dem and (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 1990, p. 239).
Direct screening and monitoring mechanisms will be a prom inent feature 
of credit m arkets to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. The costs for these activities may be relatively lower to lenders 
who are able to exploit their proximity (geographically, economically and 
socially) to the potential borrowers. In rural credit markets, there is 
considerable evidence that informal sources of finance -  such as through 
kinship groups or local moneylenders -  are important and viable even in  
the face of subsidised competition from formal institutional lenders. 
Informal m oneylenders address the adverse selection problem by 
acquiring an intim ate knowledge of the borrower's character and 
circumstances. They deal with only longstanding clients, accepting new  
borrowers only after extensive investigation for the purposes of screening,
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and engage in ongoing monitoring. Aleem (1990) finds screening costs for
rural moneylenders in Pakistan to be substantial. On average, screening
involves at least one full day of the lender's time as well as significant
transport costs. Inquiries are made of the farmer's likely marketable crop
surplus, the manner in which he conducted business, his indebtedness
and reputation in the market. These inquiries include interviewing other
farmers in the applicant's village who are already known to the lender.
The cost of screening is also increased by a high rejection rate of over 50%
of applicants. Principally due to the screening process, the cumulative
rate of default is on average 2.7%, a much better result than achieved by
institutional lenders, whose default rates are more than 30%. High
interest rates charged by moneylenders are more of a reflection of the costs
of screening potential borrowers, rather than an exercise of monopoly
power over local communities.
Screening mechanisms, which overcome information problems, can 
include interlinking of credit with other transactions. The lender may 
also provide goods and services to the borrower or act as the borrower's 
landlord (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982). Forcing a crop to be sold to or 
through the lender provides a form of quasi-security as well as a stream of 
valuable private information about the borrower.
Although governments have encouraged mainstream banking 
institutions to enter rural markets, moneylenders continue to thrive 
given their more intimate knowledge of the potential borrowers (Stiglitz, 
1990, p. 352):
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[Moneylenders] can separate out high-risk and low-risk 
borrowers and charge them appropriate interest rates; and they 
can monitor the borrowers more effectively, making sure that 
the funds are used productively and thus lowering the default 
rate.
In northern Nigeria, for example, credit markets are almost completely 
segmented along geographic lines and kinship groups. Some 97% of the 
value of credit transactions are between individuals in the same village or 
kinship group, overcoming information asymmetry (Udry, 1990). In 
Thailand, village kinship structures are matrilineal, so women tend to be 
dominant among informal lenders (Siamwalla et ah, 1990). Another 
example of the value of local area knowledge is the Orangi Charitable 
Trust, a credit institution investing in small-scale enterprises in a slum in 
Karachi (Inayatullah and Birley, 1997). A major contributing factor to its 
financial success (including a repayment rate of 94%) was identified as the 
development of efficient and robust lending procedures, particularly a 
strong appraisal and monitoring process. Critical to the lending 
procedures were local area supervisors who tend to know the applicant 
personally and were "well integrated into local socio-ethnic networks" (p. 
315). Personal guarantees and group lending complemented lack of 
sufficient security, and emphasised socio-cultural dependence. Similar 
results have emerged from empirical studies of moneylending in rural 
communities within contemporary India (Akerlof, 1970; Bell, 1990), 
Bangladesh (Stiglitz, 1990) and Pakistan (Aleem, 1990).
page 66
3.2.3 Peer monitoring
One organisational mechanism for reducing the chances of default 
(addressing moral hazard) is peer monitoring. Stiglitz (1990) believes that 
peer monitoring is an effective way of designing an incentive-monitoring 
system in the presence of costly information. An example of peer 
monitoring is the Grameen Bank operating within Bangladesh. Its record 
of very low default rates (approximately 2% compared with other lenders 
with rates of 60% to 70%) is based on loans being made to small groups of 
farmers who are mutually responsible for repaying the loans. Other 
members of the group cannot obtain credit until existing loans are repaid 
Threats to cut off future credit also induces desired borrower behaviour 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983). The small sizes of the borrower groups 
(approximately five) increase the incentives for monitoring. A larger 
group may suffer from free rider problems. The Grameen Bank is able to 
exploit the local knowledge of group members, and an incentive structure 
whereby others within the village do the monitoring for it. By 
encouraging self-selection into these borrowing groups, the bank is 
exploiting the local farmers' informational advantage not only in  
monitoring but also in initial screening (Stiglitz, 1990, p. 362). A similar 
peer monitoring mechanism operates within the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand (Siamwalla et al., 1990).
Similar processes for credit allocation in developing countries include 
rotating savings and loan associations, or tontines as they are described in  
some African nations. Members, typically from a village or family group,
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agree to pay periodically into a common pool. Each, by rotation, can then
borrow a larger sum to finance an expensive purchase. The credit
exchange between these individuals as both lenders and borrowers is
enhanced by powerful social sanctions. This improves upon the
operation of the conventional market and provides funds with very
small spreads between saving and borrowing rates (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990,
p. 244):
[B]y creating a group of individuals whom the borrower comes 
to know, and who would be hurt if he defaulted . . . the 
borrower performs more reliably than if the cost were borne 
only by the lender, with whom the relationship is brief and 
impersonal.
These types of associations agree with the argument that mutual 
organisations emerge in response to severe information asymmetry, 
providing benefits to members based on its informational advantages, 
including non-market-disciplining mechanisms. This explanation of the 
mutual is also supported by the evolution of German banking 
cooperatives and mutual institutions in the United States.
3.2.4 Banking cooperatives in Germany
Bonus and Schmidt (1990) examine the evolution of the cooperative 
banking group in Germany in the nineteenth century. The usefulness of 
the Raiffeisen credit cooperative is principally in the cost advantages in 
dealing with information relevant to the risk of lending to small farmers, 
tradesmen and craftsmen. To assess credit risk, a lender would need to 
gather and analyse a great deal of information on both the individual and
page 68
__________________ _______________________________ Chapter Three -  Financial Mutuals
the local community. This is difficult to acquire and relies upon local
knowledge as well as an understanding of the nature of the trade. Banks
would find the cost of acquiring this information prohibitive relative to
the size of the potential revenues from writing the loan. Moreover, at the
time the banks had no experience with the specifics of the business of
farming and would find it difficult in developing criteria by which loans
could be assessed. This supports the argument that informational
problems were significant contributors to the lack of adequate finance in
these rural communities, who often depended heavily on local
moneylenders and paid high rates of interest. Moneylenders operated
within limited geographical areas and acquired a great deal of local
knowledge relevant to assessing credit risk. The high cost of credit
obtained through these individuals reflected the high cost of information
acquisition and pursuit of delinquent borrowers (Bonus and Schmidt,
1990, p. 187).
Formation of credit cooperatives drew upon the local informational 
advantages to provide credit to members without the degree of associated 
costs for screening and monitoring incurred by moneylenders and passed 
onto borrowers. The Raiffeisen cooperatives, at negligible cost, tapped the 
private information sources of its members regarding the personal and 
family backgrounds of members of the local community, their property, 
and local economic conditions. This provided a significant informational 
advantage over any outside bank in assessing creditworthiness. Bonus 
and Schmidt (1990) argue that the association was an economic coalition
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(Alchian, 1984) in which the coalition-specific quasi-rent was substantial,
given the high rates charged by moneylenders and the lack of interest fcy
outside banks in providing credit. Powerful incentives followed to
ensure that no applicant was admitted to membership and extended a
loan that did not live up to high standards of personal integrity.
Screening processes were therefore essential to the operation of the
cooperative.
The structure of the cooperative is also explained by the reliance on the 
members' human capital. The actual capital shares held by members thus 
bears no relation to the actual capital of the association. Bonus and 
Schmidt (1990, p. 188) compare a capital share to an "entrance fee", of a 
symbolic nature. Democratic governance in terms of one-member-one- 
vote follows from the fact that capital contributions are not a measure of 
the resources pledged by individual members but instead reflect the 
members' joint responsibility for the cooperative. Membership rights 
were non-tradeable, which is consistent the importance of the identity of 
the members of the cooperative and their mutual economic 
interdependence.
3.2.5 Mutual banks in the United States
Two other forms of financial institution, mutual savings banks and 
mutual savings and loan associations, also illustrate information 
problems in financial intermediation. The advantage of mutual savings 
banks is in the informational benefits for savers, while the advantage of
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m utual savings and loans is in the benefits for borrowers.
Drawing upon histories of the development of m utual savings banks in  
the United States (Teck, 1968; Welfling, 1968), Hansm ann (1990) examines 
the evolution of the industry from the perspective of inform ation  
asymmetry. M utual savings banks arose in the early nineteenth century 
and provided the only place for individuals of modest means to invest. 
Some of these banks were set up by philanthropic businessmen, w ho 
donated the initial capital, to prevent pauperism and encourage th rift 
(Welfling, 1968, p. 17). These charitable motives alone, however, did no t 
provide a satisfactory explanation for the growth of m utual savings banks. 
Of greater relevance was the state of commercial banks in the n ineteen th  
century. These dealt principally with businesses, through discounting of 
m erchants' bills of exchange, and did not accept small deposits from  
individuals. Capital was raised by issue of equity to wealthy investors. 
More importantly, commercial banks were seen as too untrustw orthy for 
individuals to make investm ents (Clain-Stefanelli, 1975). In particular, 
the sector was largely unregulated with no requirements for reserves or 
restrictions on investments. This provided an incentive for comm ercial 
banks to behave opportunistically towards depositors (Hansmann, 1990, 
pp. 69-70):
In short, consumer deposit banking was characterised by a high 
degree of asymmetric information (contract failure) in its early 
years: depositors could not know, or control, w hat com m ercial 
banks were doing with their funds.
Shareholders of the banks had an incentive to invest in highly
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speculative ventures, capturing the benefits if successful, but leaving the
creditors and depositors to bear a substantial part of the losses if they
failed. The riskiness of these commercial banks was demonstrated by the
high rates of failure and collapse, of up to 50% in the mid-nineteenth
century. Mutual banks therefore provided a safe haven for depositors. It
should be noted that Hansmann believes that the nondistribution
constraint is the critical element in the trustworthiness of the mutual
banks. As argued in section 2.1.3, this emphasis on the nondistribution
constraint is unsatisfactory. The events should be interpreted on the basis
that trust does not arise from the nondistribution constraint, but requires
the identity between depositors and owners inherent in the mutual
organisational structure.
The comparative advantage of mutual savings and loan associations lies 
in the lower cost these organisations incurred in addressing adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems in lending. This efficiency relies on 
the social distance between the members of the association (Hansmann, 
1990, p. 74). The institution arose in the 1830s, as vehicles whereby small 
groups would pool their savings and from which they would take loans, 
in turn, to finance purchase or construction of a house. The members 
would have superior information with which to determine the risk of a 
loan to one of their members. Even in hard times, a borrower is less 
inclined to default with the knowledge that friends, colleagues, and 
neighbours would bear the loss. This explanation is consistent with the 
cases of peer monitoring, such as the Grameen bank and African tontines,
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as well as the German credit cooperatives.
3.3 Credit Union Behaviour______________
To this point, the discussion in this chapter has been on financial mutuals 
generally. The comparative advantages of their ownership structure lies 
in overcoming informational problems of financial intermediation and 
insurance provision. The economic literature specifically modelling 
credit union behaviour is now reviewed in this context. A number of 
formal models have been proposed with a range of objective functions, 
and minimisation/maximisation rules applied to explain operational 
decisions. These models fail to capture the essential features of credit 
unions as financial mutuals, as discussed earlier in this chapter. A theory 
of credit union behaviour is proposed, with a basic assumption of 
management self-interest, moderated by the influence of the com m on  
bond. The common bond is identified as the principal determinant of 
credit union behaviour.
3.3.1 Formal economic models
Much mainstream economic literature rejects the proposition that credit 
unions are significantly different from other financial institutions for the 
purposes of economic analysis (Navratil, 1981). Yet, models of a financial 
firm based on profit maximisation cannot be translated directly to a credit 
union environment (Smith, Cargill and Meyer, 1981). This creates 
difficulties in the definition of an appropriate objective function. A 
variety of formal models has been suggested, using alternative objectives.
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One approach is to assume that credit unions minimise costs, based on an
exogenously determined level of output (Fry, Harper and Stansell, 1982;
Koot, 1976; Murray and White, 1980 and 1983; Navratil, 1981; Wolken and
Navratil, 1980). This assumption is typically defended as reflecting
competitive market forces.
Smith (1984) believes, however, that the cost minimisation assumption is 
theoretically deficient. While cost minimisation is relevant and 
important, it does not address the objectives of the credit union inherent 
in its structure as a financial services cooperative. In particular, output 
should be treated as not exogenous (Baltensperger, 1980) but endogenous 
to choices made by credit union managers as to interest rates and non­
price characteristics of the services offered to members. Smith (1984) 
suggests a formal model based on an objective of maximising provision of 
financial services to members, measured in terms of differentials on the 
rates of deposit and loan interest rates. The general objective function is 
to maximise the sum of pecuniary gains to members flowing from higher 
deposit rates and lower lending rates compared with other financial 
institutions. The maximisation process is subject to the constraint that 
the institutions must break even. Smith (1988) extends this formal model 
to include uncertainty and the effects of taxation. A problem with this 
approach, however, symptomatic of many formal models, is the 
assumption of a break-even result. Such an assumption places emphasis 
on the nonprofit status of credit unions at the expense of their mutuality 
characteristics. Formal models related to Smith's approach generally
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assume a zero profit constraint, after distribution of interest rebates on
loans or bonus dividends on savings (Smith, Cargill and Meyer, 1981).
Such a model defines credit union behavioural constraints too narrowly.
An economic model of credit unions that takes better account of 
mutuality is proposed by Taylor (1971). He argues that the credit union  
operates for the benefit of all the members. Member welfare is achieved 
through minimising the difference between the credit union's deposit 
and lending rates. Saver welfare is increased by a higher interest or 
dividend rate on deposits, while borrower welfare is increased by lower 
interest rates on loans. The objective of the credit union is to m inim ise  
this difference, subject to covering long-run average costs. Unlike Smith's 
model, the maximisation of member welfare can occur through growth 
and reserve accumulation (Spencer, 1996), gains to scale, and by cost 
efficiencies. In this framework, a conflict potentially arises between 
members of the credit union who are principally savers or borrowers. 
Patin and McNiel (1991a) examine credit unions in the United States to 
find that, although there is evidence of some strong borrower- and saver- 
dominated behaviour, the most widespread behaviour observed was 
neutrality. Regulatory constraints may affect the allocation of benefits as 
between savers and borrowers. Walker and Chandler (1977) argue that 
dividend and loan rate ceilings for credit unions in the United States 
create a strong pro-borrower bias, by guaranteeing a minimum return on  
deposit rates and placing a ceiling on lending rates.
While Taylor's model and its extensions are useful, the major focus in
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this literature is on borrower-saver conflicts. The Taylor model, as for
many other formal models, fails to capture the informational features of
credit unions as an important element in explaining their comparative
advantages. Formal analysis ignores the role of subsidisation by sponsor
organisations (such as employers) and volunteer labour (Navratil, 1981).
A theory of credit union behaviour is arguably incomplete without
considerations of altruistic motives (Peterson, 1981).
3.3.2 The common bond
Members of a credit union are linked by a common bond of association 
such as a common employer, a common social or ethnic background, or 
geographical location. Some argue that the essential difference between 
commercial banks and credit unions is to be found in the concept of a 
common bond (Bundt, Chiesa and Keating, 1989). It is this common  
bond, not merely mutuality, which distinguishes credit unions from 
other financial institutions (Crapp and Skully, 1985, p. 1). This section 
proposes a model of credit union behaviour based on the strength of the 
common bond as the major variable influencing organisational 
behaviour and comparative economic advantages accruing to the 
institution.
As discussed in section 2.2.3, the starting point for explaining the 
economic behaviour of credit unions is the lack of market-based 
disciplining mechanisms on management, leading to significant member- 
manager agency problems. In the absence of an effective common bond,
page 76
_____________ _____________________________________Chapter Three -  Financial Mutuals
credit union managers can be assumed to act in their own interests. This
is consistent with formal models that assume maximisation of
managerial utility, subject to a minimum member benefit constraint
(Keating and Keating, 1975a; Keating, 1979). This approach draws on
Williamson's (1970, 1974) managerial discretion model of organisational
behaviour. Managers exert discretion both over earnings and the
proportion of earnings distributed to members as benefits. These benefits
must not fall below levels which would trigger member intervention in
management decisions or risk replacement by new managers (Croteau,
1963). Managers are able to spend the residue according to their personal
preferences. An extreme form of this position would be the statement
that, except for the obligation to pay depositors interest, a credit union
manager is "otherwise free to operate the firm as he pleases" (Rasmusen,
1988, p. 397).
A common bond addresses this situation in four ways. First, the comm on  
bond reduces member-manager agency costs. Part of this explanation is 
based on altruism. Fama and Jensen (1983b, pp. 343-345) state that the 
"altruism of internal agents" allows a lower cost for control of agency 
problems and acts to limit the risk of expropriation. This is based on 
"strong tastes for an organization's outputs" on the part of managers. A 
credit union manager is more likely to be altruistic given a common bond 
of membership, which the manager is more likely to share. Social norms 
encouraging altruism and against profiteering will be far more developed 
within credit unions with a strong and effective common bond. Credit
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unions are partly an //idealistic,/ movement, based on cooperative
principles of self-help (Arneil, 1969, p. 18), and guided by altruistic
principles (Flynn, Lo and Runcie, 1969, p. 133). Crapp and Skully (1985,
pp. 13-15) note that in part the success of the credit union m ovem ent is in
subscription to principles of cooperation:
These unifying principles make possible a common identity 
and set of operating practices among the credit unions, w hich 
in turn allows for the emergence of systems and organisations 
to serve the needs of the credit unions, enabling them in tu rn  
to better serve their members.
According to the World Council of Credit Unions, these cooperative 
principles include (WCCU, 1983):
• open and voluntary membership -  within the common bond of 
association;
5
• democratic control -  one member, one vote;
• return of surplus to members -  no member or group of m em bers 
should benefit at the expense of others;
• neutrality in race, religion and politics;
• services to members -  to increase economic and social well being 
rather than to maximise profit;
• ongoing education -  promotion of thrift and wise use of credit;
• co-operation among co-operatives -  at local, national, and 
international levels; and
• social responsibility -  to human and social development.
More importantly, however, the common bond provides the basis for
A majority voting system can also be analysed as a commitment device to guarantee 
maximum access to credit in those states of nature where the value of borrowers' 
collateral is low, since in those states of nature the poorer credit union members are 
likely to form a majority (Aghion, 1998). A difficulty with this argument is that it  
relies on substantial heterogeneity among credit union membership, which is likely to 
be inconsistent with the common bond.
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screening, selection and socialisation processes, as discussed in section
2.4.3. The common bond is a benchmark for assessing compatibility 
between credit unions and members in terms of values. The 
homogeneity in value systems will reduce uncertainty, encourage 
inform ation flows and enhance economic coordination. The ability of 
cooperation to reduce agency costs depends on the strength of bonding 
between members of an organisation (Williams, 1986, pp. 274-275). N o n ­
conformity or deviant behaviour from group norm s results in increased 
costs and reduced rewards for group members. This role for the com m on 
bond is distinct from agency theorists who emphasise contracting as the 
m echanism to provide an agent with incentives to act in the interests of 
the principal. Such contracting solutions typically rely on the operation of 
efficient markets. By contrast, this analysis stresses the search for and 
screening of potential agents, and expenditure by the principal on 
socialising the agent so that the agent's personal preferences are closer to 
the principal's.
Second, the common bond reinforces the relationship of m utuality, and 
thereby the identity of interests between members and depositors. This 
addresses potential conflicts between shareholders and depositors, 
whereby shareholders have an incentive to increase risk, as discussed in  
section 3.1.5. The shareholder-debtholder agency conflict is addressed 
since members share both roles. Davis (1994) described this situation as a 
form of "self-insurance" by credit union members.
Third, the common bond has an informational role. The relationship
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between members of a credit union is essential in reducing the cost of
gathering information relevant to screening borrowers and monitoring
credit risk to reduce bad debt losses (Black and Dugger, 1981). Members
participating in management with a shared common bond are more
likely to know most potential borrowers and have an advantage in
assessing their credit worth and potential for continued employment
(Crapp and Skully, 1983, p. 40). This is consistent with the existence of
screening and monitoring processes in credit markets examined in section
3.2.2. There is evidence, for example, that industrial credit unions in
Australia have lower bad debts experience than community based
organisations (Williams, 1986, p. 281). In an industrial-based credit union,
members are also colleagues in employment. This generates pressures
through the possibility that indiscretions will become known (Williams,
1986, p. 273). Loan performance can be improved by management having
case histories of many loan applicants through the knowledge of the
directors, by the common ability to have direct salary deductions for
repayments and by the ability to secure loans by a lien over a borrower's
superannuation (Williams, 1986, p. 275).
Fourth, the common bond will also be a proxy for other comparative 
institutional advantages (Earl, 1990, p. 174). Occupational common bonds, 
for example, may imply subsidy benefits such as provision of office space, 
availability of payroll deduction for loan repayment, data processing 
services and employment entitlements for volunteer workers. Bundt, 
Chiesa and Keating (1989) find that credit unions with a common bond of
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employment had a significant cost advantage in processing deposit
accounts, presumably due to benefits from the employer in terms of data
processing. Credit unions with employment related common bonds
might also be exposed to greater cyclical risk as the saving and borrowing
habits among its members may be highly correlated. Consequently, the
nature of the business of the employer might also be relevant for
employment-bonded credit union performance (Kohers, 1986).
The argument that member bonding will affect behaviour is supported by
empirical studies.6 Williams (1986) found that the stronger the bonding 
between members, the stronger will be the bonding between members 
and management, and the greater the efficiency or the organisation. In 
his study of Australian credit unions, there was a significant relationship 
between common bond type (industrial or community) and credit union  
managers' perceptions of member cohesion. Managerial salaries were 
also significantly related to common bond classification, suggesting that 
the degree of member bonding influences the degree of divergence 
between member and manager interests. Similarly, Bundt, Chiesa and 
Keating (1989) examine whether the common bond relationship affects 
organisational behaviour, using a sample of credit unions in the United 
States. They also find that there are significant differences in behaviour 
across common bond types.
Discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.
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3.3.3 Regulatory policies for credit unions
The model of credit union behaviour developed here has implications for 
credit union regulation. In particular, the integrity of the common bond 
relationship should arguably be an objective of public policy. The 
traditional case for government intervention is underpinned by the 
existence of market failure, such as the existence of externalities or 
information asymmetries. Government fostering of new technology, for 
example, has been advocated in part due to information asymmetries in  
respect of its capabilities and commercial value (Pandit, Swann and Watts, 
1997). Credit unions constitute an institutional mechanism to address 
problems of information asymmetry prevalent in credit markets. On that 
basis, there is public benefit arising from the fostering of such institutions. 
Stiglitz (1993, p. 32) believes that an appropriate role for the government 
is to take actions which foster the establishment and support the 
maintenance of certain financial institutions, such as those which fill gaps 
in the kinds of credit provided by private institutions. Weisbrod (1988, p. 
17) states that a "healthy pluralism" is a continuing goal of public policy. 
Australian policy makers have also recognised a need for smaller, special- 
purpose financial institutions serving a particular clientele with a 
relatively narrow range of financial products (Thompson, 1990, p. 5). 
Based on the analysis in this chapter, credit union regulation will support 
the informational and other institutional benefits where it reinforces the 
common bond and mutual structure. This might be assessed, for 
example, in the degree of consistency or conflict between credit union
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legislation and cooperative principles. An appropriate public policy
objective might be the insulation of credit unions from pressures to
deviate from the social role they play in the modern mixed economy
(Weisbrod, 1988, p. 163).
Where the common bond is weaker, there will be fewer constraints on 
management. This might lead to self-interested behaviour by 
management, which credit union members are unlikely to address. On 
this basis, there may be grounds for government intervention to ensure 
against management fraud and incompetence (Hickson and McKillop, 
1996, p. 136). For example, Davis (1995, p. 51) advocates supervisory 
evaluation of management quality in credit unions, such as through the
CAMEL rating system, as well as regulation of remuneration 
arrangements and related party transactions.
3.4 Summary____________________________
This chapter critically examined the economic literature in respect of 
financial mutuals, and credit unions in particular. One perspective, 
property rights literature, argues that financial mutuals are inherently less 
efficient due to lack of clarity in definition of property rights in residual 
risk bearing, and lack of access to market incentives. In this context, their 
existence is explained by favourable legislation, taxation benefits or other
The CAMEL rating system was derived from the United States and takes into account: 
adequacy of Capital; structure and quality of Assets; quality of Management; Earnings 
performance; and Liquidity of assets (Campbell Inquiry, 1981, para. 19.72).
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concessions. Agency theory also suggests alternative control mechanisms,
including well developed decision hierarchies, internal labour markets,
monitoring by the board of directors and, in the case of financial mutuals,
redeemable member claims. A more convincing argument based on an
agency perspective is found in the argument that mutuality eliminates
the agency costs of debt. Owners who are also depositors, policyholders or
borrowers have less incentive to increase the risk of the financial mutual
as would a separate class of specialist risk-bearing shareholders. This
reduced risk explanation was supported by the mutual manager's
inherent risk aversion in the absence of market incentives.
Another perspective, based on informational advantages, finds that 
significant problems of adverse selection and moral hazard exist within  
financial intermediation. This is supported by an examination of rural 
credit markets within developing countries. Moneylenders with local 
knowledge and engaging in extensive screening processes have significant 
informational advantages over formal institutional lenders. The role of 
financial mutuals, given these problems, is to harness the private 
knowledge of its members to eliminate the high cost of screening and 
monitoring incurred by outside lenders. Rotating savings and loan 
associations, or tontines in developing nations illustrate the advantages 
in terms of screening and monitoring accruing to small groups coupled 
with associated social sanctions. The development of the Grameen bank, 
German credit cooperatives, and mutual banks and savings and loan 
associations in the United States, is consistent with the comparative
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advantages of these organisations in dealing with information
asymmetry.
Formal models of credit union behaviour generally assume simple 
objective functions such as cost minimisation subject to exogenous 
demand or maximisation of manager benefits. A preferred approach 
emphasises the common bond as the important factor influencing credit 
union operating decisions. The basic model is one of maximisation of 
manager utility, moderated by the strength of the common bond. The 
common bond also provides a basis for altruistic behaviour as a control 
on management self-interest. The common bond of association 
reinforces mutuality, and explains the degree of social distance between 
members, enhancing screening and monitoring. This explanation of 
credit unions is preferable to formal models of credit union behaviour 
that rely on simple cost minimisation or other objective functions, which 
do not capture the more essential economic features of a credit union. My 
claim is that the comparative economic advantages of the credit union  
more directly emerge from the common bond relationship than any other 
institutional feature. In the context of this theoretical model of credit 
union behaviour, Chapters Four and Five analyse the regulatory changes 
within the FI Scheme, to assess the impact on Australian credit unions. 
This is followed in Chapters Six and Seven by an empirical study of the 
impact of the Scheme.
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Chapter Four 
Credit Union Regulation
This chapter discusses the evolution and content of credit union  
legislation in Australia. In order to assess the impact of the Financial 
Institutions Scheme (FI Scheme) it is necessary to examine the changes 
introduced by the Scheme relative to the previous regulatory framework. 
The analysis demonstrates that the significant change was the application 
of Reserve Bank prudential supervision mechanisms to all non-bank 
financial institutions, and in particular a capital adequacy requirement. 
This policy approach can be explained by the philosophical view that 
competitive neutrality across financial institutions is desirable -  a 
position emerging from the Campbell Inquiry and later endorsed by the 
Brady committee. The chapter therefore begins with a brief overview of 
the approach to banking regulation emerging from Campbell, followed ty 
a detailed description of the legislative position before the creation of the 
Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC). Later, the 
evolution of the FI Scheme and its content provide the basis for analysis 
of the regulatory changes. Given the theoretical framework developed in 
the preceding chapters, the legislative analysis has particular focus on the 
issue of mutuality, such as membership rights and governance 
arrangements. Also highlighted are prudential mechanisms and 
supervisory arrangements.
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4.1 Banking Regulation after Campbell
A major consideration of financial institutions policy at a national level 
was the Campbell Inquiry (1981). The Inquiry was the first general survey 
of the financial system conducted since a Royal Commission on Money 
and Banking in 1936. A recurring theme of the Inquiry is that 
government intervention in the financial system had not achieved its 
intentions in terms of value for money, efficiency, or in assisting 
particular sectors of the economy (Perkins, 1982). The Campbell 
committee applied a clear ideological preference for the market 
mechanism and combined this with a set of recommendations 
unrestrained by political considerations. The Campbell committee asked 
that "more confidence be placed in the disciplines and processes of the 
market" (1981, para. 16). As Porter (1982) observes:
If there is a "flaw" in the Report it is perhaps the single-minded 
consistency with which the authors have adhered to their 
pursuit of economic efficiency.
The philosophy of the Campbell Committee's recommendations is 
principally that the financial sector be subject to minimal government 
interference (Valentine, 1991, p. 37). Deregulation is predicted to support 
greater allocative, operational, and dynamic efficiency. The committee 
recommended the removal of direct controls over bank intermediation 
behaviour or portfolio composition as a prudential mechanism (1981, 
para. 19.61). In particular, interest rate controls should be abolished (para. 
19.127).
page 87
Chapter Four -  Credit Union Regulation 
Coupled to the deregulation of operational controls over banking were
recommendations for new prudential supervision arrangements. The
system of prudential control endorsed by the Campbell committee had the
following principal characteristics (Valentine, 1991, p. 40):
• competitive neutrality;
• introduction of a risk-weighted variable capital ratio; and
• retention of liquidity requirements.
The Campbell committee adopted the view that competitive neutrality -  
a major philosophical objective -  would best be achieved through a 
"functional approach" to regulation. This is a policy of applying a 
uniform regulatory response to all deposit-taking activities, irrespective of 
the type of institution. Competitive neutrality involves regulating 
intermediaries undertaking similar financial activities in a consistent 
manner (1981, para. 18.38). The committee stated (para. 19.15, emphasis in 
original):
Competitive neutrality would best be achieved through a more 
functional approach to the regulation of DTIs. This involves a 
consistent approach to the regulation of all deposit-taking 
activities.
The committee followed the lead of overseas jurisdictions (such as the 
United Kingdom) in recommending the use of minimum capital 
requirements as a prudential device. The capital adequacy approach is part 
of an international movement, centred in the Bank for International 
Settlements, aimed at making prudential controls consistent across
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participating developed countries (Perkins, 1989, p. 68). These
requirements represent a major worldwide convergence of regulation
with the aim of international competitive neutrality in the financial
sector (Pecchioli, 1989, p. 23). Australia can be regarded as a case of
conservative adaptation of the Bank for International Settlements
guidelines (Ferguson, 1991, p. 156). The initiation by the Reserve Bank of
the capital adequacy mechanism as a major part of its prudential strategy
implements the Basle Concordant of July 1988.
Concern by the Reserve Bank in respect of appropriate capital 
requirements also derives from its own research in 1974 which found that 
capital ratios in Australia were low relative to a number of overseas banks 
(Thompson, 1991, p. 117). Although no formal requirements were put in  
place, Australian banks were persuaded by the Reserve Bank to maintain 
capital ratios of 5% by the end of the 1970s. In the United States, federal 
regulators imposed capital requirements to address a similar slide in  
capitalisation during the 1970s (Wall and Peterson, 1987; Marcus, 1983). 
Concerns over capital adequacy have a long history. The capital adequacy 
of early Australian trading banks declined steadily over a two decade 
period before 13 of the 22 note-issuing banks failed in the period January 
to May 1893 (Merrett, 1989).
Capital adequacy is applied to a bank's consolidated balance sheet, 
including off-balance sheet business. Total capital must be held at a 
minimum percentage of the risk-weighted value of the bank's assets, of 
which a prescribed percentage must be "core" or "Tier 1" capital, in the
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form of paid-up ordinary shares, general reserves and retained earnings,
non-cumulative irredeemable preference shares and minority interests in
subsidiaries. The remaining "supplementary" or "Tier 2" capital includes
provisions for doubtful debts, subordinated debt, asset revaluation
reserves, and cumulative irredeemable preference shares. At most, Tier 2
capital can represent 50% of the total capital requirement (Perkins, 1989,
pp. 69-70). Risk weightings are calculated by broad rating categories of zero
(liquid assets), 10% (State government securities), 20% (other public sector
securities, claims on banks), 50% (residential mortgage loans) and 100%
g
(all other claims). Implementation of the risk-adjusted capital adequacy 
requirement for banks was announced on 23 August 1988, with the 
minimum requirement set at 8%, and was made effective from 
September 1988 (Hogan and Sharpe, 1990, p. 180; Hogan, 1989).
Following Campbell, the banks were also introduced to new liquidity 
regulations in the form of the Prime Assets Ratio (PAR). Evolved from 
the LGS (Liquid asset and Government Securities) ratio, the PAR ensured 
that the banks kept a sufficient proportion of their assets in a highly liquid 
form to minimise the risk of illiquidity. The major difference was a more 
broadly denominator which covered all non-capital liabilities, and not 
merely deposit liabilities (Martin Report, 1991, para. 12.14).
The discussion in the following sections demonstrates that both the
g
For a more detailed description of the capital adequacy requirement, see Martin 
Report, 1991, Appendix 8 and Davis, 1990, Appendix 1).
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capital and liquidity requirements were applied to non-bank financial
institutions in the same manner as for banks.
4.2 Pre-Scheme Legislation______________
Credit union legislation in Australia evolved from general statutes 
regulating cooperatives. These acts included:
• Building and Co-operative Societies Act 1901 (NSW);
• Co-operative and Provident Societies Act 1903 (WA);
• Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1923 (SA);
• Co-operation Act 1923 (NSW);
• Co-operative Societies Act 1946 (Qld);
• Co-operation Act 1961 (Vic);
• Co-operative and Other Societies Act 1967 (Qld);
• Co-operative Societies Act 1976 (NT).
In Victoria, Tasmania, and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the 
legislation before the ¥1 Scheme remained based on Acts governing 
cooperatives more generally:
• Co-operation Act 1981 (Vic);
• Co-operative Industrial Societies Act 1928 (Tas);
• Co-operative Societies Act 1939 (ACT).
Specialist credit union statutes emerged with the Parliament of N ew  
South Wales (NSW) passing the Credit Unions Act 1969. This approach 
spread to Queensland, South Australia (SA), Western Australia (WA) and 
the Northern Territory (NT) over the 1970s and 1980s:
• Credit Unions Act 1976 (SA);
• Credit Unions Act 1979 (WA);
• Credit Unions Act 1982 (NT);
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• Credit Societies Act 1986 (Qld);
• Credit Unions Act 1989 (SA).
In the ACT, the use of a general cooperative statute meant that credit 
unions were a form of "trading society" (s. 13(d)), with extended powers to 
receive money on deposit (s. 16A(l)(b)). The objects of such trading 
societies were stated at a high level of abstraction:
. . .  to do all such other things calculated to promote the 
economic interests of its members in relation to the objects 
mentioned as are prescribed.
In Victoria, a "credit society" was a specialised form of cooperative under 
the Act, akin to a credit union (s. 16(c) and (d)). The objects of a credit 
society were, inter alia:
. . .  to encourage habits of thrift among its members; and to 
promote co-operative enterprise and to provide programmes or 
services to its members as prescribed by the rules for assisting its 
members to meet their financial or social needs.
Such encouragement of thrift amongst membership reflects the history of 
the movement, as discussed in earlier chapters. The clause is consistent 
with specialised statutes in NSW and WA, where the encouragement of 
thrift was supported specifically (NSW s. 4(c); WA s. 6(c)).
The provision of services to members was also a common theme, as 
illustrated by the NT Act (s. 13(c)):
. . .  to provide such advice and services for its members as in 
the opinion of its board may assist its members to meet their 
financial needs and obligations.
The objects as stated in specific legislation, such as in NSW, reflected the
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intermediation activities of credit unions (s. 4):
4. The objects of a credit union shall be -
(a) the raising of a fund by subscriptions of its members and in 
any way authorised by this Act;
(b) making loans from that fund to its members as provided by 
or under this Act and the rules of the credit union; and
(c) to encourage habits of thrift among its members.
The SA laws, for example, required a credit union "to operate as a 
financial co-operative" (s. 10(a)). In Victoria, the objects of a co-operative 
society included an obligation to "promote co-operation for the 
improvement of the conditions of rural or urban life" (s. 6(3)). In the 
ACT a society might, if authorised by its Rules, apply an amount not 
exceeding 10 per cent of the surplus arising in a financial year of the 
society from the business of the society to a charitable purpose or for 
promoting community cooperation and advancement (s. 23(4)). A similar 
but less limited provision exists in the NT (s. 55(4)).
As a matter of consumer protection, there were provisions dealing with  
the use of names. In WA, for example, credit unions must include the 
words "credit union" in their name (s. 29). This was coupled with a 
prohibition on other organisations using these words (s. 30). In 
Queensland, Victoria and NT, the prohibited words included "credit 
society" as well as "credit union" (Qld s. 25; Vic s. 54(2); NT s. 36(1)). In 
Victoria, Tasmania and ACT, the word "co-operative" was included in the 
mandate and prohibition (Vic s. 54(6); Tas s. 5(5); ACT ss. 32(2) and 40). In 
SA the prohibition was on the carrying on of the business of a credit 
union by an unregistered organisation (s. 9).
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The prior chapters discussed the comparative economic advantages of 
mutual organisations and, in particular, how the integration of consumer 
and producer interests ameliorated information asymmetry problems. 
This organisational structure is supported by screening, selection and 
socialisation processes, which reinforce cooperative social norms. The 
cooperative values of these organisations provide a degree of 
homogeneity, which facilitates information flows and address potential 
member-manager agency problems. An issue for examination is the 
degree to which the legislation in respect of credit unions supports the 
mutual organisational structure or reduces agency costs.
The specific provisions in respect of credit union governance 
arrangements before the FI Scheme were generally consistent with the 
reinforcement of the character of mutual organisations and the 
cooperative principles of the movement. In NSW, Queensland, SA, W A 
and NT, shares could not be transferred without the consent of the board 
of directors (NSW s. 43(8); Qld s. 51(5); SA s. 26(8); WA s. 45(5); NT s. 
49(9)). This is consistent with the pairwise identity of the parties being an 
important element of the social relationship. This requirement was 
reinforced in respect of parties to whom loans could be made. In most 
States and the ACT, credit unions were restricted in making loans to 
members as specified in their rules (NSW s. 6; Qld s. 64(1); Vic s. 18; SA s. 
41; WA s. 54; Tas s. 36(1); ACT, s. 15; NT s. 57(1)). In NSW, loans could 
only be granted to individuals who were members of the credit union,
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and also members of a class in a special rule (s. 6(1)). That class could be
limited by geographic area (s. 6(2)). Similarly, in WA, eligibility could be
based on residence in a particular district or by membership of a special
rule class (s. 54(2)). In the ACT (due to the broader nature of the
legislation), unless it was otherwise provided by the rules, every person
was qualified to become a member (s. 15(2)). On the other side of
intermediation, a credit union could only accept deposits from members
in SA (s. 37).
The rules regarding directors address member-manager agency problems. 
A director must be a member of the credit union (NSW s. 55(l)(a)(i); Qld s. 
75(1); Vic s. 104(1); SA s. 65(2)(c); WA s. 65; ACT s. 51(7)). In the NT, the 
director must also be a resident Territorian (s. 67(1)). In NSW, WA and 
NT, there was limit of one employee on the board of directors, who could 
not be elected chairman (NSW s. 54; WA s. 64(9); NT s. 66(9)). In SA, an 
employee was disqualified from being a director (s. 65(1)). A general 
prohibition applied to the payment of fees to directors. Such fees could 
only be approved by a general meeting of members (NSW s. 58(1); Qld s. 
80(1); Vic s. 107(2); SA s. 68; WA s. 73; ACT 55(1); NT s. 73). In WA, ACT 
and NT, a director or other officer should not borrow except in pursuance 
of a special resolution (WA s. 72A; ACT s. 55(1); NT s. 77(3)). In SA, this 
approval could be by majority of directors (s. 67(l)(a)). In Queensland, 
reasonable travelling expenses might be paid (s. 80(2)). Moreover, in 
NSW the Credit Union Advisory Committee (appointed by the Minister 
under s. 101) could set a cap on director fees (s. 58(2)). In Victoria, a cap
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was determined by Regulations (s. 107(3), and in WA, such a cap was
approved by the Minister (s. 73(2)).
There is evidence of the reinforcement of democratic principles of 
governance in the legislation. Irrespective of the rules of the credit 
union, in NSW, Victoria, WA and ACT no member could hold more 
than 20% of the share capital (NSW s. 43(6); Vic s. 59(9); WA s. 46(1); ACT 
s. 22(6)). In Queensland and NT, each member must hold the same 
number of shares (Qld s. 52; NT s. 49(4)). This ensured that no individual 
should have disproportionate influence over operating decisions. In 
NSW, Queensland, Victoria, SA and WA voting could not be undertaken 
by proxy (NSW s. 62(1A); Qld s. 90(2); Vic s. 111(6); SA s. 73(9); WA s. 
79(7)). In Tasmania, ACT and NT this prohibition applied only unless 
proxies were permitted by the rules (Tas s. 45(1); ACT s. 53(6); NT s. 79(1)). 
Prohibition of voting by proxy prevents an individual from 
disproportionate influence at meetings by exercising proxies.
Voting must be based on one-member-one-vote (NSW s. 62(2); Qld s. 
90(3); SA s. 24(1); WA s. 79(8); Tas s. 4(2); NT s. 79(2)). In the ACT, on a 
poll held at a general meeting, a member was entitled to an additional 
allotment of 1 or 2 votes, where the rules so provide, on the basis of the 
value of goods purchased by the member during the preceding financial 
year (s. 53(2)). The rules of an individual society determined the number 
of votes able to be cast in Victoria (s. 111(3)). The one-member-one-vote 
rule is consistent with the democratic character of the mutual within the 
aims of the credit union movement.
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Prudential supervision of financial institutions has two basic objectives, 
broadly to promote stability in the financial system, and more specifically 
to protect the interests of depositors of a particular institution. This 
philosophy derives from the 1937 Royal Commission on Monetary and 
Banking Systems (Thompson, 1991, p. 115). One prudential mechanism  
was the reduction of loan-specific risks. In NSW, a maximum of $5000 
could be lent unsecured, and a maximum of 1% of the value of the credit 
union's assets if secured (s. 6(7)). In Queensland, the maximum loan size, 
irrespective of security, was $10,000 or 1% of withdrawable funds, 
whichever was greater (s. 65). In SA, WA and NT, credit unions were 
limited to a maximum amount which could be lent for unsecured and 
secured loans, by directions from the Minister, the Registrar and by 
Regulations, respectively (SA s. 41; WA s. 55; NT; s. 58). In Tasmania, the 
rules of the individual societies determined the basis on which loans 
could be made (s. 36(2)). In SA, additional restrictions were placed on 
commercial loans as a proportion of the credit union's portfolio (s. 45).
Gearing limitations were applied. In NSW, SA, WA and NT, money 
could not be raised by way of loan in excess of 25% of members' funds 
(share capital and deposits) within a period of one month (NSW s. 12(4); 
SA s. 38; WA s. 10(4); NT s. 16(3)). The ACT had complex gearing 
requirement for bonds issued or deposits taken from non-members (s. 
36(2)). An ACT society could not borrow more than $2,000 without a 
special resolution of the society (s. 36(5)). Tasmania had no such
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The forms in which credit unions could invest surplus funds was 
regulated. The NSW Act, for example, listed securities for investment of 
surplus funds (s. 19):
• securities authorised for investment of trust funds;
• mortgages of real estate, where permitted by regulation;
• deposits with banks, permanent building societies, and credit 
union associations;
• shares up to a limit of $10,000; and
• other prescribed securities.
Such a list was typical of investment requirements in other jurisdictions 
(Qld s. 57; SA s. 51; WA s. 51; ACT, s. 37; NT s. 54).
The legislation imposed prescribed liquidity ratios and reserve 
requirements, analogous to LGS (Liquid Asset and Government 
Securities) requirements imposed on banks. Credit unions were subject to 
liquidity requirements, whereby a prescribed percentage of share capital 
and deposits are to be held as liquid assets (the definition of which varied 
between jurisdictions). The proportion ranged from 7% to 10%. This was 
supported by a prohibition on issuing loans which would breach this 
requirement (NSW s. 7; Qld s. 69; Vic s. 18(5); SA s. 47; WA s. 60; ACT s. 81 
Regulations; NT s. 63).
Reserves were required to be appropriated, typically based on a portion of
Chapter Four -  Credit Union Regulation
page 98
Chapter Four -  Credit Union Regulation 
the surplus, until a reasonable level of reserves were reached. In NSW
and NT, the size of the appropriation was on the basis of the "mean
balance of assets", the average of the current and preceding year's assets
(NSW s. 50(l)(a); WA s. 61(4); NT s. 64(l)(a)). Credit unions were required
to transfer from the annual operating surplus 0.5% of the mean balance of
assets to a reserve until the reserves amounted to 5% (or in NT, 7.5%) of
the mean balance of assets (NSW s. 50; NT s. 64(1)). In WA, credit unions
were required to appropriate reserves until "net worth" was equal to at
least 5% of "mean assets" (s. 61). In Victoria, 5% of the surplus in any year
is transferred to a reserve fund until the fund represents 25% of capital,
deposits and borrowings (s. 60(1)). In SA, reserves were maintained at 5%
of total assets, measured over a three-year cycle (s. 48(3)). Reserves
included any share capital ranking below deposits, capital gains over the
period (both realised and unrealised) and revenue profits appropriated to
a statutory reserve account (s. 48(1)). In Queensland and the ACT, the
appropriation was 0.3% of the withdrawable funds. The required reserve
amount was 3% (ACT, 2.5%) of the withdrawable funds (Qld s. 70(11);
ACT s. 22A). Reserves so accumulated were protected from distribution
(NSW: s. 50(5); Qld s. 70(7); Vic s. 60(2); SA s. 48(7); WA s. 61A; ACT, s.
22A(6); NT s. 64(6)).
4.2.3 Solvency and supervision
In NSW, the Credit Union Savings Reserve Board administered a fund 
that provided financial assistance to NSW credit unions (ss. 69L-69W).
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The fund was established by compulsory requirements that 0.75% of share
capital and deposits be held in the fund. Similar arrangements existed in
Queensland by the Guarantee Fund (ss. 139-160); in Victoria by the Credit
Societies Guarantee Fund (ss. 21-29); in SA by the Credit Union Deposit
Insurance Fund (ss. 100-117); and in WA by the Credit Unions Savings
Protection Fund (ss. 104A-104M). In NT, a power conferred on credit
unions included the ability to join a mutual aid stabilisation fund
approved by the Minister (s. 14(d)).
Credit unions had industry-based solvency support arrangements. The 
Australian Federation of Credit Unions Leagues Ltd (AFCUL) was formed 
to represent the interests of credit unions. This organisation offered 
centralised clearing and liquidity support facilities. AFCUL and State 
associations, such as the Queensland Co-operative Credit Union League, 
also developed stabilisation and reserve schemes for credit unions,
Registrars had wide powers to inspect credit unions and require returns 
(typically quarterly). In the ACT, the Registrar could inspect books, 
documents or records (s. 5B), require further evidence as to the 
compliance with the Act (s. 6), and if requested by the board or one third 
of the members, conduct an inquiry (s. 7). With the approval of the 
Minister, the Registrar could suspend part or all of the operations of the 
society (s. 58A), appoint an administrator (s. 58B), or have the society 
wound up (s. 59). Similar actions by the relevant statutory authority are 
authorised in Victoria, SA, WA, Tasmania and NT (Qld ss. 128-138 and 
186-199; Vic Parts 5, 8, 9 and 10; SA ss. 5-8; WA ss. 97-104; Tas ss. 19-20A,
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The relevant stabilisation and reserve fund boards exercised extensive 
powers of supervision over credit unions. In NSW, the Credit U nion  
Savings Reserve Board could make rules restricting the operation of 
credit unions, with powers to wind them up in cases of contravention (ss. 
69X-69Z). More generally, the Board could place credit unions under 
direction, bringing into play additional supervisory powers such as 
appointing their own auditors (ss. 69AA-69AE). Similar powers applied 
in Victoria (ss. 30-43); SA (ss. 118-126) and WA (ss. 104N-104ZA).
The differences in State and Territory laws over the important areas of 
concerns are presented in Table 4-1.
4.3 The Brady Report____________________
While the major focus of the Campbell Inquiry was on banks, 
recommendations were also made in respect of "non-bank deposit-taking 
institutions" or "DTIs" -  predominantly building societies and credit 
unions. Consistent with the approach for recommendations on banks, 
Campbell argued for a philosophy of "flexible regulation" -  where DTIs 
are permitted considerable freedom in respect of operational decisions, 
subject to prudential requirements -  rather than "structural regulation", 
in the form of interest rate controls and portfolio restrictions (para 19.15). 
Accordingly, the Report recommended that non-bank DTIs should be 
unrestricted in the range of lending they may undertake and investm ents 
they may hold (para 19.198); should not be subject to restrictions on the
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maturity of their investments (para. 19.200); should have no notice-of-
withdrawal requirements (para. 19.220); and should not be subject to
interest rate controls (para. 19.222).
Based on the philosophical objective of competitive neutrality, the 
approach adopted for banking regulation, according to the Campbell 
committee, should be extended to other deposit-taking intermediaries 
(para. 1918). This would be achieved under a nationally uniform  
framework through State and territory cooperation (para. 19.24). The clear 
intention of the committee was to have a national scheme covering 
building societies and credit unions to eliminate the distortions resulting 
from differences in State prudential regulation (Perkins, 1982, p. 75). 
Direct controls over non-bank financial intermediaries by the 
Commonwealth were not implemented due to concerns regarding 
Constitutional limitations of the federal Parliament (Perkins, 1989, p. 74). 
State regulations of building societies and credit unions therefore 
continued to apply, although in a manner that varied between the states 
(Campbell Inquiry, 1980, para. 3.29). Marked differences developed 
between States in respect of credit union regulation and the amount of 
resources devoted to supervision (Martin Report, 1991, para. 12.58). As 
discussed above, some States were characterised by separate legislation for 
each type of non-bank entity. In others, omnibus statutes covered a range 
of financial institutions. Inconsistencies were particularly significant in 
respect of coverage of friendly societies and agricultural cooperatives 
within the relevant Registrar offices. The Martin Report (1991, para.
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12.63) notes that the prudential guidelines which would apply to financial
institutions under the AFIC arrangements were "likely to follow those
applied by the Reserve Bank to banks". Indeed, the importance of capital
requirements -  the "linchpin of prudential regulation" is emphasised and
supported by the Martin committee (paras. 13.5 and 13.8).
In April 1990, the Queensland Governm ent initiated an independent 
inquiry to review non-bank financial institutions, including building 
societies, credit societies, friendly societies, cooperative housing societies 
and trustee companies. The need for a review was based principally on  
public concern following the collapse of the Pyramid Building Society 
group in Victoria (Brady Report, 1990, p. 2), and associated problems w ith  
institutions such as Tricontinental, the State Bank of South Australia, 
Moe Credit Union, and the West Australian Teachers' Credit Society 
(Windt, 1990, p. 31). The Queensland Treasurer appointed John Brady, 
former Head of Supervision of the Reserve Bank of Australia to chair the 
committee. The Prime Minister placed the issue of non-bank financial 
institution regulation on the agenda of a Special Premiers' Conference on 
30 October 1990, with a view to creating a national regulatory fram ework. 
The committee produced an Interim Report immediately before this 
Conference. The final Report was issued later the same year.
The Brady committee clearly favoured the adoption of prudential rules 
consistent with those applying to banks, citing the emergence of 
internationally agreed standards of supervision in the banking sector as 
best practice (1990, p. 3). The committee firmly believed the application of
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Reserve Bank style supervision as being the appropriate manner in which
DTIs should be regulated (1990, pp. 81-82).
The basic theme of the Brady Report was deregulation of DTI activities but 
increased prudential standards and supervision processes, in line with the 
post-Campbell changes to the banking sector (1990, p. 79). Due to concerns 
about the risks involved in self-regulation with a highly concentrated 
industry, the committee argued that prudential oversight should be 
undertaken through official supervision, although the supervisory body 
should be independent from Government (1990, pp. 80-81). Brady 
recommended (1990, pp. 83-84):
• adoption of a Reserve Bank style of supervision with explicit 
minimum prudential standards in respect of capital adequacy 
and liquidity, backed up by a range of informal supervisory 
procedures;
• appropriate modification of the details of this approach to take 
account of the differences between banks and DTIs; and
• within this style, a uniform supervisory approach to existing 
groups of DTIs.
All DTIs would be supervised by an independent statutory authority 
funded from DTIs themselves (Brady Report, 1990, pp. 85-88). The 
committee also believed national consistency to be important, and 
recommended this be achieved by way of concurrence of the other States 
in adopting consistent prudential standards and the establishment of a
page 104
Chapter Four -  Credit Union Regulation 
national advisory body (1990, p. 85). The preference for a State-based
approach for regulation of non-bank financial institutions rather than a
federal approach was principally related to concerns that direct regulation
by the Commonwealth might be constitutionally invalid.
The Brady Report triggered further proposals for a national supervisory 
scheme. A Working Group was formed comprising officials from the 
Commonwealth, States, Territories and the Reserve Bank. This group 
produced a draft agreement titled "Proposals for Reform of the 
Supervisory Structure for Non-Bank Financial Institutions" in April 1991. 
Heads of Agreement were endorsed at a Premiers' Conference in Canberra 
on 31 May 1991, including the principal goal of "a system of State-based 
prudential supervision of permanent building societies and credit unions 
with national co-ordination of high uniform standards and practices". At 
the Premiers' Conference in Adelaide on 21 and 22 November, 1991, the 
Financial Institutions Agreement was signed, finalising the details of the 
scheme, including initial prudential standards (Gray, 1993).
4.4 The Financial Institutions Scheme_____
The legislative approach for the FI Scheme is described as a cooperative or 
"template" model (Stanford and Beale, 1995, pp. 130-131). Under this 
arrangement, the laws of one State are taken as a template and applied to 
other Australian jurisdictions, such that amendments in the enacting 
State automatically carry to the other States. For the FI Scheme, the 
template was enacted by the Queensland Parliament.
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4.4.1 Legislation
The following represent the major elements of the Queensland model 
legislation:
Australian Financial Institutions Commission Act 1992 (AFIC Act)
Australian Financial Institutions Commission Regulations 1992
Financial Institutions (Queensland) Act 1992 (FI Act)
Financial Institutions (Queensland) Regulations 1992
Financial Institutions (Queensland) Transitional Provisions Act 1992
The Australian Financial Institutions Commission Code (AFIC Code) 
itself is enacted under s. 21 of the AFIC Act, while the Financial 
Institutions Code (FI Code) is set out in s. 30 of the FI Act. Taking this 
legislation as a template, each State applies the Australian Financial 
Institutions Commission Code (AFIC Code), the Australian Financial 
Institutions Commission Regulations (AFIC Regulations), the Financial 
Institutions Code (FI Code) and Regulations (FI Regulations) as if they 
were laws of that State. Collectively, these laws are described as the 
"scheme legislation" of the relevant State. This was achieved by passing 
up to three pieces of State legislation:
9
• an Act import the scheme legislation;
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Financial Institutions (NSW) Act 1992; Financial Institutions (Victoria) Act 1992; 
Financial Institutions (A-p-plication of Laws) Act 1992 (SA); Financial Institutions 
(WA) Act 1992; Financial Institutions (Application of Laws) Act 1992 (Tas.);
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10• an Act to establish the State Supervisory Authority (SSA); and
• an Act to deal with transitional arrangements and older statutes.
The State-based importing legislation followed a standard template. After 
preliminary commencement and interpretation provisions (ss. 1-4) each 
State A ct imported the AFIC Code (s. 5), the AFIC Regulations (s. 6), the FI 
Code (s. 8) and FI Regulations (s. 9); adjusted some definitions to suit the 
local jurisdiction (ss. 7 and 10); conferred functions and powers on AFIC 
(s. 11) and the Australian Financial Institutions Appeals Tribunal (s. 12);
conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Queensland for appeals
l iand referrals of questions of law (s. 13); designated the relevant local 
statutory authority as the State Supervisory Authority (s. 14); bound the 
Crown (s. 15); and authorised the imposition of fees (s. 16) and levies (s. 
17). All States and Territories had passed the appropriate laws by the 
deadline of 1 July 1992, the date of commencement of the FI Scheme.
4.4.2 AFIC Code
The AFIC Code (and its supporting legislation in Queensland, the AFIC 
Act) establishes AFIC (s. 14), the appeals tribunal (s. 64), and the structure
Financial Institutions (NT) Act 1992; Financial Institutions (Application of Laws) Act 
1992 (ACT).
Financial Institutions Commissions Act 1992 (NSW); Queensland Office of Financial 
Supervision Act 1992; South Australian Office of Financial Supervision Act 1992; 
Western Australian Financial Institutions Authority Act 1992; Tasmanian Office o f  
Financial Supervision Act 1992; Financial Institutions (Territory Supervisory 
Authority) Act 1992; Financial Institutions (Supervisory Authority) Act 1992 (ACT).
11 Now repealed.
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for prudential regulation. Under s. 9(1) of the AFIC Code, the principal
objects of the FI Scheme are:
(a) to protect and promote the financial integrity and the 
efficiency of the State-based fiscal bodies system; and
(b) to protect the interests of depositors.
An important principle of supervision, according to the AFIC Code (s.
10(1)0»)) is:
Responsibility for the financial success and viability of fiscal 
bodies rests with their boards and management, not with  
government or supervisors.
Supervision should be aimed at the prevention of problems; be based on 
prudential standards and reporting and disclosure requirements; and 
operate through monitoring, external auditors, reviews of policies and 
performance with directors, and on-site inspections (s. 10(l)(d)).
AFIC is responsible for the establishment of overall supervisory 
guidelines and has responsibility for the following principal objectives of 
the Scheme (s. 15):
• promotion of financial integrity and efficiency;
• development of prudential and supervisory standards;
• information dissemination, including collection of statistics;
• registration and supervision of special service providers;
• supervision of industry funded liquidity support; and
• provision of advice to the Ministerial Council.
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These functions are similar to those under s. 10 of the Reserve Bank o f
Australia Act 1959 (Cth), and endow AFIC with power to operate using a
Reserve Bank style of supervision (Beale and Stanford, 1994, pp. 11-13).
Consistent with policies in respect of the Reserve Bank, AFIC is not
subject to direction by the Government (s. 18). The AFIC Board consists of
12up to 8 persons nominated by the Ministerial Council (MINFIN), plus 
the Executive Director nominated by the AFIC board (ss. 24, 131 and 134). 
The Board has power to make standards, including prudential standards, 
principally in respect of (s. 28):
13• the business and affairs of credit unions;
• industry funded liquidity support arrangements; and
• supervision of credit unions by State supervisory authorities.
State Supervisory Authorities (SSAs) are regulated by the FI Code. SSAs 
are responsible for implementation of the guidelines set by AFIC. A list of 
SSAs by State and Territory jurisdiction is presented in Table 4-2. Under 
the FI Code, SSAs are established (s. 66):
• to register, supervise and regulate credit unions;
• to supervise and enforce compliance with the FI Code and AFIC
12
Two of these directors are nominated by the Interstate Consultative Committee, 
which comprises one representative of each SSA (Financial Institutions Agreement, 
clause 601).
13
The AFIC Code and FI Code refer either to ''societies" (building societies, credit 
unions and other deposit taking financial institutions) or "fiscal bodies" (which also 
includes friendly societies. In this discussion of the FI Scheme legislation, the words
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standards;
• to provide effective and efficient prudential supervision;
• to protect the interests of members of depositors;
• to administer funds established under the FI Code;
• to facilitate or direct transfers of engagements, conversions and 
mergers of credit unions;
• to administer and enforce the FI Scheme in respect of financial 
institutions;
• to provide information and statistics to AFIC; and
• to advise and make recommendations to AFIC.
Supervision is funded by the industry through a Supervision Levy, set in  
consultation with industry bodies and financial institutions (ss. 94-96). 
Special Service Providers (SSPs) fall under the AFIC Code, and must be 
registered with AFIC (s. 26). SSPs must be controlled by the financial 
institutions and are principally responsible for providing treasury 
management services, receiving deposits, investing funds in liquid assets, 
providing loans, and establishing lines of credit (s. 36(2)). The FI Code 
applies to SSPs as if they were credit unions regulated by the FI Code, and 
AFIC was the SSA for that institution (s. 40). On the introduction of the 
Scheme in 1992, the responsibilities of AFCUL and other State and 
Territory credit union associations were centralised into a national
"credit union" will be used to reflect the relevant context.
Chapter Four - Credit Union Regulation
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servicing group, Credit Unions Services Corporation (Australia) Ltd
(CUSCAL) and Credit Union Financial Services (Australia) Ltd (CUFSAL).
A second group, known as CREDITLINK, comprises Credit U nion
Treasury Services Ltd and Credit Union Settlement Services Ltd.
CUSCAL and CREDITLINK are the principal SSPs to the industry.
Table 4-2 -  State Supervisory Authorities
Name o f SSA Acronym
New South Wales Financial Institutions Commission FINCOM
Queensland Office of Financial Supervision QOFS
Registrar of Financial Institutions (ACT) -
Registrar of Financial Institutions (NT) -
South Australian Office of Financial Supervision SAOFS
Tasmanian Office of Financial Supervision TOFS
Victorian Financial Institutions Commission VICFIC
W estern Australian Financial Institutions Authority W AFIA
Source: Stanford and Beale, 1995.
4.4.3 Mutuality
Societies, including building societies and credit unions, are now  
regulated directly by the FI Code rather than State legislation. This 
removes several of the interstate differences discussed above. Part 3 of the  
FI Code sets out principles, objects and characteristics of societies, 
although these principles do not have the force of law. In respect of credit
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unions, the principles set out in the Code generally reflect those of the
credit union movement, namely (s. 108(2) Part B):
• open and voluntary membership;
• democratic control;
• non-discrimination;
• service to members;
• distribution to members;
• building financial stability;
• on-going education;
• cooperation among cooperatives; and
• social responsibility.
Under the FI Code, a society is a "financial co-operative" (s. 109(1)). The 
objects of such a society are (s. 109(2)):
(a) to raise funds by subscription, deposit or otherwise . . .
(b) to apply the funds . . .  in providing financial accommodation 
to its members;
(c) to encourage savings among its members; and
(d) to promote co-operative enterprise, and to provide 
programs and services to its members, to assist its members to 
meet their financial needs.
To enforce the traditional household sector lending of credit unions, 
additional controls are imposed. A credit union must ensure that at least 
60% of the total assets of the credit union are financial accommodation to
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its members (s. 113(2)). Not more than 10% of the total assets can
comprise loans for commercial purposes (s. 113(3)). Carrying on any 
business using the names "credit union", "credit society" or "credit co­
operative" is prohibited except for those organisations registered under 
the FI Code (s. 144(2). The name of a credit union must include the words 
"credit union", "credit society" or "credit cooperative" (AFIC Code s. 
47B(2)).
More significantly, for a credit union, the rules must limit membership of 
the credit union "to persons having a common bond of association" (FI 
Code s. 115(5)(d)(i) and 131(2)). This membership requirement is 
reinforced on both sides of intermediation. A credit union can only 
accept deposits from members, and can only loan money to members 
within this common bond (s. 138). Consistent with the importance of 
pairwise identity between members of a credit union, shares cannot be 
transferred without permission (s. 153).
The FI Code deals with directors in a similar fashion to the pre-AFIC 
legislation, and adds further obligations in respect of conflicts of interest 
adapted from the Corporations Law. A director must be a member of the 
credit union (s. 238(b)). There is to be at most one employee director (s. 
235) who cannot be chairperson of the board (s. 237(2)). Directors may not 
be paid, except with the approval of a general meeting (s. 244). In 
addition, a credit union (or a related body corporate) must not indemnify 
directors against liability (s. 244A). Directors, spouses, and associated 
entities may only borrow from the credit union if the terms are no more
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favourable than one would reasonably be expected if dealing at arm's
length and it is approved by two-thirds' majority of the board of directors
(s. 243(2)). If the loan does not comply with these requirements, it can still
be authorised by a general meeting, with full details made available with
at least 21 days' notice (s. 243(3)). Credit union officers who are not
directors may only borrow with the approval of a majority of the directors
(s. 242). There is a prohibition on the entering into of contracts
("management contracts"), where the management of the credit union is
vested in someone who is not an officer of the society, unless the
permission of the relevant SSA is obtained (s. 245). Duties of honesty,
care and diligence, and a duty not to make improper use of position or
information are imposed in similar terms to the Corporations Law (s.
246).
Democratic governance principles are reasonably consistent with the pre- 
AFIC situation. The position in Queensland and NT, where each 
member must hold the same number of shares, does not apply since the 
FI Code provides for societies to be able to issue "withdrawable shares", 
but credit unions cannot issue "permanent" shares (s. 148). This means 
that for some credit unions, the concept of deposits and shares may 
coincide. The Code limits disproportionate influence by restricting the 
proportion of withdrawable shares controlled by any individual to 10% (s. 
193(l)(d)). The 10% level is a stricter requirement than the pre-AFIC 
proportion of 20%, which applied in NSW, Victoria, WA and ACT. 
Voting rules are also slightly different. Although a stricter rule of one-
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member-one-vote is applied to all credit unions (s. 253(1)), proxies are
permitted if they are provided for in the organisation's rules. A person
exercising proxies, however, may not act for more than 10 other members
who have not specified the way in which their vote is to be exercised
(s. 254). There is no limit to the number of proxies that can be exercised
for members who have specified the way in which the vote is to be cast.
4.4.4 Prudential requirements
Under the FI Scheme, prudential rules are no longer contained within the 
legislation, but now are the subject of standards issued by AFIC. This 
rulemaking power is limited to a number of consultative procedures, 
reflecting the nature of the interstate agreement. Under the AFIC Code, 
the board must consult with the Commonwealth, SSAs, industry bodies, 
financial institutions, and other regulators, including: the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC); the Council of Financial 
Supervisors (COFS); the Insurance and Superannuation Commission 
(ISC); the Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC); and 
the Reserve Bank (s. 23). The statutory procedure involves at least 60 
days' notice of the resolution to SSAs and publishing notices in 
newspapers inviting written suggestions on a proposed standard, and 
subsequently written comments on these suggestions. The AFIC board 
must consider all these suggestions and comments before making or 
amending a standard (s. 29).
The Financial Institutions Agreement, incorporating the initial standards
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relating to prudential supervision and operational matters are annexed to
the AFIC Code as its Schedule. The new arrangements are largely
consistent with the Brady Committee's recommendation that direct
controls over the operations of financial institutions be repealed. Loan-
specific risks are no longer addressed by restrictions on the size of loans,
such as 1% of assets or withdrawable funds. Instead, the concern of AFIC
is to monitor large exposures in a similar manner to the Reserve Bank.
Prior notification and reporting of exposures to individuals or associated
persons above 10% of capital is required. The SSA may prohibit the credit
union from taking on this exposure, or require a higher capital ratio to
support the increased risk (Interstate Agreement Schedule [IAS] cl. 6). The
concern about exposure is also reflected in the limit of more than 10% of
the total assets for commercial lending (s. 113(3)). Gearing limitations and
restrictions on borrowing from non-members are no longer applicable.
The form in which surplus funds can be invested is no longer prescribed.
Liquidity requirements continue to be imposed, but modified to reflect 
reliance on the Reserve Bank's Prime Asset Requirement (PAR) 
mechanism. Liquid funds are to comprise 7% of all liabilities. The 
numerator for the ratio is based on the PAR numerator broadened to 
include bank deposits and bills, State or Territory Government issued or 
guaranteed securities, and deposits held with SSPs. CUFSAL acts as the 
national treasury for most Australian credit unions, investing statutory 
liquidity funds on behalf of individual institutions of over $2 billion. 
Credit unions are also required to set up comprehensive liquidity
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m anagem ent systems to monitor and manage operational liquidity and
liquidity risk prudently, to the satisfaction of the relevant SSA. This
approach is also based on the Reserve Bank liquidity supervision
m echanism (IAS cl. 4). More generally, credit unions m ust im p lem en t
risk management systems to control credit risk, liquidity risk and interest
rate risk (IAS cl. 5).
Table 4-3 - Risk Weightings for Capital Adequacy Assessment
Assets Risk (%)
Notes and coin, short term Commonwealth debts 0
Long term Commonwealth debt, State Government debt 10
Bank liabilities, local government liabilities 20
Residential mortgage loans 50
All other assets and claims (personal unsecured loans) 100
Source: Davis, 1994.
Requirements to accumulate reserves to a m inim um  level, by 
appropriations of surpluses, have been replaced by the adoption of a 
Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR). Effectively, this adopts the 
Reserve Bank's risk-weighted capital adequacy mechanism, discussed 
above. Credit unions m ust maintain at least 8% capital of which 75% (i.e. 
6% of capital) must be "core" or "Tier 1". These capital requirem ents 
m ight be increased if a credit union were to take on abnormal risks or 
failed to develop adequate risk management systems (IAS cl. 2). Table 4-3 
presents the risk weightings applicable to credit union assets under the
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AFIC Code.
Other prudential requirements in the AFIC standards include a formula 
for providing for doubtful debts for both secured and unsecured loans 
(IAS cl. 3), as well as general prohibitions against conducting financial 
intermediation through subsidiaries (IAS cl. 7), against making 
guarantees to third parties (IAS cl. 8) and against involvement with 
managed funds, such as superannuation (IAS cl. 11).
4.4.5 Solvency and supervision
AFIC can compel credit unions to provide liquidity support, on a 
proportional basis, to a credit union in an emergency (FI Code s. 42). 
Emergency lending of this kind is only compelled under restricted 
circumstances (s. 45), and AFIC is required to encourage SSPs to facilitate 
the provision of liquidity support (s. 46). AFIC also requires mandatory 
participation by all credit unions in a solvency support scheme (LAS cl. 
17), replacing the range of State and industry based schemes in operation 
before the FI Scheme. This solvency support scheme is facilitated through 
SSPs and with the supervision of AFIC, under Part 3 of the AFIC Code (s. 
47). CUFSAL manages 85% of funds for this scheme.
Under the FI Code, SSAs are also required to establish a Credit Unions 
Contingency Fund (ss. 97-105D). Credit unions are required by SSAs to 
deposit a proportion of their total liabilities in these Contingency Funds. 
These funds are intended (s. 97(2)):
• to provide protection for members of credit unions;
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• to facilitate mergers and transfers of engagements between
credit unions or between credit unions and building societies;
• to facilitate the rehabilitation of credit unions;
• to facilitate the liquidation of credit unions; and
• to facilitate the payment to and collection of levies.
Powers to supervise credit unions analogous to those of Registrars and 
Government solvency support boards are now vested in the relevant SSA 
under the FI Code. The SSA is vested with wide ranging powers of 
information gathering from financial institutions and SSPs, including 
taking evidence on oath or affirmation (ss. 75-76). Inspectors may be 
appointed with powers of entry, search and seizure supported by 
magisterial warrants (ss. 77-86). On application of a majority of directors, 
or 10% of its members, or of its own initiative, the SSA can call a special
meeting of a credit union, or hold an inquiry into its affairs (s. 87). W here
it is desirable to protect the public or otherwise in the public interest, the 
SSA can initiate special investigations under Part 10 of the FI Code, with  
functions and powers analogous to investigations carried out by ASIC. 
The SSA also has a special power of intervention. A credit union can be 
placed under direction if the SSA believes that (s. 88):
• the credit union has repeatedly contravened the financial 
institutions legislation;
• the credit union is trading unprofitably or has an accumulated 
deficit in its profit and loss appropriation account; or
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• the affairs of a credit union are being conducted in an improper
of financially unsound way.
The SSA is likewise empowered to suspend part or all of a credit union's 
operations (s. 89), to appoint an administrator (ss. 90-93), or wind it up (s. 
340). AFIC has similar enforcement powers in respect of SSPs and 
supervision of industry funded solvency support arrangements (AFIC 
Code ss. 50-63).
4.5 Changes to pre-Scheme Regulation
Table 4-4 presents the major changes introduced by the FI Scheme in 
respect of the issues discussed in respect of mutuality, prudence, solvency 
and supervision. It is apparent that the FI Code has not only removed 
interstate differences in credit union governance structures, but also 
reinforced and expanded the legislative features consistent with the credit 
union as a mutual organisation. The legacy of cooperative statutes 
covering both credit unions and other organisations, as in Victoria, 
Tasmania and the ACT, has been overcome. Membership is now strictly 
based on a common bond of association. A credit union may only make 
loans to, and accept deposits from, its members. Directors must be 
members and the principle that they be unpaid voluntary officers is now  
applied consistently. In addition, the FI Code imports a range of duties, 
particularly in respect of conflicts of interest, from the Corporations Law.
Disproportionate influence through individual financial holdings in the 
credit union has been addressed by a limit of 10% of withdrawable shares,
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Table 4-4 -  The Financial Institutions Scheme
Pre-AFIC Issue FI Scheme
M utuality
Loan restricted to members FI Code s. 138
Deposits also restricted to members.
Membership based strictly on com m on bond 
of association: FI Code s. 131(2).
Director m ust be member FI Code s. 238(b)
Directors not to be paid FI Code s. 244
No m em ber to hold more than 20% FI Code s. 192(l)(d)
No more than 10% of w ithdraw able shares.
No proxies FI Code s. 254
Limit of holding proxies for 10 other 
members if voting discretion involved.
One m em ber one vote rule FI Code s. 253(1)
Prudence
Loans limited in size No similar provision.
AFIC concerned w ith  avoidance of large 
exposures to individuals (>10% capital). 
(IAS d .  6).
A limit of commercial loans of 10% assets 
applies (FI Code s. 113(3)).
At least 60% of credit union assets m ust be 
loans to members: FI Code s. 113(2).
Gearing No similar provision.
Investm ent of surplus funds No similar provision.
Liquidity AFIC Standard
Ratio of 7% liquid assets to liabilities, based 
on an expanded RBA PAR formula.
Comprehensive liquidity m anagem ent 
systems to be im plemented (IAS cl. 4).
Reserves AFIC Standard
Ratio of 8% risk-assessed capital w ith  6% to 
comprise core capital.
Risk weightings and capital definitions based 
on RBA CAR mechanism. Increased ratio for 
abnormal risks or inadequate risk 
m anagement systems (IAS cl. 2).
Solvency support schemes AFIC Code Part 6 
AFIC Standard (IAS cl. 17) 
FI Code ss. 97-105D
Supervision AFIC Code Part 8
FI Code ss. 75-93, s. 340 and Part 10
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which is stricter than the figure of 20% in some pre-AFIC laws.
Importantly, the one-member-one-vote principle is now entrenched
without exception, although proxies are now permitted, which is more
liberal than some pre-AFIC statutes.
Prudential requirements under AFIC largely reflect the application of the 
Reserve Bank style of supervision. Only two operational restrictions, on  
gearing and the investment of surplus funds, have no directly similar 
provision in the new supervisory arrangements. Loan specific risk is now  
addressed by notification of large exposures to individuals, and a limit of 
10% in respect of commercial loans. The other loans requirement, that at 
least 60% of credit union assets must be in the form of financial 
accommodation to members, is designed to be a character reinforcing 
measure given the perceived importance of the credit union sector to 
household finance. Liquidity requirements are merely an extension of 
the Reserve Bank's PAR formula, coupled with new requirements for 
comprehensive liquidity and risk management systems similar to banks.
The major difference lies in the introduction of a capital adequacy 
requirement taken from the banking sector. Importantly, the required 
ratio is identical to banks at 8% of risk-weighted assets, although 75% of 
this must constitute core or "Tier 1" capital. Banks only need 50% (or 4% 
of risk-weighted assets) to constitute core capital. The risk weightings and 
capital definitions are taken from the Reserve Bank's CAR mechanism.
Little changed in respect of solvency support schemes and supervision,
except that the role of supervisor, combining both pre-AFIC roles of the
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Registrar and solvency fund board, was placed in the hands of SSAs.
4.6 Summary____________________________
It is apparent that the FI Scheme implements two policies, apart from the 
elimination of interstate differences in legislation, One is the 
reinforcement of the institutional character of the credit union in terms 
of membership and governance structures. The other, consistent with the 
general approach of both the Campbell and Brady inquiries, is the 
adoption of a functional approach to prudential regulation, with the 
object of competitive neutrality. At issue for this thesis is whether these 
two policies conflict. AFIC applies prudential requirements to both 
building societies and credit unions that reflect the approach of the 
Reserve Bank and international banking practice. The principal 
mechanism for prudential supervision is the minimum risk-weighted 
capital requirement. The following chapter questions competitive 
neutrality, and whether the imposition of a capital requirement is 
appropriate, given its underlying assumptions and incompatibilities with  
mutual organisational forms. It brings together the analysis of credit 
unions to draw conclusions as to the likely impact of the FI Scheme, 
particularly in respect of the integrity of the common bond of association.
Chapter Four -  Credit Union Regulation
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Chapter Five 
Impact of the Financial 
Institutions Scheme
The previous chapter discussed the legislative regulatory fram ew ork  fo r  
cred it unions, and the changes introduced by the FI Scheme. A  s ign ifican t 
aspect o f the Scheme is the group ing of b u ild in g  societies and cred it 
un ions w ith in  the one legislative and supervisory structure. This chapter 
argues tha t a fa ilu re  to appreciate the economic differences between these 
in te rm ed iaries explains conflicts between the FI Scheme regulations and 
the ins titu tion a l fo rm  o f cred it unions, pa rticu la rly  in  the im p o s itio n  o f a 
capita l adequacy requirement.
M any aspects o f the FI Scheme support the m u tua l nature o f cred it 
un ions and the im portance o f the com m on bond to the ir com para tive  
economic advantages, as discussed in  Chapter Three. P rinc ipa lly , these 
aspects include:
• exp lic it adoption of cooperative princip les d raw n  from  the  
cred it un ion  m ovem ent in  the FI Code (s. 108(2) Part B);
• endorsem ent o f the cred it un ion  as a " financia l coopera tive", 
and the inc lus ion  of objectives of p rom o tion  o f cooperative 
enterprise, and services to members (s. 109(2));
• restric tion  on m em bership o f credit un ions to persons w ith in
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the common bond of association (s. 131(2));
• restriction on accepting deposits, and making loans, only to 
members within this common bond (s. 138);
• voting on the basis of one-member-one-vote (s. 253(1)); and
• non-payment of directors, except in limited cases (s. 244).
Directors' duties have been enhanced, particularly in respect of potential 
conflicts of interest, based on the Corporations Law. This is also 
appropriate since, as was discussed in section 3.3.3, there will be fewer 
constraints on management where the common bond is weaker, which  
can lead to self-interested behaviour unlikely to be corrected by the credit 
union membership.
A major area of concern, however, is the extension of Reserve Bank style 
prudential regulations to credit unions: in particular, the imposition of a 
risk-weighted capital adequacy requirement. The conflicts between this 
mechanism and credit union structure are discussed first. It is then  
argued that the introduction of the measure can be explained by a policy 
of competitive neutrality and a failure to appreciate the organisational 
differences between non-bank financial institutions. Finally, the 
predicted impacts of the FI Scheme are elaborated.
5.1 Capital Adequacy____________________
The assessment of the impact of the FI Scheme begins with a discussion of
the problems of the major element of prudential supervision, the capital
adequacy requirement. Some inherent problems with the mechanism are
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discussed, which are as relevant to banks and building societies as they are
to credit unions. Two areas of particular concern in respect of applying
capital adequacy to credit unions are canvassed. One is that the principal
policy objective of capital adequacy -  avoiding excessive risk-taking -  is
already addressed by the mutual organisation form, particularly in respect
of the agency costs of debt. The other is that a capital adequacy
requirement assumes an ability to raise equity funding, which is
incompatible with an organisation with no permanent capital.
5.1.1 Inherent problems
Valentine (1991, p. 40) noted that the Campbell committee failed to 
consider unintended consequences of a capital adequacy requirement. 
Several inherent problems with the Reserve Bank's use of capital 
adequacy are identified in the literature. One issue is the reliance on 
historical cost accounting measurements. The distortions and potential 
biases from the use of historical cost accounting techniques can provide a 
misleading indication of a bank's capacity to absorb losses to protect 
depositors (Hogan and Sharpe, 1990). For example, the asset revaluation 
reserve arising from revaluation of bank premises counts as Tier 2 capital. 
A bonus share issue based on this revaluation converts this to Tier 1 
capital. The capital adequacy requirement can thereby be subverted by the 
use of creative accounting. In 1988, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation revalued its headquarters from $20 million to $1.1 billion, 
permitting (together with a rights issue) an expansion in its lending
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which increased group assets from $70.3 billion to $108.6 billion by 1990
(Sykes, 1994).
Another problem is that the risk-adjusted capital adequacy requirement 
bears little relation to market-related risks. In particular, the capital 
adequacy requirement distorts the allocation of credit, due to the 
unsophisticated risk weightings used by the Reserve Bank (Hogan, 1989). 
An effect of differential weighting is to encourage low risk category 
activities at the expense of those of higher risk, to segment financial 
markets, and to alter effective interest margins between alternative forms 
of financing, leading to significant market distortions (Hogan and Sharpe, 
1990, p. 191; Kim and Santomero, 1988). The weights used by the Reserve 
Bank artificially favour lending against residential housing secured by 
mortgage, by implicitly assuming that all other forms of collateral are 
irrelevant for the risk assessment. This argument applies more forcefully 
to credit unions where the scope for capital raising is limited or absent.
Davis (1990a) notes that capital adequacy requirements would also have 
an impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy, although not to the 
same degree as the previous LGS/SRD and PAR mechanisms. The 
relationship with monetary policy derives from the capital requirement s 
effect on: interest rate setting practices; the relative size of the banking 
sector; constraints on bank expansion; relative costs for particular types of 
financing; and the nature of bank intermediation.
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5.1.2 Assumption of risk-taking behaviour
Although a range of different justifications might be used for regulatory 
capital requirements (Berger, Herring and Szego, 1995), a common them e  
is the protection against excessive risk-taking (Ball and Stoll, 1998, p. 3).
Davis (1990b) discusses the potential impact of the Reserve Bank's risk- 
weighted capital adequacy requirements on Australian banks. He states 
that two arguments can be advanced for linking bank capital structure to 
riskiness of assets. One is that the capital structure of a bank may in vo lve  
a risk of deposit default that is too high, particularly where contagion may 
create widespread undesirable social effects. Riskier assets imply higher 
chance of default and justify the additional capital to avoid or reduce 
depositor losses. A second argument is that the nature of the political 
environment means that banks are being provided with underpriced 
deposit insurance. Depositors believe that there is a government-backed 
guarantee against bank deposits, or that in the case of default, a 
government will not allow depositors to suffer. In both cases, the capital 
requirements address concerns of banks taking excessive risks to 
maximise the value to shareholders, an example of the agency costs of 
debt.
Minimum capital requirements reduce the possibility of runs on credit 
unions in an environment of no deposit insurance and, unlike banks, no 
implicit government guarantee of deposits. The impact of losses on 
member confidence may be diminished if they fall on communal rather
Chapter Five -  Impact of the FI Scheme
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than private wealth (Davis, 1994, p. 37). According to the Campbell
committee, "true capital" plays an "indispensable role in providing a
margin of safety for depositors" (para. 19.189). On this basis, Campbell
recommended that non-bank DTIs should be subject to appropriate capital
ratios (para. 19.209). Given that interest rates will normally include a
margin for risk of default based on experience, the capital requirement can
only be of benefit if it is to cope with abnormal default situations. Davis
(1994, p. 39), however, assesses the requirement of 8% for credit unions to
be "grossly excessive".
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) believe that the primary concern for capital, 
from a public policy perspective, is based on the existence of incentives for 
excessive risk-taking by bankers. The lack of incentive to constrain risk in 
lending is a moral hazard problem (Hogan and Sharpe, 1990). Prudential 
regulation can be characterised as a response by government to the moral 
hazard problems stemming from the government's role as de facto 
insurer of deposits (Davis, 1997, p. 5). The incentives to increase risk can 
be conceptualised within an option pricing framework, in which  
maximising the value of shareholders' equity entails maximisation of the 
option value through increased leverage and asset risk (Merton, 1977; 
Black, Miller and Posner, 1978; Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Dothan and 
Williams, 1980; Marcus and Shaked, 1984; Diamond and Dybvig, 1986). 
This is an application of the agency problems of debt, discussed in Chapter 
Three. The existence of agency problems may explain the failure of the 
"textbook perspective" of increased efficiency from competition in the
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financial sector following Campbell (Davis, 1995, pp. 45-46). Deregulation
had reduced constraints on management behaviour, as well as the
inherent "franchise" value of a bank licence and managerial tenure. Real
profits expected over the long term through barriers to entry and stable
market share were removed. These changes led to management
incentives to increase risk-taking (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995) that
should have been matched by increased monitoring of management.
Such monitoring, through improvement in corporate governance or
market discipline, was lacking.
There is a conflict of objectives when capital adequacy requirements are 
imposed on credit unions. Prudential requirements are designed to 
reduce agency costs of debt, by reducing excessive risk-taking. Mutual 
organisations, as discussed in Chapter Three, are likely to have strong 
incentives for excessive safety, not only from the identity of depositors 
and members, but also due to agency relationships between members and 
management in the absence of market disciplining processes (Davis, 1995, 
p. 51). Prudential requirements based on assumptions of a clear 
distinction between members and managers are therefore questionable 
(Davis, 1994, p. 35). Credit unions do not have the same moral hazard 
problems as the corporate banks and should not be regulated as if they do 
(Hickson and McKillop, 1996, p. 136).
5.1.3 Assumption of equity raising
The minimum capital adequacy mechanism assumes an ability to raise
page 129
Chapter Five -  Impact of the FI Scheme 
capital. As the Campbell committee notes (1981, para. 19.82, emphasis
added):
The effect of [a capital requirement] is to protect depositors by 
ensuring that any increase in a bank's holding of 'risky7 assets 
beyond what is prudent, having regard to its existing capital 
base, is matched by an appropriate increase in its capital, i.e. is 
financed from equity rather than depositors' funds.
Commentaries on regulatory capital agree that the requirement is 
intended to ensure the appropriate raising of capital, through issue of 
equity shares, to address increased risks. Dahl and Shrieves (1990) find 
banks that are undercapitalised by regulatory standards are likely to issue 
equity. Ball and Stoll (1998, p. 4, emphasis added) state:
If a firm is required to hold more equity by regulators, it simply 
issues equity shares at a fair price and invests the proceeds at a 
fair price.
In similar fashion, Perkins observed (1989, pp. 68-69, emphasis added):
The principal aim of the new capital adequacy controls was to 
give banks an inducement to raise relatively larger amounts of 
capital if their business on the assets side was relatively [riskier].
While banks and building societies can raise equity capital from shares, 
credit unions operating in a mutual organisational form can only 
generate capital through increasing retained surpluses. In a study of 
capital management of Victorian building societies (both shareholder- 
owned and mutual) over the period 1970 to 1988, Sharpe (1991) concludes 
that mutual societies have little capacity to modify their capital in the 
short or medium term -  a matter he believes should concern prudential 
regulators (p. 77).
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The Campbell committee was aware of the special nature of the capital
structure of credit unions and "co-operative" building societies. These
institutions do not have any substantial conventional, non-withdrawable
capital (para. 19.185). In particular, credit union members can receive
their share capital back when they cease to be members and hence any
capital contribution has no fixed nature (para. 19.187).
The Brady committee also noted that a supervisory system based on 
capital adequacy would be inconsistent with DTIs whose ownership and 
control systems are unsuited to the raising of capital. The solution,
according to the committee, was to legislate to provide for all DTIs to
adopt a capital structure based on the issue of permanent equity or "non-
withdrawable" shares (1990, p. 90). This recommendation was not
implemented in the FI Scheme. Only building societies are permitted to 
issue permanent share capital under the FI Code (s. 148(2)). This further 
highlights the inconsistency between a capital requirements and credit 
union organisational form.
A conflict is inherent between the prudential mandate to increase capital, 
and the cooperative objectives of the credit union. Increasing surplus 
implies maximising the trading gap, which is the opposite to the Taylor 
(1971) model of credit union behaviour discussed in Chapter Three. 
Increasing capital requires profiting from transactions with members, 
whereas increasing member welfare may involve lowering loan interest 
rates or increasing the provision of services to depositors as implicit 
interest (Davis, 1995).
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Another effect of capital adequacy without a permanent capital source is
that credit unions can only grow with a commensurate increase in capital.
Rapid growth requires rapid increases in credit union surpluses, which
might be inconsistent with pricing of loans to attract business. This
disadvantage is not applicable to building societies and banks, which can
raise capital from equity investment (Davis, 1994, p. 40). Such a difference
may introduce a competitive bias towards shareholder-owned
institutions.
5.2 Appreciation of Institutional Differences
The previous section demonstrated that a capital requirement was 
inconsistent with the mutual organisational form of the credit union, 
particularly in the misdirected policy of reducing risk-taking behaviour, 
and in assumptions of the ability to raise equity through issue of shares. 
This section provides an explanation for the adoption of the measure: 
that the policy goal of competitive neutrality between financial 
institutions limited the ability of policy makers to appreciate the 
important institutional differences between shareholder-owned and 
mutual institutions.
5.2.1 Competitive neutrality
The Brady Committee accepts and endorses one of the important themes 
of the Campbell Inquiry, namely the goal of competitive neutrality 
between financial institutions (Beale and Stanford, 1994, p. 5). The 
committee implicitly adopts a functional regulatory stance in making its
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recommendations based on two groups of institutions; namely, those
providing intermediation and those providing financial services. Both
building societies and credit unions are merged into the same functional
group by treating them as "deposit-taking intermediaries" (DTIs) (Brady
Report, 1990, pp. 74-75). This approach treats building societies and credit
unions as effectively the same for the purposes of regulation (1990, p. 83):
Building and credit societies have much in common. Both 
raise funds from, and lend to, the household sector. Over time, 
there has been a general convergence of their balance sheet 
structures -  a process that is likely to accelerate after 
deregulation . . . Existing institutional boundaries are more a 
result of historical accident than of natural market 
segmentation. In the Committee's view, there is no case for 
treating existing institutional groups differently from the 
perspective of supervision.
This competitive neutrality approach is also found in the imposition of 
the same capital requirements for all credit unions, regardless of size or 
common bond. Such an approach improperly assumes homogeneity 
among credit unions (Davis, 1994, p. 40). Hogan (1989, p. 65) notes:
This perverse outcome can only be understood in terms of the 
fundamental objectives of uniform international capital 
adequacy requirements . . . soundness and stability in
international banking, and competitive equality amongst 
international banks.
5.2.2 Concerns about credit unions
Competitive neutrality can be argued to be inappropriate on the basis that 
financial institutions differ in important respects, including different 
clientele, "cultures" and risk characteristics. Thompson (1990, pp. 4-5) of 
the Reserve Bank states:
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Building societies and credit unions are much closer to banks in 
the type of retail services they offer. But, again, they have 
sufficient differences -  in ownership structures and business 
emphasis -  to justify continued existence as distinct groups.
The Campbell committee believed that credit unions should escape the 
proposed prudential arrangements due to the special characteristics of 
mutuality and the common bond. Significantly, the Interim Report of the 
Campbell Committee notes the importance of the "common bond" in 
influencing a high rate of growth in the industry (Campbell Inquiry, 1980, 
para. 3.8). The common bond is seen in particular as helpful in the 
assessment of credit worthiness of borrowers and minimising bad debts 
(para. 5.102). This informational role for credit unions is consistent with  
the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Three.
The recommendation of the Campbell committee regarding application of 
prudential standards, including the need for a capital base, was limited to 
those credit unions "which borrow funds from the public" (1981, 
para. 19.190). By implication, credit unions for which mutuality through 
the common bond remains the important operating principle only 
borrow from their members and so fall outside these recommendations 
(Campbell Committee, 1981, para. 19.25):
Institutions, such as smaller credit unions, that operate on the 
mutual principle in a meaningful sense and do not solicit 
'public' funds would have to be specially treated for regulatory 
purposes.
In commenting on the proposed shift to a national statement of 
prudential standards, Uri Windt, the Deputy Registrar in NSW, states that
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building societies and credit unions require different prudential
standards, and in particular, "differing versions of capital adequacy"
(Windt, 1990, p. 39). The State and Territory Registrars, in submissions to
the Premiers' Conference, supported the adoption of the principles of the
Reserve Bank capital adequacy approach, but only in respect of building
societies (Conference of Registrars and Co-operatives, 1990, para. 5.4).
Even the Brady committee did not propose complete elimination of 
differences between building societies and credit unions. This was based 
on the institutions' own strongly held preference to retain their own  
identities, and the benefits from limiting potential contagion, in the event 
of a liquidity crisis (1990, p. 83). The committee also recommended an 
exception to the functional regulatory approach in respect of smaller 
institutions with a mutual structure and "traditional" approach to their 
operations. The Report recommended that prudential supervisors be 
granted power to exempt institutions with assets of less than $1 m illion  
from full compliance with the prudential guidelines (Brady Report, 1990, 
p. 94).
5.2.3 Perceived erosion of common bond
Given these concerns, a question arises as to why the outcome of the FI 
Scheme did not reflect these concerns. One explanation is that the 
recommendations of the Brady committee, and later discussions of the FI 
Scheme, were partly based on a perception that differences between these 
institutions and other financial intermediaries had been eroded. Unlike
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the Campbell committee, the common bond was not seen as a significant
factor affecting credit union behaviour (Brady Report, 1990, p. 28):
The original self-help philosophy of credit unions provided for 
ownership of the society by its members and operation of the 
society for their benefit. Members originally had a common  
bond of association which encompassed occupational, 
industrial, religious or ethnic links. The recent tendency,
however, has been for credit unions to outgrow the base 
associated with their common bond and to become 
community-based with few, if any, restrictions on eligibility for 
membership.
Such a sentiment is consistent with some observations of decay in 
traditional rationales for the resolution of collective agency problems in 
mutual organisations (Buckland and Thion, 1991). This perception might 
also be explained by the fact that the Brady inquiry was limited to 
Queensland. It was not a national investigation of financial institutions, 
despite the implementation of its major recommendations in the other 
jurisdictions. The perceived erosion of the importance of the common 
bond may have been influenced by local conditions. Credit unions were 
highly concentrated in Queensland, with the largest 8 credit unions 
holding 83% of total credit union assets, and the largest 12 holding 93% in 
1990 (Brady Report, 1990, Table 2.7, p. 30). Given the relative size of these 
institutions, it is likely that few local credit unions were operating under 
the mutual principles "in a meaningful sense" as described by Campbell.
Until 1968, there was no separate credit union legislation in Queensland. 
The operations of credit unions were instead governed by the Co­
operative Societies Act 1946-1962, which authorised credit unions to trade 
in goods, and to accept deposits from non-members (Stanford, 1969, p.
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109). Such rules are at odds with traditional operational principles of
credit unions, and may have undermined the importance of mutuality to
institutions in Queensland. By contrast, in NSW credit unions have been
dominant since the movement's inception (Runcie, 1969b, p. 225). Had
the Brady inquiry examined NSW financial institutions, the committee
might have reached different conclusions.
Evidence supporting this argument can be found in the record of 
opposition to the introduction of the FI Scheme in NSW, in the report of 
a select committee of the Parliament on that State's adoption of its 
template legislation (NSW Select Committee, 1992). The urgency of the 
Scheme's introduction meant that the Select Committee had a mere 
eleven days, from 8 to 11 May 1992, to prepare its report. The rush in  
implementing the FI Scheme, not only in NSW but in the other States 
and Territories, by the starting date of 1 July 1992 might also explain the 
lack of attention by policy makers to possible institutional differences and 
unintended consequences. Although the Select Committee 
recommended adoption of the Bill without amendment, it also believed 
the process of consultation between the AFIC Steering Committee and 
individual credit unions was unsatisfactory. It noted that smaller credit 
unions and building societies may suffer hardship from the Scheme, and 
recommended a later review of the legislation, if necessary. In receiving 
written submissions and evidence of witnesses, the Select Committee 
found little of concern on the part of building societies, but opinion was 
divided in the credit union movement. Representatives of peak bodies
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such as AFCUL believed the consultative process to have been genuine
and thorough. Some credit unions believed that they had insufficient
opportunity to understand the full ramifications of the legislation,
particularly given that the draft prudential standards had been released
later than expected on 11 May 1992. Joining credit unions and building
societies in the same legislation was seen as retrograde by some NSW
credit unions.
5.3 Effects on Credit Unions______________
The following sections elaborate the predicted effects of the FI Scheme on 
credit unions. First are outlined the elements of the Scheme which, in 
contrast to international concerns, are not structural change issues for the 
Australian situation. These have been identified as unacceptably small 
institutions and the participation of non-user investor members. Both 
these potential challenges to credit union integrity have been addressed in 
the Scheme legislation.
Four specific areas of impact of the FI Scheme, and particularly the 
imposition of a capital requirement, are then examined. These effects are 
expected to include:
• increased emphasis on profitability to maintain m inim um  
capital;
• changes to loan portfolio composition;
• accumulation of surpluses; and
• increased costs for smaller credit unions in respect of
page 138
Chapter Five -  Impact of the FI Scheme 
management and compliance costs.
5.3.1 Concerns addressed by the Scheme
Cooperative institutional forms have developed in a slow process of 
evolution, through experience of success and failure of internal rules and 
practices. Recent concerns have been expressed in the cooperative and 
nonprofit literature that regulatory changes might threaten the integrity 
of mutual organisations. Two matters of international concern have, 
however, been satisfactorily addressed by the FI Code. One concern is the 
"generalized and indiscriminate acceptance" of cooperatives established 
with a very small number of members, as little as three or four, and the 
growth of "simplified cooperatives" which are authorised to concentrate 
their administration in a single person and operate outside regulatory 
supervision or audit requirements (Kaplan de Drimer, 1997). This might 
undermine the interactive dynamics of cooperatives; their ethical values, 
common purpose and association of efforts and resources of their 
members. In Australian, this factor is unlikely to be an issue. Although  
the pre-AFIC legislation in the ACT required a minimum of only 7 
persons (s. 16(1)), and in Tasmania, 15 (s. 5(2)), the other jurisdictions 
required at least 25 or more persons over 18 years of age (NSW, s. 20; Qld, 
s. 7; SA, s. 11; WA, s. 18; NT, s. 24). The FI Code now insists on 25 as the 
minimum number of members for registration as a credit union (s. 
114(4)). Failure to maintain this number can result in winding up (s.
341(1)«).
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The other concern is the increase in participation of traditionally external
persons or entities, which conflicts with the traditional view that
members be associated by common socio-economic needs, be owners of
the capital, in charge of the cooperative's administration and the main
users of its services. In some of European countries, capital has been
sought from non-user investor members; those who do not use the
services of the cooperatives but merely wish to make profitable
investments. This has resulted in changes to rules regarding capital, such
as granting of voting rights proportionate to the level of investm ent
(undermining the one-member-one-vote principle); authorising
significant powers of administration or supervision (undermining
solidarity and self-help); and special concessions in respect of surpluses
and interest payments on contributed capital (contrary to the principle of
benefits being distributed according to participation by use of services). In
the context of the FI Code, the development is unlikely to occur in
Australian credit unions. As discussed in Chapter Four, the one-member-
one-vote rule (with limited proxy rights) has now been entrenched across
all jurisdictions. Both the issue of "permanent" share capital, and the
creation of management contracts are prohibited.
5.3.2 Profitability and growth
Prudential regulation is widely assumed to do the least harm to the 
efficiency of financial markets if there is minimum interference with 
operating decisions and framed so as to be flexible to allow the
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intermediaries to adjust to changing circumstances (Campbell Inquiry,
1981, para. 18.30). Unless financial institutions are indifferent to their
capital position, however, the imposition of a capital requirement will
affect operational decisions (Davis, 1990a, p. 69). This creates an
inconsistency between the prudential requirements and the stated
objectives of reform within the financial sector (Greinke, 1998).
Beale and Stanford (1994, p. 17) argue that the inability of credit unions to 
raise equity capital will, in the context of the core capital requirement, 
restrict growth. Expansion is limited by the extent of retained earnings, 
which is likely to be restricted by increasing competitive pressure from 
banks. The formal relationship between credit union growth and the 
capital adequacy requirement is demonstrated by Davis (1994, pp. 41-42). If 
asset composition is assumed constant, then the required capital ratio (R) 
can be represented as:
A  =
NA,
TA
where NA is net assets and TA is total assets. This can be rewritten as:
_ # 4 ^ 0 +&«)
TA - \Q - + 8 ta)
i£ na)
1 + 8 t a
where gNA is the growth rate of net assets, and gTA is the growth rate of
p
total assets. If the capital ratio is kept constant, i.e. -----= 1, then
A - i
Sna ~ St a or ROI = gTA, where ROI is the return on investment. The capital
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ratio will rise or fall where the return on investment is greater or lesser
than the growth in total assets, respectively.
These relationships suggest a number of consequences for credit union  
financial management. Principally, credit unions must seek a particular 
target rate of return on investment to maintain capital adequacy, 
particularly when faced with growth opportunities. Davis (1994, p. 43) 
observes:
One unfortunate consequence of the capital requirements, and 
an apparent objective of AFIC, is to focus the attention of credit 
union management upon achieving an "adequate" surplus 
each year, regardless of whether this is in the members' best 
interests or not.
An effective statutory mandate to increase or maintain profitability 
challenges the mutual objectives of the organisation. A profit objective 
can be regarded as essentially inconsistent with credit union aims. One of 
the major cooperative principles is return of surpluses to members 
through enhancement of services or better savings and borrowing rates. 
In Taylor7s (1971) model, for example, the objective was minimisation of 
the interest rate differential subject to covering average costs. A profit 
objective implies maximising this margin subject to market conditions. 
This requires raising of loan interest rates, which might not be 
competitive, particularly in the housing loan area, or further increase the 
risk of loan default.
If manager's self-interest is ameliorated by the strength of the com m on  
bond, then the introduction of a requirement to achieve surpluses to
page 142
____________________________________________Chapter Five - Impact of the FI Scheme
meet prudential requirements may erode the effectiveness of the
common bond in addressing management behaviour. One issue
confronting the industry is the education of credit union directors and
managers in the methods and philosophy of the credit union m ovem ent.
Lack of education has been cited as a major difficulty (Arneil, 1969). This
problem is exacerbated if credit union managers are encouraged by
regulators to seek profits and to achieve operational benchmarks based on
commercial banking practices (Arneil, 1969, p. 38):
In an economy such as ours, private enterprise continually 
holds up the rate of profit as a measure of success and we are 
conditioned to accept this criterion.
Increases in the size of surpluses can be seen as indicative of financial 
success and the competence of the manager, due to their close association 
with private sector profit performance.
Profitability of credit unions would be expected to rise as a consequence of 
the FI Scheme. AFIC (1993, p. 35) reports that credit unions had "worked 
hard to accumulate reserves" to meet the capital adequacy requirements, 
from a shortfall of over $85 million in 1990, when the scheme was 
announced, to $4.7 million in 1993.
5.3.3 Portfolio changes
Changing the loan portfolio is a rational response to capital requirements 
where the ability to raise equity funds is limited or absent. Where credit 
unions are able to emphasise mortgage lending and hold liquid assets, the 
capital requirement becomes less binding and growth opportunities less
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restricted. AFIC annual reports reveal that residential mortgages increased
from 15% to 54% of the average credit union portfolio from 1988 to 1998,
principally at the expense of personal loans, which fell from 65% to 42%.
This is a significant change in lending behaviour given the historical
development of the credit union movement and past history of credit
allocation. This change in portfolio mix may have an impact of the risk of
the credit union itself. Personal loans have a shorter maturity than
mortgages, so on average the industry would expect to see an increase in
potential maturity mismatch between savings and borrowings. This can
also affect the competitive position of the credit union relative to other
financial institutions.
Given the informational advantages of financial mutuals discussed in 
section 3.2, the comparative advantage of credit unions would be expected 
to be found more in unsecured personal loans than in residential 
mortgages, where the real estate security suggests less of a need for costly 
screening and monitoring of borrowers. A significant shift to mortgage 
lending requires less reliance on the informational advantages of the 
common bond.
Changing the portfolio mix away from personal loans and towards 
mortgage lending brings credit unions into direct competition with other 
financial institutions. The home mortgage market in Australia is very 
competitive. The problem this poses for credit union integrity is that a 
substantial number of for-profit competitors might defeat some of the 
normative restraints embodied in the common bond. For example, the
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minimum standards of service and conduct of profit maximising
corporations may be taken as an acceptable benchmark for credit union
performance (Hansmann, 1980, p. 876). Such a trend was suggested by a
range of transaction fee impositions and increases by some credit unions
in 1998, comparable to those charged by commercial banks (Blue, 1998).
Pressures on credit union profits from competition in mortgage lending
was cited as the reason for the fees. Beale and Stanford (1994, p. 16) note:
Competition in the mortgage market between banks and non­
banks has intensified as the now common capital adequacy 
requirements direct the attention of both sets of institutions to 
this profitable but capital preserving area of lending.
An internal conflict of incentives also occurs in terms of the "character" 
requirement of the FI Code. Credit unions must hold 60% of their assets 
in the form of "financial accommodation" to its members (s. 113(2)). On 
the other hand, the risk-weighting system makes liquid investments 
(which are not financial accommodation) attractive for its asset base. 
Given the common bond restriction, demographic characteristics can 
have significant effects on demand for loans and supply of deposits. 
These changes might be reflected in liquidity position, which in turn will 
have an impact on the capital ratio. Swings in liquidity would be 
inversely related to capital position, suggesting that increase in growth 
based on loan demand will be more difficult to adjust to than growth in  
deposits (Davis, 1994, pp. 43-44). This provides credit unions with an 
incentive to expand (and thereby weaken) the common bond of 
association, such as through mergers, in order to attract deposits and
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manage liquidity.
5.3.4 Accumulation of surpluses
A consequence of the need to generate "adequate" surpluses and to meet 
capital requirements is the accumulation of significant surpluses within  
the credit union. While retained surpluses have value to mutual 
organisations, the fact that property rights in such surpluses are poorly 
defined may lead to challenges to the mutual institutional form.
Little has been written about the accumulation of surpluses and how or if 
these surpluses can be used. Tuckman and Chang (1993, pp. 259-260) 
speculate that surpluses increase the ability of the organisation to provide 
additional services or achieve a degree of independence from the 
preferences of funding sources, such as major donors (James, 1983). The 
surplus in these circumstances, particularly if derived from "commercial" 
operations, is effectively an earnings stream without external 
accountability. Accumulation of equity, particularly in liquid or sem i­
liquid assets, can finance emergent expenditures, reducing the 
vulnerability of the organization and increasing the job security of the 
managers.
A manager might increase the reserves of a mutual either to reduce the 
firm-specific risk of bankruptcy or to smooth the flow of perquisites, 
particularly if there are liquidity constraints (Rasmusen, 1988, p. 400). One 
concern is whether the goal of surplus accumulation is sufficiently 
rewarding in itself to be an incentive for nonprofit managers to behave as
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a for-profit organisation in exploiting the information asymmetries with
consumers or reduce the quality of services provided (Tuckman and
Chang, 1993, pp. 261-262).
Proposed changes to rules regarding distribution of reserves that 
emphasise individual members7 monetary interests in the cooperative 
over their common interests is increasingly of international concern to 
cooperative and mutual organisations. The traditional view is that 
reserves are indivisible, for the common benefit of members and as a 
foundation for future generations. Kaplan de Drimer (1997, p. 476) notes:
Those structural changes ignore the danger, so often pointed 
out, that the revaluation and distribution of financial reserves 
would lead to the undue appropriation of those reserves 
accumulated thanks to the effort of previous generations, in 
favour of only some of the partners.
A particular danger with the accumulation of surpluses within mutual 
organisations is based on the lack of clarity in respect of ownership of this 
equity. The growth of accumulated reserves in mutual organisations 
provides incentives for controlling interests to seek to distribute parts of 
the communal wealth as private property, through conversion to a 
shareholder-based form where property rights over the surplus are clearly 
defined (Davis, 1994, p. 45). This is the 77expropriation hypothesis77 (Davis, 
1997, p. 13), put forward as an explanation for the process of 
demutualisation in the financial sector. Kay (1991, p. 314) depicts this 
expropriation process as follows:
[T]here is then a very large money-box, to which claims are ill- 
defined, and the temptation to open that money-box and share
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out the proceeds among current stakeholders is one which may 
be very strong . . . The breaking open of these money-boxes has 
been stimulated by the activities of professional locksmiths -  
merchant banks and other advisers -  who see the prospect of 
substantial fees for themselves in enabling the custodians of the 
box to realize the value of the contents.
It is predicted that surplus accumulation will increase as a result of the FI
Scheme. More generally, the regulatory system will generate pressures on
14credit unions to adopt an alternative institutional form more consistent 
to the regulatory environment (Davis, 1994, p. 45).
5.3.5 Smaller credit unions
Finally, the FI Scheme increases the diversity and complexity of credit 
union legislation and regulatory requirements, which might conflict with 
the popular and democratic character of the organisation. Smaller credit 
unions in particular may also be adversely affected by substantial cost 
increases through supervision levies, the costs of meeting the new  
prudential standards, and additional reporting requirements.
If regulation is difficult to understand and apply, even to lawyers and 
economists, then the traditional administration of cooperatives by 
members themselves may be discouraged or eliminated. Processes of 
socialisation, education and training within cooperatives might be more 
difficult in a complex regulatory environment. Kaplan de Drimer (1997, 
p. 483) argues:
14
Davis (1994, p. 45) suggests attributing a share of the retained surplus to members
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This could undermine their democratic control and lead to the 
bureaucratization of their administration, where powers are 
concentrated in the hands of a few executives while  
communication with member-users tends to weaken.
The protection inherent in regular and close examination of credit 
unions, coupled with advice in much of the pre-AFIC supervision can be 
seen as important where accounts are kept by individuals not always 
skilled in accountancy (Ameil, 1969, p. 35). If the approach of new  
regulators is to adopt more "hands-off' supervision and rely on  
submission of information, this may place additional pressure on credit 
unions to employ individuals with the appropriate expertise. Credit 
unions arose as small community7 based organisations with simple 
operations, suggesting an alignment of management and ownership 
interests due to use of managers with a shared relationship with 
members. This advantage is likely to be eroded by growth of the mutual 
to the point where the complexity of the operations dictates the 
engagement of expert managers not necessarily related to the institution's 
owners (Mayers and Smith, 1981; Masulis, 1987).
Importantly, despite the fact that small credit unions have significant 
informational advantages, Davis (1995, p. 51) notes a "concerted push to 
get rid of small credit unions" by regulators. Such a stance is also 
identified by the Campbell committee (1981, para. 18.24):
. . . some State Registrars of Co-operative Societies have been
share accounts as a way to address the capital adequacy problem without sacrificing 
cooperative principles.
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more interested in seeing mergers of existing institutions than 
encouraging new entrants.
Part of the difficulty with a capital requirement is the inability of small 
credit unions to achieve economies of scale without a merger (Davis, 
1994, p. 40). Evidence of a supervisory stance in favour of mergers is the 
existence of the Credit Union Contingency Fund, which is partly intended 
to facilitate mergers and transfers of engagements between credit unions 
or between credit unions and building societies (s. 97(2)). There is also 
power vested in SSAs to direct a transfer of engagement (effectively force 
a merger) where certain conditions are met, under the FI Code (s. 296).
5.4 Implications________________________
Although several elements of the FI Scheme support the common bond 
characteristics of credit unions, the extension of Reserve Bank style 
prudential regulation to credit unions is inconsistent with articulated 
policy objectives. Of particular concern is the imposition of a risk- 
weighted capital adequacy requirement. The introduction of this measure 
is based on a failure to appreciate important institutional differences, and 
risks eroding the strength of credit union common bonds and mutuality. 
Smaller credit unions may be particularly affected by administrative and 
compliance costs.
The analysis in this chapter leads to the following predictions about the 
effects of the FI Scheme on credit unions:
• a focus on profitability as a principal operating objective;
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constraints on growth through increased lending;
• a change in portfolio preference away from unsecured personal 
loans and towards residential mortgages;
• accumulation of retained surpluses;
• increased compliance costs for smaller credit unions;
• merger activity to address growth, liquidity, and compliance 
problems, and capital adequacy more generally.
Given the diversity of common bond types in the industry, the degree of 
impact is also expected to be different based on common bond types. The 
remainder of this thesis empirically tests a subset of the above hypotheses 
using financial data on credit unions in NSW.
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Chapter Six
Empirical Literature Review
W h ile  few  quan tita tive  articles examine A ustra lian  cred it unions, no 
study has yet been published on the effects o f the FI Scheme on cred it 
un ions. This thesis therefore provides a valuable co n tribu tio n  to the 
lite ra ture . The purposes of th is chapter are: to rev iew  the e m p irica l 
lite ra tu re  in  respect o f cred it unions; to introduce in te rven tio n  analysis as 
a statistical method appropriate to assessing the im pact o f regu la tion; and 
to rev iew  the lite ra ture  on regulatory in te rven tions using th is technique. 
Chapter Seven presents the data and m ethodology of the present 
em pirica l study, and discusses the results.
6.1 Studies of Credit Unions______________
A  g row ing  em pirica l lite ra tu re  studies cred it unions, p rin c ip a lly  as a 
subset o f m icroeconom ics and financia l economics d isc ip lina ry  interests 
in  financ ia l ins titu tions. This lite ra tu re  can be classified in to  three broad 
groups. The firs t deals w ith  the behaviour of cred it unions as an indus try , 
its economic structure, and the influence o f the regula tory e n v iro n m e n t. 
A no the r g row ing  fie ld  searches fo r the existence o f scale economies and 
diseconomies facing cred it unions. The th ird  group, o f closer in terest to 
th is thesis, consist o f studies o f cred it un ion  organisational behav iour. 
Consistent w ith  the argum ent o f the previous chapters, the co m m o n
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bond of association is a factor identified as significant in all these
approaches is.
6.1.1 Industry Structure
Navratil (1981) develops and applies an aggregate model of the credit 
union industry in the United States. As discussed in section 3.3.1, this 
model is based on the assumption that an individual credit union is a 
price-taker. The objective function is cost minimisation subject to an 
exogenously determined level of output. Six simultaneous equations are 
used to estimate the loan market, investment in non-loan financial 
assets, and the credit union " share market7' (supply of and demand for 
deposits). The model is estimated using two-stage least-squares regression 
of monthly data from January 1972 to December 1978.
The study finds evidence that credit unions do not always behave in an 
"economically rational" fashion. In particular, loans and other financial 
assets are not as substitutable as they would be in a profit-maximising 
intermediary. Non-loan assets appear to be a residue, smoothing flows in 
deposit and loan demand by members. Navratil summarises the results 
as follows (1981, p. 548):
CUs appear to be quite loyal to their historical goal of providing 
members with low cost consumer credit, even if some potential 
revenues are sacrificed in the process.
Wolken and Navratil (1981) examine the effects of usury ceilings by 
comparing 707 federal and 769 state regulated credit unions for the years 
1978 and 1979. Univariate testing of differences in means using analysis
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of variance (ANOVA) demonstrates that federal usury ceilings are
binding, with federal credit unions exhibiting significantly lower average
loan rates. This result is supported by regression analysis of loan interest
rates and growth rates, controlling for several supply and demand factors.
Barron, West and Hannan (1994) investigate the evolution of credit 
unions in New York City from 1914 to 1990. The study examines two 
alternative theories of organisational evolution. One is that old and large 
organisations increasingly dominate due to advantages over smaller 
rivals; the other that as organisations age they become less able to respond 
to new challenges, succumbing to more adaptive competitors. These are 
compared by relating the effects of age and size to organisational mortality 
and growth. Growth and mortality are modelled as functions of age, size, 
population density and environmental factors, using a m aximum- 
likelihood estimator of a continuous-time stochastic process. The study 
controls for environmental effects using several indicators including 
inflation, and the economic climate both generally in the United States 
and locally within New York City. The results show that, controlling for 
size, the mortality rate of credit unions increases with age. This suggests 
that, at an early point in the life cycle of a credit union, adolescence is a 
liability; while at a greater age, risk of failure is due to senescence or 
obsolescence. Similarly, growth rates drop sharply after the first few years 
of an organisation's existence, consistent with senescence. The 
researchers hypothesise (p. 411) that the drop in growth rates at an early 
age for credit unions is consistent with the importance of the com m on
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bond of membership. Given this limitation of potential membership, the
rate of recruitment of new members is expected to decline over time.
Kaushik and Lopez (1994) examine the response of United States credit 
unions to the process of deregulation of financial intermediaries in the
1970s and early 1980s.15 Descriptive financial data from 1980 to 1992, 
obtained from the official reports of the Credit Union National 
Association (CUNA), are analysed to explain industry trends. Relaxation 
of common bond requirements is found to have expanded potential 
membership of the industry and contributed to a trend of consolidation 
through merger. The number of credit unions was 13,379 in 1992, a 
decline of approximately 40% since 1980, yet total industry7 membership 
was almost 64.7 million in 1992, an increase of 48%. Federal deposit 
insurance is also believed to contribute to continuing industry growth. 
The trend of consolidation is reflected in a concentration of assets in the 
hands of larger credit unions. Institutions with assets below $2 m illion  
declined from 65% in 1980 to 38% in 1992. In terms of the common bond 
relationships, declining numbers of associational and occupational bonds 
principally represent the decline in credit union numbers, with  
associational common bonds declining in both absolute and relative 
terms over the study period. Residential bond credit unions experienced 
the greatest growth in average membership, with an annual average rate
15
Including the Federal Credit Union Act 1977; Financial Institutions Regulatory and 
Interest Rate Control Act 1978; Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act 1980; and the Gam-St Germain Act 1982, as well as deregulatory changes
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of 8.96%.
Bundt and Keating (1988) analyse the effects of deregulation and enhanced 
competition on the costs and performance of credit unions in the United 
States, using a sample of the 100 largest institutions (measured by asset 
size) from 1979 to 1985. The model used is an expenditure version of a 
statistical cost accounting model applied to commercial banks (Hester and 
Zoellner, 1966; Nelson, 1985), which imposes assumptions of linear 
average cost curves and the absence of joint production. The model is 
used to test the null hypothesis that enhanced competition had no effect 
on credit union costs. The null is rejected at a 5% significance level in all 
years except 1983. In particular the costs of liability instruments are found 
to decrease on average, suggesting that deregulation (such as relaxation of 
the common bond requirement) favourably affects the cost of funds from 
membership, increasing the ability of credit unions to compete with other 
financial institutions.
6.1.2 Scale econom ies
There is an extensive empirical literature in respect of the existence of
16economies and diseconomies of scale facing financial institutions, of
by the National Credit Union Administration. See Bundt and Keating (1988, p. 1333).
Studies include: Houston and Simon, 1970; Benston, 1972; Halpem and Mathewson, 
1975; Colenutt, 1977; Geehan, 1977; Mullineaux, 1978; Benston et al, 1982; Clark, 1984; 
Gilligan and Smirlock, 1984; Gilligan et al., 1984; Nelson, 1985; Kilbride et al., 1986; 
Berger et al., 1987; Mester, 1987; Hardwick, 1989; Lawrence, 1989; Dowling and 
Philippatos, 1990; Noulas et al., 1990; Gropper, 1991; Drake, 1992; Glass and 
McKillop, 1992; Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996; Clark, 1996; Mitchell and Onvural, 
1996.
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which credit unions constitute a small yet significant subset. This topic is
of particular interest within Taylor's (1971) model of credit unions, on the
basis that economies of scale will be mutually beneficial to both existing
members and potential new members (Taylor, 1972). The other reason for
interest in scale economies is that, although significant economies are
consistently found in studies of other financial institutions, the evidence
in respect of credit unions is conflicting. For example, in a study of credit
unions in the United States over similar time periods, Koot (1978)
discovers significant diseconomies of scale, while Wolken and Navratil
(1980) find significant economies of scale using several measures of
output. Kohers and Mullis (1988) measure cost efficiency using ratios of
operating expenses to total assets and operating expenses to operating
income. Cross-sectional data from United States credit unions in 1984 are
sampled according to a matched-pair scheme, using six categories of size
for testing for differences in sample means. The results confirm
economies of scale, with smaller credit unions having significantly larger
ratios in all category comparisons.
It appears that these results are partly dependent upon the definition of 
the production function, the statistical approach, and the time period 
chosen. Cross-sectional comparisons are difficult due to the existence of 
significant technological differences (Murray and White, 1980) as well as 
voluntarism and sponsoring employer subsidies (Fry et al., 1982). A 
common specification of production is the Cobb-Douglas function under a 
cost minimisation constraint. For example, Crapp (1983) adopts a Cobb-
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Douglas function to examine cost relationships of credit unions in New
South Wales in 1979 and 1980. Using ordinary least-squares regression,
the results reveal significant diseconomies of scale, although also finding
significant cost advantages by credit unions w ith a greater involvement in
technology. The finding of decreasing returns to scale is believed to be
due to a bias introduced by the omission of organisational subsidies in the
cost function (1983, p. 44). Murray and W hite (1980) also use a Cobb-
Douglas function to examine cross-sectional data on 152 British Columbia
credit unions for each of the years 1972-1975. They find significant
economies of scale for credit unions using electronic business m achine
processing and those using computers. No economies of scale are
detected for credit unions relying on m anual accounting systems.
Technology exerts a strong influence on both the position and slope of the
estimated average cost curves for each of the three groups. The data also
provide evidence of inefficiencies created by early adoption of more costly
technologies.
M ullineaux (1978) and Murray and White (1983) adopt a translog cost 
function, which is characterised by m ultiple outputs and avoids 
assum ptions of homogeneity and constant elasticity of substitution in 
production. A translog specification facilitates estimation of the 
sensitivity of costs to increases in outputs, as well as cost savings by
17
This is essentially a Taylor series expansion in output quantities and input prices, 
producing a more generalised form of the Cobb-Douglas function. The translog function 
is also quadratic in logs, whereas the Cobb-Douglas function is linear in logs.
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production of several outputs jointly, that is, it allows estimation both of
economies of scale, as well as scope. Murray and White (1983) use cross-
sectional data for a sample of 61 credit unions in British Columbia for the
1976-1977 financial year, with the sample limited to organisations with
similar levels of integration of information technology. Using ordinary
least-squares regression in a system of simultaneous cost equations, the
results show increasing returns to scale, as well as economies of scope
between mortgage lending and other lending activities. Kim (1986)
extends this system of cost equations and applies it to the same data set, to
find overall economies of scale and product-specific economies of scale,
but product-specific diseconomies of scale in respect of non-mortgage
loans.
6.1.3 Organisational behaviour
There appear to be two approaches to studying the organisation behaviour 
of credit unions in the empirical literature. The first applies models of 
manager behaviour in the context of the industry and regulatory 
environment. The second measures the degree of conflict between 
borrower and saver interests in a credit union, through estimation of 
monetary benefits of membership.
Keating and Keating (1975b) examine the behaviour of credit unions in 
response to the regulatory environment, adopting the managerial 
discretion model of behaviour discussed in section 3.3.2. The manager 
strives to maximise personal utility rather than organisational goals such
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as cost minimisation or profit maximisation. The model predicts that
where the environment is more munificent, a manager is more likely to
spend on emoluments and staffing. A sample of 299 credit unions in 1969
is analysed, measuring firm efficiency as the difference between the
average cost of a credit union and a minimum average cost "frontier
frame" based on the "best" firms in the sample. Environmental
conditions are represented by proxies for local competition, factor prices,
payroll deduction availability, and regulation. Costs are found to follow a
U-shaped long run average cost curve, with economies and diseconomies
of scale. Environmental factors have a significant and predicted effect on
efficiency. The major finding of the study is that regulation is the most
important of the environmental factors. The stringency of regulation was
the most important determinant of credit union efficiency. Keating (1979)
uses the same approach on this data set to assess the impact of potential
efficiency-promoting factors. The effect of decreases in subsidies and
competitive environments on the level of emoluments is assessed in a
X1 test. The relationship with subsidies is significant at the 1% level,
while the relationship with competition is significant at the 10% level.
The same factors were related to the degree of organisational efficiency
(relative to frontier frames) at 1% degree of significance.
The second stream of literature follows from Taylor's (1971) model of 
credit union behaviour, which identifies a potential conflict between 
borrower and saver interests in the allocation of membership benefits (as 
discussed in section 3.3.1). Studies find evidence of pro-saver bias in some
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cases and pro-borrower bias in others. One approach adopts the
measurement approach of Walker and Chandler (1977). Net monetary
benefits are measured as the dividend and loan rates available from the
credit union and the next best rates available to a credit union member.
The distribution of benefits is measured as the ratio of net monetary
benefits of saving by the net monetary benefits of borrowing. This ratio is
equal to one if equally distributed, greater than one if biased to savers and
less than one if biased to borrowers. Patin and McNiel (1991a) modify this
model and apply it to 15,063 and 14,924 credit unions in the United States
for the years 1984 and 1985, generating the null hypothesis that the mean
of the differences between net monetary benefits of saving and net
monetary benefits of borrowing is equal to zero across the industry. The
null is rejected at 0.1% significance for each year, indicating a pro-saver
bias at the industry level, although the actual size of the bias is less than
1% of the total industry assets. An examination of individual credit
unions reveals a distribution of saver-, neutral and borrower-dominated
behaviour across credit unions, with neutral behaviour the most
common. Patin and McNiel (1991b) extend this analysis by examining the
relationship between member orientation and the total benefits of
membership. The same data set is used, but with the exclusion of credit
unions considered inactive or insolvent, together with those with
negative net benefits of saving or borrowing, reducing the sample to 9,660
credit unions. Total benefits are calculated as the sum of saving and
borrowing benefits, and means are calculated for groups of credit unions
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exhibiting each type of behaviour. The results show that credit unions
that are highly borrower-oriented have the lowest level of total monetary
benefits to members, while credit unions that are saver-oriented provide
the greatest total member benefits. Neutral credit unions provide levels
of member benefits greater than the borrower-oriented but less than the
saver-oriented group. Different results emerge when the total benefits are
scaled against particular base amounts. Neutral credit unions provide the
lowest levels of net monetary benefits per member, per dollar of loans
and shares (deposits), and per dollar * of assets. Saver-oriented credit
unions provide the greatest net monetary benefits per member, while
borrower-oriented credit unions generate the greatest net monetary
benefits per dollar of loans and shares, and per dollar of assets. The
conclusion is that saver-oriented credit unions perform best in terms of
maximising both total and per member benefits.
The argument that credit unions have variant objective functions which 
are saver or borrower biased is disputed by Smith (1986). He examines 951 
United States credit unions over the period 1975 to 1979, to detect 
significant differences in behaviour in respect of loan and dividend rates. 
Separate regressions are run for each year against a set of institutional and 
geographic variables, and for the loan rate on a set of loan heterogeneity 
factors. The hypothesis of variant objectives is evaluated against a f-test of 
equality of coefficients as the null hypothesis. The calculated f-statistic is 
not statistically significant, nor are the signs of the coefficients consistent 
with the theory of borrower or saver bias. The failure to reject the null
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hypothesis is maintained despite narrower and broader classifications of
the different categories. The conclusion is that a neutral objective
function is a reasonable description of credit union behaviour.
6.1.4 Common bond type
As discussed in section 3.3.2, the common bond of association is an 
important determinant of credit union behaviour and identification of 
comparative institutional advantage. The common bond has therefore 
been used as a variable when conducting empirical work in each of the 
three areas discussed above. For example, Kohers and Mullis (1988), in 
using a matched-pair technique to estimate scale economies, also pair 
credit unions by common bond of membership, as well as the principal 
activity of the sponsoring employer in cases of industrial membership 
(Kohers and Mullis, 1986). Brown and O'Connor (1995) use the com m on  
bond to divide Victorian credit unions into subsamples of asset size and 
bond type. The functional form implemented in that study is the translog 
cost function, which is used to calculate an average economy of scale 
measure for each subsample. To control for time period variations, cross- 
sectional analyses are conducted in each of 1983, 1986, 1990 and 1993. A 
total of 127, 108, 100 and 76 credit unions are used after data exclusions. 
Parish credit unions are entirely excluded from the sample and the 
remainder divided into "community" and "industrial" common bond 
categories. The results show that the null hypothesis of constant returns 
to scale cannot be rejected for community credit unions in all analyses
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18except 1990. For industrial credit unions, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected in 1983 and 1993, although significant diseconomies of scale are 
detected in 1986 and 1990. Smaller credit unions display significant 
diseconomies of scale in 1983 and 1993, but the null is not rejected in the 
other years. The subsamples based on medium and large credit unions 
fail to reject the null hypothesis across all years. Using the total sample, 
diseconomies of scale are found to be significant at the 5% level.
Similarly, the common bond is used in studies of borrower-saver conflict. 
In examining net monetary benefits from credit union membership, Patin 
and McNiel (1991b) use common bond categories to test whether 
orientation or total monetary benefits is related to the type of bond. The 
common bond classification follows that used by the National Credit 
Union Administration, which divides credit unions into associational, 
occupational and residential groups. A comparison of mean values for 
each group finds that occupational credit unions have a significantly 
stronger saver-orientation than those with associational or residential 
common bonds, at the 0.1% level. Associational credit unions exhibit 
neutrality between borrowers and savers. Significant differences were 
also found in the total monetary benefits generated by credit unions with 
these different common bond types. Occupational credit unions ranked 
first, associational second and residential third.
18
In 1990, significant diseconomies of scale are found, which the authors believe to be a
bias introduced by a one-off levy imposed in that year due to an insolvency (Brown
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Importantly, there is evidence that the common bond is a significant
determ inant of organisational behaviour. Using data from a survey of
357 Australian credit unions, and 129 useable responses, W illiams (1986)
tests the hypothesis that the stronger the bonding between members, the
stronger will be the bonding between members and m anagement, and the
greater the efficiency of the organisation. After filtering out credit un ions
with a parochial or ethnic membership base, the two categories of
common bond remaining are industrial (organised around a com m on
employer) and comm unity (operating within a specific geographical
location). The industrial credit union is seen as embodying a stronger
common bond, since the relationship is an extension of the em ploym ent
bond of its members. Com munity credit unions, particularly in urban
areas, are expected to be more anonymous and to suffer loss of group
cohesion. Credit union managers were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to
10, their perception of the strength of the common bond of the
cooperative's members. Industrial credit unions are found to have
stronger common bonds as shown by a Mann-W hitney U test.
Managerial salaries, controlled by asset size, are also related to the
classification between the two types of common bonds, suggesting that the
degree of bonding between members influences the degree of divergence
between member and manager interests. Industrial credit unions also
have significantly lower bad debts experience than comm unity based
and O'Connor, 1995, p. 10).
page 165
Chapter Six -  Empirical Literature Review
organisations (Williams, 1986, p. 281).
Bundt, Chiesa and Keating (1989) examine whether the common bond 
relationship affects credit union behaviour, in respect of operating 
efficiency. Their study uses data from year-end balance sheets and income 
statements of United States credit unions from 1979 to 1985. Credit 
unions are divided into two groups, one representing "occupational" and 
"governmental" (civilian and military employees) common bonds, and 
the other representing "associational" bonds (religious organisations, 
labour unions, and similar types). Residential credit unions are excluded 
from the study. The largest 100 credit unions in terms of asset size are 
chosen from each group. Differences are expected to emerge between 
these two groups, with the occupational-governmental group predicted to 
have a comparative advantage in availability of payroll deductions, 
reduced interest collection costs, lower costs of information, greater 
subsidies from employers, and increased member convenience. The 
associational credit unions, typically smaller, are expected to have a 
comparative advantage in member cohesion due to "fraternalistic 
altruism" and a greater availability of volunteer labour (Bundt, Chiesa 
and Keating, 1989, p. 31). The expenditure version of the statistical cost 
accounting model used in Bundt and Keating (1988) is applied, using a 
pooled cross-sectional time series model to analyse the panel data from 
the year end balance sheets. A generalised least-squares estimation 
procedure is employed (Fuller and Battese, 1974). The study finds that the 
occupational-governmental group has a significant advantage in
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processing of deposit accounts, presumably due to benefits from the
employer in terms of data processing. This group also enjoys significantly
greater economies of scale. Savers receive relatively lower average rates
of return, and borrowers pay relatively higher rates of interest on loans, at
associational credit unions. This result is contrary to expectations that
associational credit unions are more exposed to competitive market
forces. It implies that, in fact, the degree of bonding intensity is greater in
the associational credit unions.
6.2 Intervention Analysis_________________
When modelling some sets of data it is known that certain abnormal 
events will affect the variables under analysis. A method of modifying
19
econometric models to account for these events uses "intervention" 
variables. While such variables can be used to control for disturbances, 
the model may also focus on the intervention to test hypotheses about the
impact of the intervention itself. This approach is referred to as
20"intervention analysis".
6.2.1 Box-Tiao approach
Box and Tiao (1975) examine the question of modelling the impact of a 
regulatory intervention on time series data. Standard procedures such as
19
The term "intervention" was introduced by Glass (1972), in turn based on work by Box 
and Tiao (1965).
20
In pre-Box-Tiao studies this approach also described as an "interrupted time series 
quasi-experiment" (Campbell, 1963; Campbell and Stanley, 1966).
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a Student's t test for differences in means would be invalid due to the
likelihood of serial dependence, seasonality and nonstationarity in time
series data. In general form, the time series model employed is:
y( = /(fc,£,t)+N ,
where:
y t = F(Y{) is an appropriate transformation of Yf, the actual response;
/(?c,^,f) can allow for deterministic effects of time (f) the effects of 
exogenous variables and interventions (£), with unknown  
parameters ([k); and
Nt represents stochastic background variation or noise, modelled as 
a general integrated mixed autoregressive moving average (ARIMA) 
process, using Box-Jenkins techniques (Box and Jenkins, 1970; Box et 
al, 1994).
The intervention is represented by dummy variables. The two common  
forms of the variable used are pulses and steps. A pulse variable takes on 
the value 1 when the intervention occurs and 0 elsewhere. A step 
variable takes on the value 0 before the intervention and 1 thereafter.
Standard statistical analyses, such as trend analysis or comparison of 
mean observations during particular periods, will also detect the impact 
of an intervention event. The advantage of Box-Tiao modelling of an 
intervention event, however, is the capacity to identify changes in rates of 
increase and the nature of the intervention in terms of dynamic response
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(Wiehern and Jones, 1977). Transfer functions based on a step, pulse, or
combination of these variables can be used to model dynamic responses to
an intervention (Jenkins, 1979). For example, a first order dynamic
response to an intervention could be represented by the following transfer
function (Box and Tiao, 1975, p. 71):
y _ ( _coB_^l£(t)
1 i l - S ß J  '
where:
Yt represents the additional effect of the intervention over the noise;
co is the unknown magnitude of the intervention;
B is the backshift operator;
Sf(T) is the step form of the dummy variable; 
t is time;
T is the time period of the intervention;
5 is the rate of decay of the intervention effect; 0 < 5 < 1.
When ö —> 1, the above transfer function collapses into a model of the 
form Yt = ^
"ramp" response of slope co. Similar transfer functions can be applied to
_CoB_^ \ r(T)
1 ~ b)  1
in which the step dummy variable produces a
pulse intervention variables, or transfer functions can combine both 
pulse and step dynamics (McCleary and Hay, 1980).
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To illustrate the technique, Box and Tiao (1975) apply intervention  
analysis to events intended to reduce the oxidant pollution level in Los 
Angeles. In I960, traffic was diverted following the opening of the Golden 
State Freeway, and reactive hydrocarbon levels in locally sold gasoline 
were regulated by legislation. In 1966, regulations required engine design 
changes in new cars to reduce the exhaust of pollutants. The time series 
data consist of monthly averages of pollutant levels in Downtown Los 
Angeles from January 1955 to December 1972. The expectations are that 
the 1960 interventions would produce a step change in pollutants, while  
the 1966 intervention would generate a constant intervention change (a 
ramp effect), as new cars were sold. Due to the effect of the summer- 
winter atmospheric temperature inversion differential, the model form 
separates the post-1966 intervention variables into summer months and 
winter months. Significant monthly seasonality is also corrected in the 
final model. The fitted model provides evidence that the 1960 
interventions create a step change of -1.09 units of pollutant, while the 
1966 intervention triggers a yearly change of -0.025 units in the summer 
months and -0.07 units in the winter months.
Intervention analysis has been used in a range of contexts. Caporaso and 
Pelowski (1971) examine the effects of events on the degree of economic 
and political integration in Europe. Trend lines are fitted to the pre-test 
and post-test periods. Time series properties of the data are not modelled 
using ARIMA but by adjusting critical f-values by the degree of
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autocorrelation. Lewis-Beck (1979) assesses the impact of the Cuban
Revolution on economic production. Theoretical models of revolution  
all agree on a significant and immediate drop in economic production, 
followed by growth. Competing views of revolution, however, disagree 
as to the rate of economic growth in the longer term. These competing 
theories are analysed within a trend analysis using dummy variables for 
the revolutionary intervention, and comparing the pre- and post­
revolution slopes for the fitted line. Contrary to the competing models, 
the regression demonstrated a short-term increase in energy production, 
followed by a negative change in slope. The study suggests that 
revolution might better be characterised as short-term benefits and long- 
run costs. Fomby and Hayes (1990) apply Box-Tiao intervention analysis 
to assess the impact of the "War on Poverty", a public policy initiative in 
the United States, on the income of families in the lowest quintile. 
Bonham and Gangnes (1996) examine the effect on hotel revenues of a 
room tax imposed by Hawaii. Lloyd, Morrissey and Reed (1998) estimate 
the effects of anti-dumping actions and cartelisation in the European 
Union on polypropylene prices and the level of imports from Japan. 
Detection of outliers within a time series is another application of
intervention analysis (Shao, 1997, p. 184).21
Examples indude Abraham and Box, 1979; Hilmer, 1984; Tsay, 1986; Ledolter, 1988; 
Chen and Tiao, 1990; Chen and Liu, 1993, Tiao and Tsay, 1994.
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6.2.3 Regulatory interventions
Intervention analysis is used for the empirical study of the impact of the 
FI Scheme reported in Chapter Seven. This reflects that an important 
area of application -  indeed the "widest use" (McCleary and Hay, 1980, p. 
141) -  of intervention analysis is the assessment of the impact of 
regulatory changes.
Two "interrupted time series quasi-experiments" are reported into a 1955 
crackdown on speeding in Connecticut (Campbell and Ross, 1968; Glass, 
1968). The analysis uses annual data from 1951 to 1959. Graphical 
interpretation is consistent with an increasing fatality rate before the 
intervention and a decreasing rate afterwards, particularly in comparison 
to fatalities in other states. In statistical analysis, the intervention is 
assumed to have an immediate and constant effect (a step response) on  
the time series of fatalities, modelled as an integrated moving average 
process, and transformed for monthly seasonality. Although predating 
Box-Jenkins techniques, the method is based on an estimate for the shift 
created by the intervention suggested earlier by Box and Tiao (1965). This 
assumes an ARIMA (0,1,1) model of the following form:
Z{ — L + <5 + (1 — 6)  ^ f l - t - j
where:
Z is an observation at a point in time;
L is the true level of the series;
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5 is the shift accompanying the intervention effect;
6 is the parameter for the moving average process; and 
a represents the noise; and
t is represents either pre- or post-intervention observations, with 
the former model excluding the 6 term.
Point estimates and f-statistics can be computed for both L and 5. The null 
hypothesis of no significant effect of the intervention is H0 :<5 = 0. Data 
for Connecticut are compared with data from four control states 
(Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island), to test the 
hypothesis that the shift in level of the Connecticut time series is less 
than the average shift in the other states. A statistically significant 
(p=6.5%) reduction in fatalities is detected.
Zimring (1975) examines the effect of the Gun Control Act 1968 on the 
rate of gun related violence in the United States, particularly the ban on 
importation of "Saturday Night Special" handguns. Visual interpretation 
of the trend of handgun homicides and firearm assaults for the 57 largest 
cities is that these crimes increase consistently through 1966 to 1963, but 
the rate of increase slows after 1969. This is consistent with a restricted 
supply of handguns. An inspection of trends for gun-related crimes as a 
percentage of all homicides and assaults shows a similar moderation from 
1969. The impact of enforcement effort is estimated from "Operation
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Disarm the Criminal", using monthly figures for gun and non-gun
homicides in the District of Columbia from 1966 to 1971. Comparison of
means for the pre- and post-intervention observations found a change in
level for the gun homicides significant at the 10% level. A dynamic effect
("slow drop") is incorporated into the change in state by defining an
intervention based on the effect being zero prior to the enactment, 1/6 in
the first month, 2/6 in the second month, up to 6/6 (=1) from the sixth
month and thereafter (Zimring, 1975, p. 190, fn. 200).
Deutsch and Alt (1977) use a Box and Tiao (1965) test to examine the effect 
of gun control laws on crimes in Boston, particularly a minimum one- 
year sentence for carrying a firearm without a licence. The deterrent effect 
of the gun law is evaluated by measuring the change in level of homicide, 
assault with a gun, and armed robbery, before and after its enactment. 
The data consist of monthly observations of these offences from January 
1966 to October 1975. A significant decrease (p=0.001) in assaults of 18% is 
found after March 1975, and a 20% reduction in the monthly rate of 
armed robberies (p=0.033) after February 1975. Both responses are before 
the operative date of the law, consistent with early publicity. No  
statistically significant level process shift is detected in the homicide time 
series.
These results are disputed by Hay and McCleary (1979), using more 
parsimonious time series models and an extended set of post­
intervention observations. In particular, they adopt a Box-Jenkins model­
fitting procedure involving the examination of autocorrelation (ACF) and
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partial autocorrelation (PACF) functions of the time series. Based on
inspection of these functions and residuals of each model, the homicide
time series is argued to be better modelled as ARIMA (1,0,0) than (0,1,1) as
assumed by Deutsch and Alt (1977). The assaults time series is argued to
be better represented in a model without seasonal differencing. The
armed robberies series is also believed to be a model without seasonal
differencing but also with a log transformation. Using the same
characterisation of the effect of the intervention as a step variable, the
intervention is significantly negative only for the assaults series. The
Deutsch and Alt (1977) finding of a significant shift in the armed robberies
series is not detected with the alternative model. The assaults time series
also incorporates a temporary impact with a decay. Hay and McCleary
find that the negative effect on assaults is not sustained, but erodes rapidly
22in the post-intervention months. .
Aaronson et al. (1978) examine the impact of decriminalisation of public 
drunkenness laws on the level of police handling of inebriates in 
Washington, D.C. and Minneapolis, testing the hypothesis that 
decriminalisation will be followed by a decline in police involvem ent. 
This would be contrary to legislative expectations that police would  
continue to serve as agents for the new model of detoxification and 
treatment rather than arrest and prosecution. Monthly rates of arrest for
22
In rejoinder, Deutsch (1979) disputes the proposed alternative models, arguing that 
Hay and McCleary made errors in specification and in analysis of residuals, resulting 
in a "gross misidentification,, (p. 318).
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public drunkenness and police deliveries to detoxification facilities for the
two test cities are used as well as two control cities (Houston and San
Francisco). Statistically significant reductions in the level of police intakes
are detected for the test cities (p=0.001) but not for the control cities. Using
additional data, these reductions are evident even when controlling for
the level of public intoxication and the rate of recidivism.
Bhattacharyya and Layton (1979) use a Box-Tiao model to assess the 
effectiveness of seat belt legislation on the road toll in Queensland. Three 
interventions are examined: compulsory installation of front belts in new  
vehicles from 1969, rear belts from 1971, and compulsory wearing of belts 
from 1972. Quarterly data on road deaths are collected for the period 1950 
to 1976, restricted to deaths which were capable of being affected by the 
wearing of a seat belt. The original series demonstrates nonstationarity, 
trend and seasonality, which is partly corrected by seasonal differencing. 
Parsimonious accommodation of autocorrelation implies the following 
model for the pre-intervention series:
(1 -  B4)Zt = 60+( 1 + 04B4)(1 + 63B3 + 05B5)at
where:
Z are the observations;
B is the backshift operator;
6q/63/04/65 are moving average parameters; and 
a is a white noise process.
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This model is found to be adequate for the years 1970 and 1971, but
inadequate after 1972, based on the significance of the Q-statistic (Box and
Tiao, 1976; Bhattacharyya and Anderson, 1976). This implies that the
effective intervention is the compulsory wearing of seat belts in 1972, and
not merely the fitting of seat belts to new cars. Given that older cars were
not required to fit seat belts, and that cars with belts would be a growing
proportion of the vehicle population, the intervention is modelled as a
step change in the series, with a dynamic growth com ponent
(1 -  B4)Zt = 6 0 + + ®2S, + (1 + 04B4)(1 + 0,B4 + 05B5)«,
1 - y / B
where:
S t is the step dummy variable;
co1,co2 are the intervention parameters; and
23y/ is an exponential decay parameter.
Applied to the entire data set, y/ is found to have a positive fractional 
value, while col ,co2 have negative values. Only co2, however, is 
significantly different from zero. This suggests that the process of 
conversion of vehicles to seat belts is incomplete by the final observation 
of the time series used, as a stable negative trend is not sustainable in the 
longer term. A reduced model with only the step com ponent co2S t is
23
The model is analogous to the first order dynamic response transfer function noted by 
Box and Tiao (1975, p. 71), discussed above.
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fitted to the data, with the intervention coefficient negative and
statistically significant. The conclusion is that the compulsory wearing of
seat belts did significantly reduce the road toll in Queensland.
Harvey and Durbin (1986) examine the effects of a 1983 law compelling 
the wearing of seat belts on British road casualties, using a structural time 
series model rather than an ARIMA approach. A structural model 
represents a time series as the sum of a trend, seasonal, cyclical, and 
irregular components, with complex models being fitted by the use of a 
Kalman (1960) filter. The structural model of the casualty time series 
incorporating an intervention is of the following form:
k
y, = ft + r i + M + e<
where:
y are the observations, after appropriate transformation;
fj, is a trend component;
y is a seasonal component;
x are they explanatory variables, with S coefficients; 
w is an intervention dummy variable, with A coefficient; and 
£ is a white noise process.
The data are monthly observations of numbers killed and seriously 
injured car drivers, front seat passengers, rear seat passengers, pedestrians
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and cyclists from January 1969 to December 1984 in Great Britain, as well 
as seat belt wearing rates, indices of traffic densities and the real cost of 
petrol. Trend and seasonality components for the pre-intervention 
period are estimated, and additional explanatory variables, such as the car 
traffic index, and the real price of petrol, incorporated where significant. 
The intervention is treated as a step dummy variable, with a partial 
dummy (w;{ =0.18) in January 1983, for anticipation of the new laws. 
Amongst other statistically significant results for different types of road 
users, the model estimates a 23% reduction in drivers killed or seriously 
injured.
Deadman and Pyle (1993) use a Box-Tiao approach to examine the effect of 
the abolition of capital punishment, in November 1965, on homicides in  
Great Britain. The time series data are compiled from annual records of 
homicide in England and Wales from 1880 to 1989, and in Scotland from 
1884 to 1987. An ARIMA model is constructed by inspection of ACF and 
PACF graphs, tentatively indicating an ARIMA (0,1,1) process for both the 
English-Welsh and Scottish data. A simple step dummy variable for 
intervention is found to be insignificant for England-Wales. A change of 
trend (ramp response) is instead adopted as the intervention process, as 
follows:
A horn = cotI t + £ t -  0i£{_i
While the estimated change in trend is significant, the model without the 
intervention effect continues to provide a parsimonious representation of
Chapter Six -  Empirical Literature Review
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the postintervention homicide series, although marginally
underpredicting the homicide series. For the Scottish data, a step change
rather than a trend change is more appropriate.
There is, however, only one study of credit unions that adopts (in part) an 
intervention approach. Barron, West and Hannan (1994), in their study 
of credit union growth and mortality, use a dummy variable to specify a 
period effect arising from the 1934 Federal Credit Union Act. This 
regulatory intervention enhanced the institutional standing of credit 
unions and increased founding rates for credit unions in the short term. 
Over the longer term, however, the fecferal legislation caused a decline in 
State-based registrations. The short term effect is captured by a dummy 
variable set at 0 for all years before 1934 and 1 for all later years. The 
declining registration trend is captured by defining the trend term of their 
model as the same dummy variable multiplied by a log-linear time trend 
set equal to 0 for all years before 1934 and equal to (year-1934) for all 
subsequent years.
6.3 Summary____________________________
This chapter provides a review of the empirical and methodological 
literature relevant to the empirical study to follow in Chapter Seven. In 
particular, the studies of credit unions can be grouped into three principal 
areas of interest: industry structure, scale economies, and organisational 
behaviour. In assessing the impact of the FI Scheme on individual credit 
union behaviour, the results provided by this thesis are most
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appropriately classified as addressing organisational behaviour issues.
The common bond is shown to be a significant component of analysis for
all three areas. Intervention analysis, particularly in the Box-Tiao form, is
introduced. Regulatory intervention literature using various
intervention models is also reviewed. The intervention analysis
technique is adopted in Chapter Seven as an effective statistical method
for assessing the impact of regulation. The intervention analysis is
supported by trend analysis and cross-sectional regressions to provide a
basis for assessing whether impact of the FI Scheme is consistent with the
predictions made in Chapter Five.
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Chapter Seven 
Empirical Analysis
The empirical study presented in this chapter tests some of the predictions 
made in Chapter Five as to the likely impact of the FI Scheme, principally 
in the introduction of a capital adequacy requirement. One prediction is 
that credit unions are more likely to focus on profitability as the principal 
operating objective, under pressure to maintain or increase capital, 
consequently accumulating retained surpluses. Another is that the 
Scheme would induce a change of portfolio preference towards residential 
mortgage loans, which carry a lower risk weighting. The former is 
assessed using intervention analysis the latter using trend analysis (due to 
data limitations), and these results in turn explained by a cross-sectional 
multiple regressions of factors drawn from the discussion in Chapter 
Five, including whether differential impacts are detectable between credit 
unions with different common bonds. The results suggest that the 
Scheme had an impact on credit union behaviour consistent with 
theoretical expectations.
7.1 Data and Aggregate Trends___________
7.1.1 NSW credit unions from 1987 to 1997
The empirical analysis is restricted to institutions in NSW, for three 
principal reasons. First, such a restriction avoids potential distortions
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caused by interstate differences in pre-FI Scheme legislation. Second, a
State other than Queensland is expected to provide a more effective
evaluation of unintended consequences, on the assumption that the local
conditions of the industry may have influenced some of the Brady
Committee's assumptions (Chapter Five). Third, NSW contains the
majority of Australian credit unions and therefore is expected to provide
results that can be generalised to the other states and territories.
The data are compiled from statistical information records on credit 
unions maintained by the NSW Financial Institutions Commission  
(FINCOM) and the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC). 
These data are supplemented by hand-collected annual reports for the 
credit unions studied, particularly for the purposes of classification by 
common bond, identification of institutions with outdated FINCOM 
codes, and checking the data for errors before analysis. Quarterly financial 
data (income statements and balance sheets) for all NSW credit unions 
were obtained for the period June 1987 to September 1994 from FINCOM, 
and for all Australian credit unions from September 1992 to June 1997
from AFIC. These databases were spliced“ and checked for errors both 
graphically and by random reconciliations with annual report 
information. The resulting database contains financial information for 
NSW credit unions from June 1987 to June 1997. Later financial periods 
are excluded, since the basis for collection of financial data by AFIC
24
Using Microsoft Excel 98 Macintosh Edition.
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changed in September 1997. From that quarter, a new Statistical Data
System (SDS), developed internally by AFIC, was implemented (AFIC, 
1998, p. 12). The years 1987 to 1997 are useful as pre- and post­
intervention periods are of similar duration. From an initial set of 197 
NSW credit unions operating in June 1987, exclusions were made of 
credit unions that merged or exited the industry, if the remaining time 
period was insufficient for the intervention analysis. This suggests a 
survivorship bias in the study that should be taken into account w hen  
interpreting the results. A total of 47 institutions were removed, leaving  
a sample of 150 credit unions for analysis (Table 7-1). In the Appendices, 
individual credit unions are identified by code rather than name, due to 
conditions on the use of data made available by FINCOM and AFIC.
Table 7-1: Data Exclusions
Institutions in 1987 197
Excluded 47
Analysed 150
7.1.2 Classification by common bond
Credit unions are also classified according to common bond. Several 
approaches to classification appear in the literature, although the major 
groupings appear to be consistent, despite different labels. In the United 
States, for example, regulators classify institutions into //associational,,/ 
"occupation" and "residential"; and a fourth category of "multiple 
groups" -  an unknown composite of the other three categories (Kaushik
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and Lopez, 1994, p. 236). Arneil (1969, pp. 21-22) divides Australian credit 
unions into three general types of common bond: "parish" credit unions, 
which embrace members of a particular church within the limitation of 
parish boundaries; "community" credit unions, which emerged from the
growth of parish credit unions; and "industrial" credit unions. In turn, 
industrial credit unions are divided into three sub-groups. One group 
represents credit unions within public service departments and 
instrumentalities, a second group from private industry, and the third 
type based within a trade union. Other credit unions are known as 
"associational". Crapp and Skully (1985, pp, 40-41) classify Australian 
credit unions into three broad varieties: "industrial", "community" 
(geographic area) and "sponsored" (trade unions, religious and ethnic 
groups).
Based on this literature the sample of credit unions is classified as follows:
26• community bonds, based on geographic area;
• industrial bonds, based on employment; and
• associational bonds, based on membership of a com m on
Brown and O'Connor (1995) adopt this classification in their study of scale economies 
in Victorian credit unions, discussed in Chapter Six.
A subdivision of community bonds into metropolitan communities (Sydney, Newcastle 
and Wollongong areas) and regional/rural communities was also undertaken. No 
statistically significant differences in behaviour emerged between these two groups 
after controlling for size and capital ratio influences.
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association.
A subdivision of industrial bonds into public and private sector 
institutions is made, consistent with Arneil. Classification is undertaken 
using information in the relevant credit union's annual report. The 
composition of the common bond categories is presented in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2: Common Bond Classification
Community 69
Industrial -  public sector 51
Industrial -  private sector 26
su b -T o ta l In d u str ia l 77
28Associational 4
Total Sample 150
7.1.3 Aggregate trends
Some trends, consistent with the predictions in Chapter Five, are evident 
in the data in aggregate, and in turn are supported by observations of 
AFIC contained in its annual reports. Figure 7-1 presents the total assets 
for NSW credit unions over the sample period. At the industry level, the 
data indicate maintenance of significant growth in assets. In 1995, for 
example, credit unions "posted strong performances over the year despite 
a slow down in economic activity" (AFIC, 1995, p. 27), and "solid asset
27
Analogous to the "sponsored" group identified by Crapp and Skully (1985).
28
The four associational bonds comprised one religious group, one primary producer 
association, and two ethnic community organisations.
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growth" in 1996 despite a slump in the housing sector (AFIC, 1996, p. 25).
Accumulated reserves are presented in Figure 7-2, which indicates that 
capital has increased consistently with the growth in assets over the 
sample period. By 1996, reserves had grown at an average rate of 15% 
since the commencement of the FI Scheme (AFIC, 1996, p. 27). The rate of 
growth is funded entirely by greater reserves, increased, according to AFIC 
(1996, p. 29), despite "intense competition in the retail financial services 
sector". In 1997, AFIC (1997, p. 25) found:
The high levels of capital through accumulated reserves . . . 
have supported growth over recent years.
More recently, however, intense competition for mortgage finance has 
eroded margins and limited profitability from lending. As a result, the 
introduction of fees and charges in the industry has been widespread, 
together with other non-interest income through cross-selling of 
insurance and personal finance products such as superannuation (AFIC, 
1998, p. 26).
Aggregate liquidity is found in Figure 7-3. Liquidity levels were in excess 
of minimum requirements before the commencement of the FI Scheme, 
due to pre-AFIC prudential liquidity requirements (see Chapter Four). 
Liquidity is variable, swinging with changes in demographic 
characteristics and exacerbated by maturity problems in the credit union  
portfolio mix (Davis, 1994). The lower risk weighting of liquid assets also 
explains the upward shift in liquidity, visually apparent in Figure 7-3, on 
the introduction of the scheme.
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As predicted, the traditional form of lending by credit unions, personal
loans, was overtaken by residential housing loans. This trend is evident
in the lending portfolios since the scheme's commencement, contained in
Figure 7-4. Nationally, housing loans reached 51% of the industry
portfolio in 1996 and 54% in 1998 -  from only 37% at the introduction of
the FI Scheme. The change in portfolio mix contributed to slightly
reduced loan yields after 1997 (AFIC, 1998, p. 26).
The credit union industry has "rationalised substantially" (AFIC, 1998, p. 
24) since the introduction of the scheme, continuing a general trend of 
merger from the peak of over 700 institutions in the early 1980s. The 
number of credit unions registered each year is displayed in Figure 7-5. At 
a national level, there was a 29% reduction in the number of credit 
unions from 345 at the commencement of the Scheme to 245 by June 1998. 
The pattern is consistent with the expectation that mergers would in part 
address capital requirements under the FI Scheme. It also appears to be 
consistent with the experience in the United States following 
deregulation (Kaushik and Lopez, 1994).
7.2 Intervention Analysis_________________
As discussed in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.4, the capital adequacy requirement 
of the FI Scheme is expected to result in an increased emphasis on 
profitability as the principal operating requirement, to accumulate 
reserves for funding increases in lending. This prediction is assessed 
using intervention analysis.
page 189
C
ha
pt
er
 S
ev
en
 -
 E
m
pi
ri
ca
l 
A
na
ly
si
s <O'
00
<3a.
o O o o o o
o O o o o o
o O o o o o
o O o o o o
o o' o o o o
o in o in o mto-co
t O
CNto CNto Ü £
■ 
H
ou
si
ng
 L
oa
ns
 ^
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 L
oa
ns
 x
R
ev
ol
vi
ng
 C
m
7-
5:
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 C
re
di
t U
ni
on
s 
(N
at
pa
ge
 1
89
B
Chapter Seven -  Empirical Analysis
7.2.1 Method
Adopting a Box-Tiao approach, the model of the impact of the FI Scheme 
on the time series of accumulated reserves for each credit union is as 
follows:
ROA, = a 0 + ß STEPt + ^ ] PULSEjt + N t
where:
(RESERVESt -RESERVES,^)
^  _ ASSETS,
a 0 is the model constant
ß is the coefficient of the intervention variable 
STEPt is a step intervention dummy variable, which is either: 
STEP91t = OVf < 1991Qtrl, l  Vt > 1991Qfrl 
or
STEP93t = 0 Vf < 1993Qfrl,lVf > 1993Qirl
is the coefficient of the f h pulse variable
PULSEjt is the f h pulse variable, which is computed as 
PULSEjt = 0Vt ^ TJ.,lVf = T-, T being the relevant quarter in each 
case, and
N t is a noise process, modelled as white noise or an 
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process.
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In this model, a 0 is the pre-FI Scheme ROA, while ß  is the increase
resulting from the regulation. The null hypothesis of no significant 
regulatory impact is assessed as H0: ß = 0. The form of the model is 
consistent with the intervention model discussed by Box and Tiao (1975). 
ROA (a proxy for return on assets) is a transformation of the time series of 
accumulated reserves (general reserves and retained profits) to induce 
stationarity and account for the size of the investment base from which 
profits are obtained. Even if profitability is constant, mere examination of 
a series of accumulated reserves would show increasing growth simply 
from a compounding effect due to an expanded asset base.
The intervention is represented by the step dummy variable, which is 
fitted either to STEP91 or STEP93. Transfer functions for dynamic 
responses for the intervention are not used due to the short length of the 
time series. Use of two potential time periods to reflect the impact of the 
Scheme is based on the fact that the capital requirements were officially 
foreshadowed in April 1990, but legislatively implemented from July 
1992. As noted in section 5.3.2, anecdotal evidence from AFIC suggests 
that some credit unions responded to this announcement by increasing 
reserves prior to the effective operational date for the scheme (AFIC, 1993, 
p. 35). The PULSE variables are not regulatory interventions, but 
variables to control for the effects of mergers or other outliers which affect 
the time series. Mergers are expected to induce a temporary upward spike 
in ROA. The incorporation of pulses in the analysis is presented in Table 
7-3.
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Table 7-3: Use of Pulses in Reserves Model
No pulses 115
One pulse 30
Two pulses 4
Three pulses 1
Total Cases 150
The noise component of the model is estimated using a model-fitting
29procedure. The noise identification process relies initially on inspection 
of plots of the autocorrelation function (ACF) -  "correlogram" -  and 
partial autocorrelation function (PACF), for both the pre-intervention 
series and the series as a whole. ACF(k) is the correlation coefficient
between the time series and its k* lag, while PACF(k) is a measure of 
correlation between time series observations k units apart after the 
correlation at intermediate lags has been controlled or "partialed out". It 
cannot be directly computed, but is estimated by a solution of the Yule- 
Walker equation system (Box and Jenkins, 1976, p. 64; Durbin, 1960). The
The following strategy to model-fitting advocated by Box and Tiao is used (1975, pp. 
70-71): "1. Frame a model for change which describes what is expected to occur given 
knowledge of the known intervention. 2. Work out the appropriate data analysis 
based on that model. 3. If diagnostic checks show no inadequacy in the model, make 
appropriate inferences; if serious deficiencies are uncovered, make appropriate model 
modification, repeat the analysis, etc."
30 Estimated as ACF(k) =
N - k
Z(X - -  y>
{=1
E ( y , - y ) 2
f  N 'S
VN- k J
f=l
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model is estimated based on the initial identification, then diagnostic
procedures are conducted, principally the estimation of ACF and PACF of
the error series of the fitted model, together with computation of the
relevant Box-Ljung Q statistic. The identification-estimation-diagnosis
process is iterative until a satisfactory model is obtained for each of the 150
credit unions (Vandaele, 1983).31
7.2.2 Results
The results of each of the 150 intervention regressions and diagnostic 
statistics are reproduced in Appendix One. Table 7-4 shows the fitting of a 
noise process to each time series. Of the cases, 108 (72%) do not display 
autoregressive or moving average characteristics and are analysed using 
linear regression. It is likely that this is due to the short length of the time 
series involved, and a lack of resolution from using quarterly data.
Table 7-4: Noise Processes Fitted
(Intervention Analysis)
AR(1) process 32
AR(2) process 5
Seasonal AR(1) process (quarterly) 5
Linear regression (white noise) 108
Cases analysed 150
The summarised results of the hypothesis testing are reproduced in Table
The statistical processing and plotting of data is facilitated by SPSS 6.1 for Power 
Macintosh, incorporating SPSS Trends 6.1.
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7-5. There is evidence consistent with the argum ent that the FI Scheme
had an impact on credit union reserve accumulation, in terms of a
significant change in the ROA  time series following introduction of the
Scheme. For 65 credit unions (43%) the null hypothesis of no regulatory
impact is rejected at a significance level of 10% or less, with 23 institutions
(15%) rejecting the null at 1% significance. The more interesting result is
that for 43 (66%) of the significant cases, the coefficient (ß) is negative.
This finding is consistent with AFIC's observation that the overall 
profitability of credit unions has decreased since the commencement of 
the FI Scheme (AFIC, 1998, p. 28).
32Table 7-5: Results o f Intervention R egressions
ß i% 5% 10% >10% Total
P ositive 9 4 9 50 22/72
N egative 14 15 14 35 43/78
Total 23 19 23 85 65/150
The intervention regressions provide mixed results in terms of the ex 
ante expectation of increased emphasis on profitability to meet capital 
requirements. A majority of the cases show no significant regulatory 
impact, and many of the significant cases show a negative impact. There 
are two explanations for these results. One is based on the relationship 
between capital and growth under the capital adequacy requirem ent noted
32 The significance levels are represented as exclusive categories; e.g. 5% refers to the 
number of cases in which 0.01<p<0.05. The same applies to Table 7-8.
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by Davis (1994) and discussed in section 5.3.2. The dependent variable,
ROA, is scaled by total assets. Therefore, a fall in ROA might not indicate
reduced emphasis on profitability, but instead represent a pattern of
growth in assets through increased lending which outstripped growth in
capital through increased reserves. The other explanation is that changes
to profitability and portfolio mix are substitutes in terms of addressing
capital adequacy requirements. The latter argument is supported by the
results of the trend analysis in the following section, and the cross-
sectional regressions in section 7.4.
7.3 Trend Analysis______________________
Changing the loan portfolio is argued (in section 5.3.3) to be a rational 
response to a risk-weighted capital requirement. The prediction is that 
credit unions will increase the proportion of housing loans, which carry a 
weighting of 50%, to address the new regulatory requirements. The 
results reported in this section confirm this hypothesis.
7.3.1 Method
An intervention analysis could not be conducted in respect of the 
portfolio behaviour of credit unions, since a decomposition of loans by 
category is unavailable until after the commencement of the Scheme. A 
post-intervention trend analysis is used instead, but using a similar 
model to the intervention analysis, based on the general form of the Box- 
Tiao model. This incorporates an explicit time variable, but omits the 
step intervention dummy:
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% HOUt = a, + yt + ]T ZjPULSEjt + Nt
where:
%HOUtis housing loans as a percentage of total loans 
cq is the model constant
y is the coefficient of the time variable
is the coefficient of the f h pulse variable
PULSEjt is the 7th pulse variable, PULSEjt = OVf * Tj.,1Vt = T~, 
T being the relevant quarter in each case, and
Nt is the noise process.
The null hypothesis of unchanged portfolio preference is evaluated as 
H0 :y = 0. The constant term (cq) is irrelevant as its difference from zero
and statistical significance depend entirely on the way in which t is
33modelled. The proxy CLOCK, which is computed as:
CLOCKt = 4FYEARt + QTRt -  7951 represents time (t). This produces a 
variable that increments by one every quarter, commencing at CLOCK= 1 
at the 4th quarter of the 1987 financial year. As in the intervention  
analysis, pulse dummies are used to control for merger effects, but these 
are not appropriate where the merger or outlier event does not occur after 
the 1st quarter of 1993. The assessment of the noise process is identical to
33 Coefficients and significance levels for a 1 are, however, reported for completeness in 
Appendix Two.
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the procedure used in the intervention study, with no assum ption that
the processes for an individual credit union will necessarily be identical.
Table 7-6: Exclusions for Trend A nalysis
Initial cases (June 1987) 197
Incomplete series exclusions 47
No housing loans exclusions 41
Cases analysed 109
The num ber of cases analysed is further limited by the observation that 
some credit unions do not engage in home loan lending. These 
institutions (41) are excluded from the trend analysis, as in Table 7-6.
7.3.2 Results
The results of each of the 109 intervention regressions and diagnostic
statistics are reproduced in Appendix Two. Table 7-7 shows the fitting of a 
noise process to each time series. A first-order autoregressive process is 
detected in 88 cases (81%), with the remainder white noise, prom pting the 
use of linear regression.
Table 7-7: N oise Processes Fitted 
(Trend A nalysis)
AR(1) process 88
Linear regression (white noise) 21
Cases analysed 109
A summary of the results of the hypothesis testing are found in Table 7-8. 
The evidence of a changed portfolio preferences following introduction of
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the FI Scheme is considerable, with 94 cases (86%) rejecting the n u ll
hypothesis at a significance level p<10%, and 61 (56%) at a significance 
level of p<l%. Moreover, the sign of the y coefficient also supports the
predicted increase in proportion of housing loans, with 80 (85%) of the 
significant coefficients positive. This includes 51 (84%) of the coefficients 
significant at the 1% level.
Table 7-8: Results of Trend R egressions
7 1% 5% 10% >10% Total
P ositive 51 16 13 7 80/87
N egative 10 3 1 8 14/22
Total 61 19 14 15 94/109
The strongly positive response across the sample supports the proposition 
that a change in portfolio and increased profitability are substitutable 
strategies for dealing w ith the imposition of a capital requirem ent. 
Indeed, given the lower margins and more competitive m arket for 
residential mortgages, the generally negative or null responses in terms of 
ROA  found in the intervention analysis should be expected if many credit 
unions have instead increased the proportion of housing loans in their 
portfolios.
7.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis_____________
To better understand the nature of the responses by the sample of credit 
unions to the regulatory intervention, the results from each of the 
intervention and trend analyses are explained by cross-sectional m ultip le
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linear regression. This permits hypotheses as to the nature of the
responses to be tested. It is argued that the individual responses can be
explained by four principal factors. First, as discussed above, the two
strategies predicted in Chapter Five (increasing profitability or increasing
the proportion of housing loans) are likely to be substitutes. If the
portfolio mix changes to emphasise lending for residential mortgages, the
smaller margins and more competitive market are likely to lead to a
decrease in ROA. Second, different behaviour should be detectable across
different common bond types, as a proxy for strength of member trust and
cohesion, screening and selection processes, and informational
advantages in the credit market. Third, size should also influence the
nature of the response to the introduction of the Scheme, on the basis that
size is also a proxy for member bonding. The usefulness of the comm on
bond is likely to deteriorate as the credit union becomes relatively large
and impersonal (Gambs, 1981). Fourth, the level of capital existing at
introduction of the Scheme will influence the response. Changes in
behaviour as a result of the Scheme are more likely where the credit
union is facing difficulties in meeting the regulatory requirements.
7.4.1 Explaining Beta
To explain the results of the intervention analysis, a cross-sectional 
equation is developed with a transformation of ß as the dependent 
variable. The regression model (in general form) used is:
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BETA = a 3 + XfiAMMA + X2LOGCAR + X3LOGASS + £  X3+jBONDj + £
where:
BETA is a transformation of the results of the intervention  
analysis, computed as:
BETA = -lVjS < 0 a  p(t) < 1O%,1V0 > 0 a  p(f) < 10%,0Vp(f) > 10%
a 3 is the model constant
X1 3+i are the model coefficients
GAMMA  is a transformation of the results of the trend 
analysis, computed as:
GAMMA = IVy > 0 a  p(t) < 10%,0Vy < 0 v  p(f) > 10%
LOGCAR is the natural log transformation of the capital 
adequacy ratio of each credit union at the commencement of 
the scheme
LOGASS is the natural log transformation of the total assets of 
each credit union
BONDj is the f h dummy variable representing a particular 
common bond classification, and
s is the error term.
The transformations of BETA and GAMMA  are made to avoid the 
influences of variance within coefficients where p>10%. All these 
coefficients are assumed to be zero, as are cases excluded from the trend
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analysis on the basis that no housing loans were extended. These
institutions are all treated as non-responsive on the question of portfolio
mix, with G A M M A  set to zero. Natural log transform ations of size
(LOGASS) and capital ratios (LOGCAR) are made to avoid problems of
non-norm ality in the variables, due to kurtosis. In m odelling the
common bond variables, BOND is represented by each of the dum m y
classifications presented in Table 7-2. The final equation is based on a
model-fitting process, aimed at parsimonious representation of the
significant factors influencing each of the earlier results, assisted fcy
diagnostic assessment of the fitted model and its residuals.
The regression model finally estimated, and presented in Table 7-9 is:
BETA = -1.364830 -  0.288111GAMMA -  0.263240LOGCAR 
+0.052461LOGASS + 0.131074INDPÜB
= 4.32818 Significance of F = 0.0025
Table 7-9: Variables in Beta Equation
Variable 2 SE t p(f)
Constant -1.278664 0.422842 -3.024 0.0030
GAMMA -0.272489 0.097252 -2.802 0.0058
LOGCAR -0.255808 0.106686 -2.398 0.0178
LOGASS 0.049256 0.026828 1.836 0.0684
INDPUB 0.110359 0.092288 1.196 0.2337
Some inferences can be drawn from these results. First, the results for 
BETA (intervention to ROA) and GAM M A  (trend of %HOU) are 
inversely related. This confirms the hypothesis proposed earlier that
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changing portfolio mix and increasing profitability are substitutes.
Second, the negative coefficient for LOGCAR implies that a systematic
increase in ROA is more likely where the capital levels of the institution
are lower. This result agrees with the proposition that the impact of the
capital requirement will be greater where the institution is closer to
infringing the regulation. Third, the influence of the common bond of
association is apparent, but its statistical significance is weaker. After
controlling for the effects of size through LOGASS, only INDPUB
(industrial, public sector bonds) had any influence on the model
approaching reasonable statistical significance. The positive coefficient for
LOGASS confirms the hypothesis that larger institutions will have less
effective common bonds. Consistent with stronger membership bonding
and cooperative principles, smaller institutions are less likely to increase
profitability as a result of the PI Scheme. That INDPUB is also positive
agrees with the observation of Arneil (1969, p. 22) that public service credit
unions, in contrast to the private sector, "do no usually attain the ideal of
service usually rendered by other credit unions", suggesting a less
effective common bond. This finding is, however, tentative given that its
p-value is only 23.37%. That the remaining common bond classifications
do not approach significance suggests that, for this sample, size may be a
better proxy for member bonding than the classifications used in the
literature.
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7.4.2 Explaining Gamma
Using the same computation process for the relevant variables, the cross- 
sectional regression model used to explain the results of the trend analysis
(transformed y as dependent variable) is:
GAMMA — a4 + (p^BETA + cp^ LOGGALB + cp^LOGASS + ^ ' (p%+ jBOhJD i + s
where:
aA is the model constant; and 
(px 3+y are the model coefficients.
This model in part replicates the regression in 7.4.1. Again, an iterative 
model-fitting process is used, particularly in dealing with the common 
bond dummy variables. The final multiple regression model obtained, as 
detailed in Table 7-10, is:
GAMMA = -1.784767 -  0.188488BETA -  0.196104LOGCAR 
+0.123368LOG ASS -  0.105293INDPUB
F = 16.94761 Significance of F = 0.0000
Table 7-10: Variables in Gamma Equation
Variable <P SE t p m
Constant -1.784767 0.330922 -5.393 0.0000
BETA -0.188488 0.067272 -2.802 0.0058
LOGCAR -0.196104 0.088996 -2.204 0.0291
LOGASS 0.123368 0.020112 6.134 0.0000
INDPUB -0.105293 0.076636 -1.374 0.1716
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Similar inferences can be drawn from this model. G A M M A  and BETA
are inversely related. The coefficient of LOGCAR is significantly negative,
demonstrating that the capital requirement has more impact on credit
unions with lower capital ratios. Size is positively related to GAMMA,
suggesting that larger institutions (with less effective common bonds) are
more likely to change the portfolio mix away from personal loans, the
traditional area of credit union lending. Consistent with the earlier
finding, only the coefficient of INDPUB approaches statistical significance.
The sign is negative, suggesting that a change in portfolio is a less likely
response for this common bond sub-classification. The positive and
negative coefficients for INDPUB in each model imply that industrial
public sector credit unions are more likely to respond to the FI Scheme by
increasing profitability instead of changing their loan portfolios.
7.5 Summary____________________________
The objective of this empirical analysis is to assess whether the impact of 
the FI Scheme on credit unions is consistent with the theoretical 
expectations drawn from the analysis in earlier chapters. To this end, 
three statistical procedures are undertaken using quarterly financial 
information for a sample of 150 NSW credit unions over the period 1987 
to 1997. First, the impact on the pattern of reserve accumulation, using 
ROA  as a proxy, is examined using intervention analysis, introduced in  
section 6.2.1. These results, viewed in isolation, are mixed in regard to the 
expectation that credit unions are likely to increase the rate of reserve 
accumulation due to the new capital adequacy requirement. Only 43% of
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institutions rejected the null hypothesis of no impact, and of these, 66%
had coefficients that were negative, rather than positive as predicted.
Second, the impact on loan portfolio preference is evaluated, due to data 
limitations, by a post-intervention trend analysis of the proportion of 
housing loans for each institution. These results provide much stronger 
support for the prediction that credit unions would increase the 
proportion of housing loans, since this form of lending carries much  
lower risk weighting under the prudential rules of the FI Scheme. 
Significant coefficients were estimated in 86% of the cases (56% at a 
significance level of 1%), and of these, 85% of the coefficients were 
positive, consistent with expectations. The consistently positive response 
in terms of portfolio mix partly explains the generally insignificant or 
negative results for the intervention analysis. Lending for residential 
mortgages suffers from lower yields and faces an increasingly competitive 
market, particularly in a period of low official interest rates and the entry 
of cut-price mortgage providers such as Aussie Home Loans and Rams.
Finally, the credit union behaviour is explained by the use of cross- 
sectional models of the responses to the regulation. Transformed 
coefficients are modelled in terms of each other, credit union size, 
common bond, and levels of regulatory capital at the commencement of 
the Scheme. The results indicate that:
• increasing reserves through greater profitability and changing
the portfolio mix to emphasise housing loans are alternative 
strategies;
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• smaller credit unions (presumably with more effective
common bonds) are less likely to increase profitability or to 
emphasise housing loans in response to capital requirements;
• both strategies are more likely for institutions w ith lower levels 
of regulatory capital; and
• industrial public sector credit unions are more likely to look to 
increased profitability, rather than increased emphasis on 
housing, to meet capital requirements.
Chapter Eight reviews the thesis and discusses the implications of the  
results empirical analysis, particularly in the context of the Wallis Inquiry 
recom m endations.
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusions
This thesis concludes with a review of the content, an identification of 
significant contributions, and expectations about the future of credit 
unions following the Wallis Inquiry.
8.1 Review______________________________
A major theme is that credit unions represent an institutional response to 
economic problems of information asymmetry. The literature on 
nonprofit organisations generally assumes that these problems are 
overcome by the existence of a nondistribution constraint. This approach 
is unsatisfactory, and in particular at odds with agency theory which 
suggests that the difficulties in using market-based disciplining 
mechanisms will lead to serious problems of management efficiency. The 
preferred view of nonprofit organisations is that the development of 
altruistic social norms and relationships of trust provide comparative 
informational advantages through encouragement of cooperation and 
facilitate non-pecuniary reward for managers. This is particularly so for 
mutual nonprofit organisations, including credit unions, where a 
community of interest between producers and consumers addresses 
information asymmetries in the relevant market. This argument is 
supported by transaction cost economics, which finds that internal
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organisation of transactions to be a rational response to information
impactedness.
Financial economics commonly argues that mutual institutions are 
inherently less efficient than open corporations, based on lack of clarity in  
the definition of property rights in residual risk bearing, and lack of access 
to market incentives. Such agency costs of equity may be exacerbated in  
mutual institutions, but the elimination of a separate class of 
shareholders should reduce the agency costs of debt, as the incentive to 
increase the risk of the institution is reduced. More importantly, mutual 
organisations are more likely to have a comparative advantage in credit 
markets due to severe problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Rural and developing credit markets, German credit cooperatives, and 
savings and loan associations in the United States, provide examples of 
these information problems, and the effectiveness of mechanisms such as 
peer monitoring for dealing with information asymmetries. In this 
context, the credit union common bond of association represents a source 
of comparative institutional advantage in reinforcing mutuality, 
promoting altruistic behaviour, and enhancing screening and monitoring 
activities in lending.
Examination of recent credit union regulation reveals a trend away from 
institutional forms of regulation towards functional regulation, in the 
pursuit of competitive neutrality. Part of this policy, triggered by the 
Campbell Inquiry, involves the extension of prudential rules applicable to 
banks to all deposit-taking institutions. From the Brady Report emerged
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an inter-State agreement to harmonise cooperatives and credit union  
legislation with uniform regulation through the FI Scheme. Although  
the Scheme eliminated inconsistencies between State laws, and formally 
reinforced some of the mutual characteristics of credit unions, the major 
change to operating principles is found in the imposition of a capital 
adequacy requirement, consistent with Reserve Bank supervision. This 
new prudential requirement is incompatible with the mutual 
organisational structure of a credit union, and is argued to reflect a failure 
by regulators to appreciate important institutional differences. 
Consequences of the measure are likely to include: profitability as the 
principal operating objective to accumulate surpluses; an increased 
preference for residential mortgage loans; constraints on growth; 
increased compliance costs for smaller credit unions; and merger activity 
to address problems of capital.
These predictions are tested empirically using a sample of 150 NSW credit 
unions over the period 1987 to 1997. Prior quantitative studies of credit 
unions reflect interests in industry structure, scale economies, and 
organisational behaviour, with the common bond a typical component of 
such studies. Intervention analysis, particularly in terms of the Box-Tiao 
form of time series analysis, provides an appropriate method for assessing 
the impact of regulation. The empirical study adopts this approach and is 
therefore consistent with a growing literature examining the effect of 
legislation. While the intervention analysis of the pattern of reserve 
accumulation generally shows insignificant or apparently confounding
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results, this can be explained by the post-intervention trend analysis of the 
proportion of lending for residential mortgages. Considerable support is 
found for the prediction that credit unions would emphasise housing 
loans since these carry a lower risk weighting for the purposes of capital 
adequacy. The inverse relationship between profitability and proportion 
of mortgage lending is confirmed by cross-sectional regressions of the 
credit unions responses. Consistent with expectations, the response of 
credit unions to the FI Scheme is also a function of regulatory capital 
levels, common bond, and institution size (a proxy for member bonding).
8.2 Contributions_______________________
This thesis provides at least eight significant contributions. First, an 
alternative perspective is offered to the widely held view that the 
nondistribution constraint is the essential institutional feature for 
nonprofit organisations. Nonprofit organisations should be analysed in 
terms of the informational advantages flowing from relationships of trust 
amongst the membership, whether arising from embedded social norms, 
or from a coalition of producer and consumer interests in markets 
characterised by severe adverse selection and moral hazard.
Second, it is demonstrated that transaction costs economics can be applied 
to these issues of institutional form. Little progress has been made in  
applying transaction cost economics to situations of cooperatives (e.g. 
Bonus, 1986; Krashinsky, 1986; Staatz, 1987) and less so for the case of 
mutuals. Williamson (1985, p. 394) advocates further inquiry into
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applications of transaction cost analysis to nonprofit forms of enterprise. 
Neoinstitutionalism provides a complementary perspective to the 
arguments based on information asymmetry.
Third, a counterpoint (consistent with Llewellyn and Holmes, 1991) is 
provided to an emerging conventional wisdom that mutuality is 
outdated and such institutions can and should convert to a shareholder- 
owned corporation. Economists studying the differing incentives of 
owners, borrowers and managers have typically done so within the 
context of shareholder companies, particularly with the discipline of the 
sharemarket. The usual assumption has been of a high degree of 
efficiency within these markets and the implied disciplining of managers 
through market-based processes. The coexistence of mutuals and other 
forms of institution has been hypothesised as arising from agency costs, 
adverse selection problems and the efficiency of risk-sharing 
arrangements. The economic analysis of credit unions generally deals, 
however, with only one aspect of a complex social movement. My claim 
is that credit unions are a distinct form of socio-economic organisation 
with important informational advantages in particular markets.
Fourth, an economic model of credit union behaviour is proposed. This 
model is based on an assumption of maximisation of manager utility 
(Keating, 1979; Williamson, 1974), subject to the influence of the common  
bond of association. The common bond reduces member-manager agency 
costs (particularly in screening, selection and socialisation processes), 
reinforces the principle of mutuality, provides informational advantages,
Chapter Eight -  Conclusions
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and is a proxy for other institutional advantages such as employer
subsidies. The common bond should therefore be an important element
of the economic analysis of credit union behaviour.
Fifth, a detailed analysis of the development of Australian credit union  
regulation, and the legislative changes introduced by the FI Scheme is 
undertaken. More importantly, an explanation of the nature of these 
changes -  the policy of "competitive neutrality" -  is provided.
Sixth, a theoretical assessment of the impact of the FI Scheme on credit 
unions is conducted, principally the imposition of a risk-weighted capital 
adequacy requirement. It is argued that this prudential regulation 
conflicts with the mutual structure of the credit union, through 
inappropriately assuming excessive risk-taking behaviour, and an ability 
to raise permanent capital. Likely consequences for operating policies, 
portfolio preferences, and industry structure are predicted.
Seventh, the empirical study of the impact of the FI Scheme on credit 
unions is significant because no similar Australian study has been 
published. Also of significance is the use of intervention analysis to study 
the impact of a regulatory change. The results therefore make an 
important contribution to the growing literature using this technique.
Finally, this work promotes greater cognisance of possible unintended 
consequences from government intervention. The imposition of 
inappropriate supervisory mechanisms on credit unions arises from a 
failure to appreciate important institutional differences. This creates a
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"regulatory paradox" (Sunstein, 1990). Policy makers need to have a 
thorough understanding of the actual consequences of regulatory 
programmes. Analytical rigour is needed in the planning and 
implementation of public policy. The important message is that 
regulators should be aware of the distinct institutional and economic 
differences between credit unions as mutual organisations and other 
forms of financial intermediaries. In short, this thesis agrees with the 
position of Bundt, Chiesa and Keating (1989, p. 27) that:
[Regulators, by systematically ignoring the rich behavioural 
dynamics of the relationships among members in the financial 
cooperative, may pursue actions that will hamper the social 
utility of the cooperative's members as well as lead to a socially 
inefficient allocation of savings flows.
8.3 Limitations and Further Research______
This thesis uses a theoretical approach to the question of credit union  
organisation that is based principally on information asymmetry and 
institutional economics literatures. Other approaches, particularly 
themes emergent within behavioural economics literatures (Earl, 1988), 
might also have provided some valuable insights into these social 
institutions.
For example, propositions might be developed from a framework of 
competency (Foss, 1998) rather than information impactedness and 
opportunism. This approach would emphasise the financial 
competencies of both the borrower and the credit union manager-lender. 
An important element of such an analysis would be the kind of
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information social networks are in fact able to convey to credit unions. 
The usefulness of such information in turn depends on whether financial 
risk arises from calculated guile or mere incompetence. Guile can include 
the management of impression within social settings as a form of 
deliberate miscommunication (Goffman, 1956, 1969). The economic 
psychology of problem debt (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) is an obvious 
area for further exploration of the role of the credit union in mediating 
information flows.
Direct empirical testing of these alternative propositions, as well as those 
presented in this thesis, would require the use of a more qualitative 
methodology involving questionnaire, interview and case studies of 
individual Australian credit unions. Such fieldwork would be able to 
more directly observe loan approval and monitoring processes, screening 
of applicants (and managers), constitution and operation of committees, 
and information-gathering procedures. This wider issue of ethnographic 
realism of the theoretical propositions presented in earlier chapters is, 
however, beyond its scope of this thesis.
8.4 The Future_________________________
The future facing credit unions following the Financial System Inquiry 
(Wallis Inquiry, 1997) is considered. This Report adopted a similar 
deregulatory philosophy to that of Campbell (Greinke, 1998). The 
essential recommendation is that all prudential regulation functions be 
rationalised into a single national regulator to be termed the Australian
Chapter Eight -  Condusions
page 214
Prudential Regulation Commission (Recommendation 31). Inherent in
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this recommendation is the intention to repeal the FI Scheme and replace 
it with a federal regulatory framework. The report stated (1997, p. 307):
While the FI Scheme has raised the prudential standing of 
institutions supervised, it has failed to deliver uniformity, cost 
efficiency or regulatory neutrality either across industries 
supervised or with competitors in the wider financial system. 
The excessive layering in the structure has resulted in  
duplication of supervisory, policy and administrative 
arrangements; slow decision making in important areas, 
including legislative review; and conflicts between those 
making policy and those implementing it.
The Commonwealth has since legislated to establish the new prudential 
regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), 
which by 1 July 1999 will assume the prudential functions of AFIC and the 
SSAs and end the operation of the FI Scheme. The corporate regulation 
of financial institutions will be undertaken by the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC). One consequence of this 
consolidation of prudential supervision into a single agency is the 
continuation of bank style risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements 
applied across the sector (Recommendation 35):
Prudential regulation of all licensed DTIs should be consistent 
with standards approved by the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision and should aim to ensure that the risk of loss of 
depositors' funds is remote. Quantitative prudential 
requirements such as capital adequacy, liquidity requirements 
and large exposure limits should apply, (emphasis added)
Indeed, in 1997/98 AFIC embarked on a harmonisation programme for its 
prudential standards ahead of the transfer to APRA, described as its 
"major undertaking" for that financial year to "bring them into line with
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APRA's standard for banks" (AFIC, 1998, pp. 6, 11). From 1 October 1998, 
the capital adequacy regimes for all deposit taking institutions will be 
almost identical. The prudential rules, however, already closely reflect 
those applying to banks. On this basis, the FI Scheme might be 
characterised as "revolutionary" and the Wallis consequences as 
"evolutionary" (De Gruchy, 1997).
A fundamental concern, based on the arguments in this thesis, is that the 
Wallis Inquiry unduly concentrates on the similarities, rather than the 
differences, between financial institutions (Neal, 1997, p. 25). Regulation 
treating credit unions as no different from building societies or banks may 
have self-fulfilling qualities. Principally, the competitive neutrality 
objective will maintain pressure to erode important institutional 
differences, such as mutuality, and the relationship between credit union  
members reflected in the common bond of association. The current trend 
is for the common bond of membership to be broadened and, in effect, 
many credit unions have become community credit unions (Stanford and 
Beale, 1995, p. 42). Indeed, the common bond appears to be of such little 
concern to the prudential regulators that AFIC recently stated that "a 
common bond for credit union membership is no longer required" (AFIC, 
1998, p. 25). As this is at odds with the FI Code, it appears that in practice, 
the requirement for a common bond is being systematically overlooked by 
AFIC. Based on this trend, APRA might abandon the common bond 
entirely as an essential operating principle for credit unions.
If the common bond is not perceived as important by regulators, then the
Chapter Eight -  Conclusions
page 216
associated organisational benefits of altruism, and managerial motivation  
through screening, selection and socialisation will be eroded. An  
increased recruitment of managers from profit-oriented financial 
institutions is a natural consequence, particularly for smaller credit 
unions dealing with increasingly complex regulatory responsibilities. 
Indeed, it has been argued by AFIC that (De Gruchy, 1997):
[Credit unions] need to find adequately skilled management 
and quality for their boards. Without this, how can an 
institution effectively plan for growth and profitability?
Another foreseeable trend is demutualisation of credit unions to change 
the institutional form into one better suited to the assumptions of the 
regulators (Davis, 1994). Cooperative entities, in facing new financial 
conditions or regulation, can be induced to adopt structural changes that 
lead, consciously or not, to a loss of their cooperative nature (Kaplan de 
Drimer, 1997). Davis (1997) identifies demutualisation as a significant 
trend in the process of Australian financial restructuring. 
Demutualisation may be prompted by the accumulation of reserves, due 
to the capital adequacy requirement, as these reserves grew significantly in 
aggregate since the introduction of the FI Scheme. Expropriation of this 
communal wealth by the current membership may provide an incentive 
for credit union members to demutualise. Share capital has importance 
to open corporations in dealing with a number of agency problems. The 
perceived benefits of permanent share capital will become more 
prominent if the comparative advantages of mutuality are ignored or 
eroded. There is evidence that regulators are moving towards facilitating
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the widespread use of share capital in the credit union industry. On 21 
August 1998, AFIC resolved (PR17/98) to amend the prudential standards 
to issue a special form of share capital, not merely subordinated debt, in  
order "to support growth targets". The provisions if the FI Code 
prohibiting issue of shares by credit unions can be indirectly repealed for 
an individual institution by proclamation of a regulation "prescribing" 
that society. The prescription of a credit union effectively deems it a 
building society for the purposes of issuing permanent share capital (FI 
Code ss. 148, 200 and 216). This standard intends to preserve the mutual 
character of a credit union by requiring maintenance of the one-member- 
one-vote principle, and by limiting participation in any surplus on 
winding up to members as a class rather than shareholders. It is arguable, 
however, that such share issues have the capacity to undermine the 
mutual structure, should directors be inclined to value maximisation of 
shareholder return over promotion of member benefits. The 
foreshadowed infusion of professional managers and directors to the 
industry make such an outcome more likely.
Mergers are likely to continue, leading to further concentration of the 
industry. Recently, de Gruchy (1997) stated:
Consideration of future strategies [by institutions] w ill 
undoubtedly include formation of alliances and possible 
mergers. . . Many believe that the rate of rationalisation over 
the next few years will escalate.
Merger combined with demutualisation may be a new trend. 
Crystallisation of the property rights in reserves may be attractive, for
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example, to shareholders of a building society. Regulators are already 
acting to provide avenues for demutualisation. On 24 June 1998, AFIC 
resolved (PR15/98) to make a prudential standard to facilitate 
demutualisation of credit unions, partly for the purpose of potential 
merger with building societies.
A final observation is made: credit unions have a strong sense of social 
responsibility, but the importance of this role is not apparently shared by 
regulators. Indeed, in discussing potential community service obligations 
of financial institutions, the following was stated (Wallis Inquiry, 1997, 
p. 195):
Financial institutions, like other business corporations, are 
designed to produce wealth, not to redistribute it . . . Obliging 
financial institutions to subsidise some activities compromises 
their efficiency and is unlikely to prove sustainable in a 
competitive market.
Credit unions are, however, likely to have positive social value without 
the mandate to be a competitive element of an efficient financial system. 
Freedom for mutuals without pressure to perform on profits and growth 
permits engagement in activities that are not profit-oriented, such as 
improvement of community interests. Recognition of important 
differences, particularly mutuality and the role of the common bond of 
association, are essential if credit unions are to continue their historical 
role of social improvement.
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Appendix One 
Results of
Intervention Analysis
A1.1 Model Coefficients
ß
t
p(t)
LinR
AR(1), AR(2) 
step_91, step_93 
p u lse_ l . . . _3 
const
Variable coefficient
Student7s t-statistic for coefficient
Significance of t (p-value)
Linear Regression (no tim e series process)
First-, second-order autoregressive processes 
Step dum m y variable for 1st Quarter 1991 or 1993 
Pulse dum m y variables 
M odel constant
Institu tion M odel Variable ß t p(t)
ACFE LinR step_93 -0.001661 -2.886 0.0064
const 0.003706 9.110 0.0000
ADCU AR(1) AR(1) 0.721097 6.960 0.0000
step_91 0.006367 2.799 0.0081
const 0.000947 0.443 0.6603
AGLG AR(1) AR(1) 0.620352 3.897 0.0004
step_93 0.000977 0.994 0.3266
const 0.001463 1.923 0.0622
AGRI AR(2) AR(1) -0.304206 -1.842 0.0737
AR(2) -0.397041 -2.446 0.0195
step_91 -0.002403 -10.869 0.0000
const 0.003284 17.807 0.0000
ALBU LinR step_93 -0.003178 -2.737 0.0095
p u lse _ l 0.026669 7.172 0.0000
const 0.003901 4.692 0.0000
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AMPE L in R step _ 9 1 0.001752 2.366 0.0233
c o n s t 0.002306 4.922 0.0000
A SQ U A R (1) A R (1 ) -0.548831 -3.848 0.0005
sar4 s tep _ 9 3 0.020085 1.410 0.1678
c o n s t -0.003909 -0.866 0.3925
A U B U A R (1) A R (1) -0.682572 -5.158 0.0000
sar4 ste p _ 9 3 0.006675 1.752 0.0891
c o n s t -0.001057 -0.877 0.3868
AUDI A R (1) A R (1) -0.557591 -3.470 0.0021
step _ 9 1 -0.001977 -0.286 0.7771
c o n s t 0.000475 0.225 0.8239
A V IA L in R step _ 9 3 -0.001352 -1.262 0.2148
c o n s t 0.005247 6.923 0.0000
B A N A A R (1) A R (1) 0.735991 6.041 0.0000
s te p _ 9 3 0.000902 1.013 0.3194
c o n s t 0.004580 6.267 0.0000
B A N D L in R step _ 9 1 0.000541 0.686 0.4967
c o n s t 0.000154 0.234 0.8164
B A N K L in R p u l s e _ l 0.006486 2.342 0.0248
step _ 9 1 0.002212 1.795 0.0810
ste p _ 9 3 -0.002280 -2.004 0.0526
c o n s t 0.004042 5.188 0.0000
BCCC A R (1) A R (1 ) -0.406394 -2.772 0.0088
step _ 9 1 0.000699 0.724 0.4736
p u ls e _ l 0.014001 3.842 0.0005
c o n s t 0.001657 2.009 0.0521
BCUL L in R step _ 9 3 0.000189 0.242 0.8103
c o n s t 0.004057 7.334 0.0000
BEMB A R (2) A R (1) -0.100307 -0.689 0.4953
A R (2) -0.488595 -3.362 0.0018
ste p _ 9 3 0.002285 1.635 0.1108
c o n s t 2.480 0.0180
BERR L in R ste p _ 9 3 -0.000649 -1.031 0.3091
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const 0.003076 6.906 0.0000
BIG R AR(1) AR(1) 0.248245 1.448 0.1563
step_91 -0.001612 -2.430 0.0202
p u lse _ l 0.002313 1.580 0.1228
const 0.005153 9.263 0.0000
BLM O AR(1) AR(1) 0.463565 3.095 0.0038
step_91 0.003398 3.385 0.0017
p u lse _ l -0.007498 -4.721 0.0000
const -0.000720 -0.837 0.4081
B O R A AR(1) AR(1) 0.342452 2.217 0.0328
step_93 -0.001836 -1.416 0.1651
const 0.003047 3.263 0.0024
BO RG LinR p u lse _ l -0.015941 -3.689 0.0007
step_91 -0.001455 -0.988 0.3295
const 0.004566 3.728 0.0006
B R A M LinR step_91 -0.001968 -1.745 0.0891
const 0.004632 4.907 0.0000
BR O K AR(1) AR(1) 0.444511 2.892 0.0064
step_93 -0.001573 -3.090 0.0038
const 0.003615 9.714 0.0000
BRO O LinR step_93 -0.001345 -1.810 0.0783
const 0.003140 5.976 0.0000
BTRE LinR step_91 0.001371 0.769 0.4465
const 0.002426 1.627 0.1120
C A L A LinR step_93 0.001020 1.068 0.2921
const 0.002837 4.203 0.0002
C A M P AR(2) AR(1) -0.026959 -0.143 0.8876
AR(2) -0.519794 -2.830 0.0090
step_91 0.001096 1.164 0.2553
const 0.001309 1.835 0.0785
CAPE AR(1) AR(1) -0.312619 -1.626 0.1128
step_91 0.001884 2.883 0.0067
step_93 -0.001615 -2.674 0.0113
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p u lse_ l 0.012695 7.000 0.0000
const 0.002466 -2.674 0.0113
C A PR LinR step_93 -0.001097 -1.998 0.0529
const 0.003601 9.278 0.0000
CA R E LinR step_93 0.000990 0.610 0.5464
const 0.004362 4.389 0.0001
C B O A AR(1) AR(1) -0.349837 -2.269 0.0292
step_93 -0.000299 -1.199 0.2381
const 0.003966 22.608 0.0000
C D H C LinR step _ 9 1 0.001719 0.673 0.5050
const 0.001394 0.652 0.5182
CESS LinR step_91 -0.004855 -1.891 0.0663
const 0.006441 2.999 0.0048
C IB A LinR step_93 0.002161 1.530 0.1350
const 0.001043 1.089 0.2837
CITY LinR step_93 -0.001381 -2.793 0.0097
p u lse_ l 0.005648 3.485 0.0013
const 0.003663 10.106 0.0000
C L A R LinR step_91 -0.002249 -1.539 0.1345
const 0.005512 4.818 0.0000
C O A S LinR step_93 -0.000097 -0.156 0.8769
const 0.003141 7.123 0.0000
C O M F LinR step_91 0.000999 1.385 0.1767
p u lse_ l 0.056384 28.096 0.0000
const 0.000238 4.115 0.0003
CO M P LinR step_93 -0.000479 -1.478 0.1476
const 0.003314 14.451 0.0000
C O M T LinR step_91 0.001571 1.925 0.0617
const 0.001679 2.459 0.0186
CSRE LinR step_91 0.001224 1.537 0.1326
const 0.001602 2.404 0.0212
C W C U LinR step_93 0.000526 0.143 0.8868
const 0.003207 1.235 0.2243
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DEPE LinR step_91 0.000260 0.502 0.6189
const 0.003227 7.452 0.0000
DUBB LinR step_93 -0.002189 -2.077 0.0466
const 0.004971 6.670 0.0000
ECUL LinR step_91 -0.001761 -2.406 0.0212
const 0.002424 3.980 0.0003
EDCU LinR step_93 0.003259 2.789 0.0100
const 0.001563 2.628 0.0145
ELCO AR(1) AR(1) 0.431677 2.716 0.0144
step_93 -0.000696 -0.854 0.3993
const 0.004450 7.117 0.0000
ENDE LinR step_93 -0.000410 -0.824 0.4155
p u lse _ l 0.032342 20.548 0.0000
p u lse_2 0.005060 3.215 0.0028
const 0.004475 12.716 0.0000
ESSO LinR step_93 -0.001179 -2.591 0.0135
const 0.003929 12.212 0.0000
EURO LinR step_93 0.002250 1.479 0.1474
const 0.003280 3.049 0.0042
FBEC AR(1) AR(1) -0.266171 -1.684 0.1006
step_91 0.001079 0.803 0.4270
const 0.003157 2.814 0.0078
H R S AR(1) AR(1) -0.407333 -2.725 0.0098
step_93 -0.000692 -0.493 0.6249
const 0.005542 5.616 0.0000
FORS LinR step_93 -0.001764 -2.165 0.0367
const 0.004149 7.204 0.0000
GIOS LinR step_91 0.000792 0.761 0.4515
const 0.002007 2.304 0.0268
GOSF LinR step_91 0.000352 0.582 0.5646
const 0.004353 8.159 0.0000
G R A N LinR step_93 0.002004 0.666 0.5094
p u lse _ l 0.239861 24.895 0.0000
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const 0.002102 1.001 0.3232
GREA LinR step_91 0.001641 2.767 0.0087
const 0.003516 7.083 0.0000
HARD LinR step_91 -0.001411 -1.848 0.0724
const 0.003586 5.612 0.0000
HIBE AR(1) AR(1) 0.872555 11.760 0.0000
sar4 step_91 0.001827 2.182 0.0373
const 0.003311 2.275 0.0305
HMCS LinR step_93 -0.001497 -4.441 0.0001
const 0.003325 13.952 0.0000
H o n AR(1) AR(1) 0.690541 5.909 0.0000
step_93 -0.001741 -2.277 0.0287
const 0.003700 5.947 0.0000
HORI LinR step_93 -0.000705 -1.711 0.0954
p u lse _ l 0.027155 20.583 0.0000
const 0.002784 9.684 0.0000
H UUN LinR step_93 -0.001365 -3.011 0.0046
const 0.004198 13.100 0.0000
ILLW AR(1) AR(1) 0.315883 2.065 0.0460
step_93 -0.001383 -2.211 0.0333
const 0.003737 8.314 0.0000
INTE LinR step_91 -0.000923 -1.013 0.3176
const 0.007003 9.187 0.0000
KARP LinR step_93 -0.001382 -2.335 0.0251
p u lse _ l 0.004840 2.553 0.0149
const 0.004342 10.508 0.0000
LABO LinR step_93 -0.002487 -1.293 0.2040
const 0.004833 3.552 0.0010
LABS LinR step_91 0.000576 1.553 0.1308
const 0.004646 15.853 0.0000
LECU AR(1) AR(1) 0.341564 2.223 0.0324
step_93 -0.001340 -1.745 0.0893
const 0.003879 7.011 0.0000
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LMCU LinR step_93 -0.001388 -2.106 0.0418
const 0.003683 7.905 0.0000
LSCU LinR step_93 0.000335 0.552 0.5840
const 0.001771 4.132 0.0002
MACO LinR step_91 -0.004497 -4.737 0.0000
const 0.007710 9.707 0.0000
MACQ LinR step_93 -0.000514 -0.520 0.6059
const 0.006692 9.582 0.0000
MAIT LinR step_93 0.001464 0.702 0.4872
const 0.001260 0.854 0.3933
M A N L LinR step_91 -0.000757 -0.287 0.7759
const 0.002779 1.258 0.2162
M A N N AR(1) AR(1) 0.358256 2.184 0.0354
step_93 -0.000550 -0.624 0.5366
const 0.005443 8.545 0.0000
MARI AR(1) AR(1) 0.393947 2.535 0.0157
step_91 -0.000846 -0.963 0.3421
p u lse _ l -0.008754 -5.610 0.0000
const 0.003636 4.886 0.0000
M A W A LinR step_93 -0.000908 -2.209 0.0333
const 0.003623 12.463 0.0000
MCUL LinR step_91 0.001203 1.644 0.1085
const 0.003184 5.201 0.0000
M IN N LinR step_91 0.001158 0.416 0.6798
const 0.003088 1.333 0.1906
M M CU LinR step_91 -0.000791 -1.011 0.3186
const 0.004314 6.591 0.0000
M ONI LinR step_91 0.000404 0.647 0.5220
const 0.003170 6.168 0.0000
MSBC LinR step_91 -0.001813 -4.573 0.0000
const 0.003699 11.153 0.0000
MUCL LinR step_93 0.000632 0.325 0.7471
const 0.004407 3.201 0.0028
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NBUS LinR step_93 0.000273 0.321 0.7499
pu lse_ l 0.018029 6.618 0.0000
const 0.004148 6.986 0.0000
NCIT AR(1) AR(1) 0.271838 1.756 0.0876
step_91 0.006092
. >•
2.755 0.0092
step_93 -0.004625 -2.264 0.0297
const 0.000622 0.428 0.6713
NCOM LinR step_93 0.002589 2.200 0.0340
const 0.001417 1.702 0.0969
NDIS LinR step_93 -0.001998 -2.161 0.0370
const 0.004287 6.557 0.0000
NENG LinR step_91 0.002014 2.922 0.0058
const 0.002257 3.913 0.0004
NEWC LinR step_93 -0.006031 -2.287 0.0279
const 0.015902 8.526 0.0000
NIND LinR step_91 0.000797 1.336 0.1903
const 0.003028 5.759 0.0000
NOVA LinR step_91 -0.000594 -0.783 0.4386
pu lse_ l 0.018522 8.312 0.0000
const 0.003776 5.978 0.0000
NRIV AR(1) AR(1) 0.403557 2.668 0.0113
step_91 -0.000397 -0.564 0.5763
const 0.003460 5.781 0.0000
NRM A LinR step_91 -0.000368 -0.397 0.6932
const 0.003351 4.327 0.0001
N SU N LinR step_91 -0.001870 -2.125 0.0416
const 0.003895 5.551 0.0000
NSW P AR(2) AR(1) -0.498403 -3.308 0.0021
AR(2) -0.428769 -2.888 0.0065
step_91 -0.000401 -0.460 0.6480
const 0.001775 2.444 0.0196
NSW T LinR step_93 0.000769 1.861 0.0705
const 0.002750 9.414 0.0000
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N W L G L in R step _91 -0.000456 -0.235 0.8157
c o n st 0.004317 7.770 0.0000
O R A N L in R step _91 -0.000742 -1.516 0.1377
c o n st 0.003731 9.116 0.0000
ORIO L in R step _ 9 3 0.000718 0.959 0.3449
p u ls e _ l 0.029576 13.574 0.0000
c o n st 0.003209 6.587 0.0000
O R M U L in R step _ 9 1 -0.000216 -0.490 0.6267
c o n st 0.003682 11.844 0.0000
P A R K L in R step _ 9 1 0.001044 0.670 0.5067
c o n s t 0.003686 2.829 0.0074
PBBC L in R step _ 9 1 -0.006539 -0.648 0.5210
p u ls e _ l -0.017430 -5.885 0.0000
c o n s t 0.003036 3.616 0.0009
PCUL L in R step _ 9 3 0.000832 2.251 0.0302
c o n s t 0.003083 11.802 0.0000
PEEL L in R step _ 9 3 -0.001968 -5.662 0.0000
p u ls e _ l 0.024858 22.326 0.0000
c o n s t 0.004477 17.982 0.0000
P E N R L in R step _ 9 3 0.001672 1.516 0.1385
p u ls e _ l 0.029965 8.708 0.0000
c o n s t 0.002312 3.092 0.0039
PHOE A R (1) A R (1) 0.309952 1.966 0.0569
step _ 9 3 -0.001426 -2.463 0.0186
c o n s t 0.003958 9.517 0.0000
PO W E L in R step _ 9 1 -0.001185 -1.771 0.0848
p u ls e _ l 0.017140 8.726 0.0000
c o n s t 0.002685 4.735 0.0000
PR O S A R (1) A R (1) 0.489145 3.402 0.0017
step _ 9 1 0.000684 1.034 0.3082
p u ls e _ l 0.002746 2.743 0.0094
c o n s t 0.002593 4.561 0.0001
PTO S L in R step _ 9 1 -0.002822 -3.282 0.0027
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const 0.004380 6.506 0.0000
PUNC LinR step_93 -0.000851 -1.216 0.2318
p u lse _ l -0.046613 -21.060 0.0000
pulse_2 0.004671 2.110 0.0419
const 0.003912 7.905 0.0000
QANT LinR step_91 0.001969 3.597 0.0090
const 0.001126 2.459 0.0186
RALE LinR step_93 -0.001695 -2.547 0.0150
const 0.003371 7.162 0.0000
RAND LinR step_93 -0.001388 -1.345 0.1866
const 0.005239 7.177 0.0000
REIi LinR step_93 -0.001206 -1.816 0.0779
p u lse _ l 0.053838 25.950 0.0000
p u lse_2 0.046653 22.487 0.0000
pulse_3 0.016437 7.934 0.0000
const 0.002993 6.289 0.0000
RESO AR(1) AR(1) 0.454140 3.166 0.0031
step_91 0.000801 0.663 0.5113
const 0.003328 3.228 0.0026
ROTH LinR step_93 -0.001440 -1.892 0.0661
const 0.003308 6.146 0.0000
RTAS AR(1) AR(1) -0.640629 -5.190 0.0000
step_93 0.000492 1.331 0.1912
const 0.002437 9.381 0.0000
RYDE LinR step_93 -0.000391 -0.595 0.5551
const 0.002560 5.512 0.0000
RYOM LinR step_93 0.001133 1.176 0.2484
p u lse _ l 0.021023 7.293 0.0000
const 0.001798 2.808 0.0084
SCCU LinR step_91 0.000270 0.523 0.6043
const 0.002051 4.738 0.0000
SCEC AR(2) AR(1) -0.627057 -3.925 0.0006
AR(2) -0.565488 -3.589 0.0014
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step_93
const
SECU LinR step_93
const
SELE LinR step_93
p u lse _ l
const
SHEL AR(1) AR(1)
step_93
const
SHOA LinR step_91
const
SNOW LinR step_91
const
SPAP AR(1) AR(1)
sar4 step_93
const
STGE LinR step_93
puls©_1
const
STHE LinR step_93
const
SUMM AR(1) AR(1)
step_93
p u lse _ l
const
SUTH LinR step_93
const
SWSC AR(1) AR(1)
step_91
const
SYDN AR(1) AR(1)
step_93
0.001532 1.941 0.0636
0.002244 5.343 0.0000
-0.000377 -0.488 0.6287
0.003798 6.947 0.0000
-0.000703 -1.196 0.2393
0.022366 11.878 0.0000
0.003081 7.508 0.0000
0.382660 2.576 0.0141
-0.002320 -3.487 0.0013
0.005319 11.043 0.0000
0.001236 1.954 0.0607
0.002645 5.401 0.0000
0.002397 3.135 0.0033
0.001169 1.828 0.0754
0.783381 8.637 0.0000
0.001072 1.551 0.1293
0.002035 2.431 0.0200
0.001409 1.185 0.2435
0.038773 10.186 0.0000
0.003117 3.663 0.0008
-0.001337 -1.442 0.1575
0.004661 7.111 0.0000
0.631912 5.099 0.0000
-0.000484 -0.451 0.6543
0.007005 5.325 0.0000
0.002975 3.557 0.0011
0.000428 0.218 0.8290
0.003040 2.185 0.0351
0.503545 3.534 0.0011
0.003200 1.391 0.1726
0.001835 0.928 0.3594
0.403333 2.391 0.0223
-0.000633 -1.719 0.0944
page 255
Appendix One -  Results of Intervention Analysis
p u lse _ l 0.003816 5.529 0.0000
p u lse_2 0.006772 9.813 0.0000
const 0.003249 12.148 0.0000
TABS LinR step_93 0.000242 0.167 0.8683
p u lse _ l -0.005535 -1.192 0.2407
const 0.002268 2.242 0.0310
TAFE LinR step_91 -0.003071 -1.707 0.0960
const 0.008119 5.394 0.0000
TART LinR step_91 0.002974 1.703 0.0970
step_93 -0.003247 -2.028 0.0498
const 0.008323 7.535 0.0000
TCUL LinR step_91 0.000516 0.734 0.4675
p u lse _ l 0.059412 28.967 0.0000
p u lse_2 0.032003 16.004 0.0000
const 0.002667 4.504 0.0001
TELS AR(1) AR(1) 0.457013 3.176 0.0030
step_91 0.001638 1.378 0.1765
const 0.001282 1.263 0.2145
T R A N AR(1) AR(1) 0.401979 2.549 0.0151
step_93 -0.003087 -4.522 0.0001
const 0.004038 8.146 0.0000
T W SH AR(1) AR(1) 0.652431 5.436 0.0000
sar4 step_93 0.001905 0.646 0.5226
const -0.000890 -0.320 0.7508
UAO D LinR step_93 0.000328 0.579 0.5668
p u lse _ l 0.001856 1.083 0.2867
const 0.001970 0.514 0.6106
UNIC LinR step_91 0.000194 0.355 0.7243
const 0.001988 4.353 0.0010
UPPE LinR step_91 0.001195 1.806 0.0788
const 0.002817 5.091 0.0000
W AG G LinR step_93 -0.002006 -1.859 0.0710
p u lse _ l -0.012946 -3.747 -0.0006
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const 0.004074 5.411 0.0000
W BDE LinR step_91 -0.002071 -3.412 0.0015
const 0.005136 10.114 0.0000
W EST LinR step_93 -0.000988 -1.950 0.0588
p u lse _ l 0.029226 18.019 0.0000
const 0.003447 9.504 0.0000
WILL AR(1) AR(1) -0.407366 -3.250 0.0025
step_91 -0.000601 -0.361 0.7200
p u lse _ l -0.019881 -3.166 0.0031
const 0.004173 3.033 0.0045
W Y O N LinR step_91 0.000851 1.691 0.0991
const 0.003231 7.669 0.0000
Y E N N LinR step_91 0.000466 0.777 0.4420
const 0.003439 6.851 0.0000
A1.2 Diagnostics________________
Linear Regressions:
F F-statistic
p(F) Significance of F (p-value)
D W  Durbin-W atson statistic
Autoregressive models:
AIC Aikike's Information Criterion
Institu tion F P(F) DW AIC
ACFE
ADCU
AGLG
AGRI
8.33142 0.0064 1.7688
-353.7353
-405.8824
-431.8340
ALBU 33.46635 0.0000 2.4054
AMPE
A SQ U
4.58926 0.0166 1.8608
-128.5177
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A U B U -217.5424
AUDI -147.5544
A V IA 1.59156 0.2148 2.3638
B A N A -345.1739
BA N D 0.47090 0.4967 2.1439
BA N K 3.08373 0.0394 2.0597
BCCC -331.7607
BCUL 0.05842 0.8103 2.3676
BEMB -281.9259
BERR 1.06285 0.3091 1.7198
BIGR -402.9253
BLMO -390.7567
BORA -352.6718
BORG 7.75913 0.0015 1.9917
BRAM 3.04341 0.0891 1.9940
BROK -438.1058
BROO 3.27490 0.0783 2.0377
BTRE 0.59178 0.4465 2.2314
CALA 1.14154 0.2921 1.7456
CAMP -238.9690
CAPE -386.0024
CAPR 3.99292 0.0529 2.3085
CARE 0.37227 0.5464 2.3625
CBOA -432.3264
CDHC 0.45298 0.5050 2.0086
CESS 3.57631 0.0663 2.2959
CIBA 2.34095 0.1350 2.1326
CITY 11.61531 0.0001 1.9654
CLAR 2.36992 0.1345 2.2110
COAS 0.02431 0.8769 1.3689
COMF 408.58405 0.0000 2.0632
COMP 2.18452 0.1476 1.7854
COMT 3.70576 0.0617 2.1986
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CSRE
CW CU
DEPE
DUBB
ECUL
EDCU
ELCO
ENDE
ESSO
EURO
FBEC
H R S
FORS
GIOS
GOSF
G R A N
GREA
HARD
M BE
HMCS
HOH
HORI
H U U N
ILLW
INTE
KARP
LABO
LABS
LECU
LMCU
LSCU
MACO
MACQ
2.36258 0.1326 1.6837
0.02055 0.8868 2.3855
0.25153 0.6189 2.3176
4.31323 0.0446 2.0215
5.79030 0.0212 2.1874
7.78049 0.0100 2.0420
- 362.4261
148.64401 0.0000 1.3841
6.71224 0.0135 2.1049
2.18727 0.1474 1.4198
- 309.8253
- 290.8374
4.68693 0.0367 2.0797
0.57866 0.4515 2.2360
0.33843 0.5646 1.8266
321.00139 0.0000 2.5388
7.65542 0.0087 2.0090
3.41387 0.0724 1.8787
- 310.9245
19.72273 0.0001 1.6507
- 434.4782
213.11834 0.0000 1.4825
9.06710 0.0046 1.7512
- 408.3606
1.02571 0.3176 1.7968
5.16330 0.0105 1.9344
1.67082 0.2040 2.6056
2.41303 0.1308 2.4357
- 394.4710
4.43654 0.0418 1.9595
0.30502 0.5840 2.2711
22.44050 0.0000 2.5547
0.27065 0.6059 2.0164
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MAIT 0.49150 0.4872 2.2237
MANL 0.08216 0.7759 1.9419
M ANN
MARI
M AW A 4.88030 0.0333 2.5686
MCUL 2.70158 0.1085 1.7165
M INN 0.17305 0.6798 1.7674
MMCU 1.02116 0.3186 2.0258
MONI 0.41838 0.5220 1.2545
MSBC 20.91642 0.0000 1.9314
MUCL 0.10547 0.7471 1.7218
NBUS 22.87798 0.0000 2.2632
N O T
NCOM 4.83889 0.0340 1.8459
NDIS 4.67189 0.0370 2.2873
NENG 8.53602 0.0058 1.9262
NEWC 5.22832 0.0279 1.2920
NIND 1.78604 0.1903 1.7405
NOVA 34.54566 0.0000 2.2592
NRIV
NRMA 0.15798 0.6932 1.8883
N SU N 4.51744 0.0416 2.2071
NSWP
NSWT 3.46253 0.0705 1.6692
NWLG 0.05511 0.8157 2.1497
ORAN 2.29976 0.1377 2.1633
ORIO 92.65867 0.0000 2.1802
ORMU 0.24040 0.6267 1.6342
PARK 0.44943 0.5067 1.7600
PBBC 18.12402 0.0000 1.4175
PCUL 5.06823 0.0302 1.4749
PEEL 293.00413 0.0000 1.4648
PENR 42.62878 0.0000 2.3882
-385.0223
-394.0111
-326.4374
-413.4493
-312.2725
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PHOE -413.9351
POWE 46.18250 0.0000 2.1134
PROS -426.7628
PTOS 10.77251 0.0027 2.2347
PUNC 151.42476 0.0000 1.5493
QANT 12.93864 0.0009 1.9360
RALE 6.48624 0.0150 1.9149
RAND 1.80859 0.1866 2.0834
RELI 313.86656 0.0000 2.4085
RESO -375.5137
ROTH 3.58039 0.0661 1.6295
RTAS -385.2965
RYDE 0.35453 0.5551 2.2632
RYOM 29.92936 0.0000 1.4796
SCCU 0.27314 0.6043 1.8816
SCEC -233.3368
SECU 0.23767 0.6287 1.7664
SELE 70.80241 0.0000 1.6420
SHEL -410.1241
SHOA 3.81915 0.0607 2.5455
SNOW 9.82634 0.0033 1.5994
SPAP -407.1479
STGE 51.98321 0.0000 2.2965
STHE 2.07935 0.1575 1.8479
SUMM -399.4176
SUTH 0.04732 0.8290 2.0315
SWSC -329.1908
SYDN -458.1593
TABS 0.71131 0.4976 2.2933
TAFE 2.91414 0.0960 2.2868
TART 2.17983 0.1274 2.1027
TCUL 372.94460 0.0000 1.7626
TELS -377.1036
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T R A N
T W SH
UAO D 0.67438 0.5164 2.2665
-410.0513
-275.2401
UNIC 0.12629 0.7243 1.8523
UPPE 3.26296 0.0788 2.0305
W AGG 10.12387 0.0003 1.4148
W BDE 11.64225 0.0015 1.7530
W EST 174.34669 0.0000 1.8670
WILL
W Y O N 2.85814 0.0991 1.4896
-284.3720
Y E N N 0.60358 0.4420 1.4790
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Appendix Two 
Results of Trend Analysis
A2.1 Model Coefficients
ß
t
P(t)
LinR
AR(1)
clock
pulse_l . . . _3 
const
Variable coefficient
Student7s t-statistic for coefficient
Significance of t (p-value)
Linear Regression (no time series process) 
First-order autoregressive process 
Time variable increasing by 1 each quarter 
Pulse dummy variables 
Model constant
Institution Model Variable ß t p W
ACFE AR(1) AR(1) 0.820691 6.802 0.0000
clock 0.007755 2.440 0.0259
const 0.072429 0.700 0.4934
ADCU AR(1) AR(1) 0.391861 1.798 0.0900
clock 0.002634 5.010 0.0001
const -0.012497 0.017 0.4690
AGRI AR(1) AR(1) 0.600310 2.348 0.0313
clock 0.009546 5.379 0.0000
const 0.174965 3.063 0.0070
ALBU AR(1) AR(1) 0.729447 2.847 0.0159
clock 0.013370 2.847 0.0159
const -0.208086 -1.286 0.2250
AMPE AR(1) AR(1) 0.889358 8.885 0.0000
clock 0.034499 5.428 0.0000
const -0.706536 -3.368 0.0037
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A V I A LinR clock
const
B A N A LinR clock
const
B A N K AR(1) AR(1)
clock
p u lse _ l
const
BC U L AR(1) AR(1)
clock
const
BER R AR(1) AR(1)
clock
const
BIGR AR(1) AR(1)
clock
p u lse _ l
const
BLM O AR(1) AR(1)
clock
const
B O R A AR(1) AR(1)
clock
const
BR O K AR(1) AR(1)
clock
const
BRO O LinR clock
const
C A L A AR(1) AR(1)
clock
const
CAPE AR(1) AR(1)
- 0.002936 - 1.550 0.1384
0.382217 6.303 0.0000
0.008359 7.801 0.0000
0.066363 1.934 0.0690
0.668120 3.887 0.0013
0.011982 4.115 0.0008
- 0.094321 - 3.465 0.0032
0.148898 1.585 0.1325
0.873283 9.763 0.0000
0.016347 3.481 0.0029
0.242568 1.572 0.1344
0.627862 3.232 0.0049
- 0.015337 - 2.943 0.0091
0.923548 5.503 0.0000
0.516742 1.611 0.1520
0.006356 2.913 0.0226
- 0.038850 - 2.600 0.0354
0.489707 8.099 0.0001
0.468974 1.778 0.0988
0.005682 6.308 0.0000
0.373016 13.832 0.0000
0.827657 7.436 0.0000
0.023931 6.242 0.0000
- 0.553847 - 4.433 0.0004
0.884749 9.981 0.0000
0.013067 1.878 0.0787
- 0.181979 - 0.784 0.4442
0.024434 9.793 0.0000
- 0.638915 - 6.994 0.0001
0.475494 2.177 0.0439
0.005385 6.035 0.0000
- 0.087381 - 3.049 0.0073
0.347023 1.554 0.1387
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c lock -0.004306 -1.028 0.3182
c o n st 0.618850 4.608 0.0003
CAPR A R (1) A R (1) 0.702993 4.270 0.0005
clock 0.004152 0.850 0.4070
c o n st 0.002403 0.015 0.9880
CARE L in R clock -0.005550 -6.414 0.0000
c o n st 0.487555 16.220 0.0000
CBOA A R (1) A R (1) 0.758190 5.314 0.0001
clock 0.014499 3.213 0.0054
c o n st -0.186057 -1.257 0.2268
CITY A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.357211 1.600 0.1280
clock 0.005590 2.062 0.0549
c o n st 0.274769 3.159 0.0057
COAS A R (1) A R (1) 0.784250 4.799 0.0002
clock 0.002029 0.350 0.7307
c o n st 0.477310 2.537 0.0212
COMF L in R clock 0.000117 0.205 0.8401
c o n st 0.213994 11.658 0.0000
COMP A R (1) A R (1) 0.850747 8.410 0.0000
clock -0.002322 -1.385 0.1839
c o n st 0.371473 6.778 0.0000
COMT A R (1) A R (1) 0.849166 7.247 0.0000
clock 0.022828 3.427 0.0057
c o n st -0.507685 -2.167 0.0531
CSRE A R (1) A R (1) 0.727574 4.154 0.0011
clock 0.012538 2.806 0.0149
c o n st -0.214627 -1.411 0.1818
CW CU L in R clock 0.005296 7.081 0.0000
c o n st 0.302380 13.542 0.0000
DEPE A R (1) A R (1) 0.305513 1.256 0.2262
clock -0.008016 -10.684 0.0000
c o n st 0.703351 29.315 0.0000
DUBB A R (1) A R (1) 0.443609 1.846 0.0824
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ELCO AR(1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
ENDE A R(1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
ESSO AR(1)
p u lse _ 2
clock
con st
A R (1)
EURO AR(1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
FBEC A R (1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
FIRS L inR
clock
con st
clock
GIOS AR(1)
con st
A R (1)
GOSF A R (1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
GREA AR(1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
HARD A R (1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
HIBE A R(1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
0.003429 6.113 0.0000
- 0.053427 - 2.966 0.0087
0.828493 6.939 0.0000
0.002703 0.652 0.5255
0.328210 2.313 0.0377
0.509044 2.283 0.0364
- 0.120046 - 6.337 0.0000
0.004345 3.010 0.0083
0.260729 5.617 0.0000
0.479518 2.415 0.0273
0.002212 1.143 0.2688
0.577299 9.287 0.0000
0.435864 1.456 0.1711
0.003923 1.977 0.0715
0.011105 0.163 0.8732
0.613648 3.097 0.0066
0.021123 30.865 0.0000
- 0.208509 - 9.463 0.0000
- 0.006762 - 2.827 0.0112
0.797036 10.404 0.0000
0.683203 2.394 0.0436
0.007374 2.021 0.0779
- 0.175316 - 1.488 0.1751
0.905153 10.917 0.0000
0.020864 6.323 0.0000
- 0.366017 - 3.341 0.0039
0.681874 4.893 0.0001
- 0.001650 - 0.760 0.4577
0.135605 1.936 0.0697
0.460075 1.832 0.0869
0.010516 3.883 0.0015
- 0.092836 - 1.047 0.3118
0.685714 3.884 0.0012
page 266
Appendix Two -  Results of Trend Analysis
c lock -0.002973 -1.335 0.1996
c o n st 0.828976 11.534 0.0000
HMCS A R (1) A R (1) 0.666057 3.871 0.0012
clock 0.021380 4.649 0.0002
c o n st -0.339772 -2.291 0.0350
non L in R clock 0.002357 2.127 0.0516
c o n s t 0.403221 10.761 0.0000
HORI A R (1) A R (1) 0.705264 4.387 0.0004
clock 0.006998 1.811 0.0879
c o n s t 0.235562 1.887 0.0763
H U U N A R (1) A R (1) 0.920150 12.676 0.0000
c lock 0.008594 3.553 0.0024
c o n s t 0.202677 2.504 0.0228
ILL W A R (1) A R (1) 0.834573 7.580 0.0000
c lo ck 0.007582 6.546 0.0000
c o n s t 0.235343 6.230 0.0000
INTE L inR clo ck 0.042956 7.024 0.0000
c o n s t -1.193506 -5.471 0.0003
LABS A R (1) AR(L) 0.638300 4.200 0.0006
c lock 0.023396 2.941 0.0091
c o n s t -0.043793 -0.171 0.8664
LECU A R (1) A R (1) 0.401910 1.755 0.0972
clock -0.005355 -3.560 0.0024
c o n s t 0.563041 11.661 0.0000
LMCU A R (1) A R (1) 0.450943 1.836 0.0893
clock 0.008921 7.049 0.0000
c o n s t 0.001593 0.042 0.9671
MACO A R (1) A R (1) 0.455191 1.683 0.1267
clock 0.009407 2.259 0.0503
c o n s t 0.136846 1.183 0.2672
MACQ A R (1) A R (1) 0.699592 4.298 0.0005
c lock 0.010178 9.164 0.0000
c o n s t 0.080651 2.249 0.0380
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MARI A R (1) A R (1) 0.932000 13.826 0.0000
c lock -0.003459 -1.962 0.0664
c o n st 0.400289 6.726 0.0000
M AW A A R (1) A R (1) 0.818606 6.774 0.0000
c lock -0.004284 -2.899 0.0100
c o n s t 0.603760 12.553 0.0000
MCUL A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.923185 14.338 0.0000
clock 0.004983 1.914 0.0726
c o n s t 0.320490 3.672 0.0019
MMCU A R (1) A R (1) 0.729036 4.814 0.0002
c lock -0.004932 4 .3 8 3 0.0004
c o n s t 0.400065 10.999 0.0000
MONI A R (1) A R (1) 0.810116 4.141 0.0020
c lock 0.012187 3.665 0.0044
c o n st 0.036263 0.335 0.7445
MSBC A R (1) A R (1) 0.729547 4.397 0.0004
clock 0.008610 2.304 0.0341
c o n s t 0.187817 1.555 0.1385
MUCL A R (1) A R (1) 0.649640 3.018 0.0117
clock 0.005391 1.979 0.0734
c o n s t 0.125009 1.316 0.2149
NBUS A R (1) A R (1) 0.630926 3.325 0.0043
clock 0.008772 1.870 0.0799
p u ls e _ l 0.180776 3.781 0.0016
c o n s t 0.106028 0.701 0.4933
NCIT A R (1) A R (1) 0.639509 3.161 0.0057
clock -0.004935 4 .4 5 2 0.0004
c o n st 0.430138 12.044 0.0000
NENG A R (1) A R (1) 0.625790 3.370 0.0036
clock -0.004693 -1.516 0.1479
c o n st 0.652708 6.547 0.0000
NIND A R (1) A R (1) 0.646361 3.601 0.0022
clock 0.008508 3.310 0.0041
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N O V A A R (1)
con st
AR(1)
N R IV A R (1)
clock
con st
AR(1)
N R M A A R (1)
clock
con st
A R(1)
N S W T A R (1)
clock
con st
AR(1)
O R A N A R (1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
ORIO A R (1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
O R M U A R (1)
clock
co n st
A R(1)
P A R K L inR
clock
con st
clock
PBBC L inR
con st
clock
PCUL A R (1)
con st
AR(1)
PEEL A R (1)
clock
con st
AR(1)
PHOE A R (1)
clock
con st
A R (1)
0.254576 3.073 0.0069
0.773816 4.059 0.0028
0.010788 2.541 0.0316
0.254043 2.107 0.0644
0.829177 7.949 0.0000
0.018613 7.846 0.0824
- 0.234544 - 0.714 0.4851
0.826956 7.302 0.0000
0.017106 4.500 0.0003
- 0.220554 - 1.781 0.0928
0.455653 2.006 0.0610
0.003666 6.678 0.0000
0.244114 13.847 0.0000
0.519681 1.949 0.0679
- 0.001184 - 1.322 0.2036
0.454280 15.788 0.0000
0.787051 4.382 0.0011
0.009608 4.768 0.0006
0.463837 7.904 0.0000
0.820210 5.976 0.0000
0.004933 6.220 0.0000
0.265869 10.298 0.0000
0.015773 2.339 0.0441
- 0.334667 - 1.373 0.2029
0.006873 1.963 0.0973
- 0.164945 - 1.254 0.2564
0.565752 2.359 0.0306
- 0.006848 - 7.058 0.0000
0.674243 21.607 0.0000
0.889319 8.120 0.0000
0.011676 1.945 0.0737
0.004235 0.023 0.9820
0.843312 7.662 0.0000
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c lock 0.005957 3.441 0.0031
c o n st 0.257112 4.547 0.0029
POWE A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.920098 12.365 0.0000
clock 0.018243 6.221 0.0000
c o n s t -0.181409 -1.849 0.0820
PROS A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.607627 2.654 0.0167
clock -0.003274 -3.766 0.0015
c o n st 0.648090 23.154 0.0000
PU N C L in R clock 0.001322 2.213 0.0440
c o n st 0.305785 15.139 0.0000
Q A N T A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.794036 6.910 0.0000
clock 0.007430 9.137 0.0000
c o n st 0.311825 11.811 0.0000
RALE A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.622060 3.287 0.0044
clock 0.016593 7.980 0.0000
c o n st -0.026660 -0.398 0.6955
R E li A R (1) A R (1) 0.701368 4.356 0.0004
clock -0.009820 -1.202 0.2460
c o n s t 0.556632 2.110 0.0500
RESO A R (1) A R (1) 0.405142 1.892 0.0756
clock 0.006864 1.558 0.1377
c o n st 0.119058 0.842 0.4116
ROTH A R (1) A R (1) 0.512566 2.511 0.0224
clock -0.008678 -2.596 0.0188
c o n st 0.584108 5.437 0.0000
RTAS A R (1) A R (1) 0.449848 2.077 0.0533
clock 0.021732 5.058 0.0001
c o n st -0.266480 -1.931 0.0703
RYDE A R (1) A R (1) 0.585434 2.933 0.0093
clock 0.006199 2.322 0.0329
c o n st -0.029499 -0.343 0.7355
RYOM A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.457798 1.733 0.1067
clock -0.008522 -3.152 0.0076
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const 0.519914 6.425 0.0000
s c c u AR(1) AR(1) 0.882103 10.404 0.0000
clock 0.002661 1.530 0.1445
const 0.479871 8.377 0.0000
SECU LinR clock 0.014438 5.989 0.0000
const -0.250166 -3.241 0.0045
SELE LinR clock 0.019843 4.025 0.0024
const -0.022399 -0.164 0.8731
SHEL LinR clock 0.014000 9.999 0.0000
const 0.042901 0.859 0.4104
SHOA LinR clock 0.011603 10.445 0.0000
const 0.200241 6.763 0.0001
SNOW AR(1) AR(1) 0.576171 2.452 0.0366
clock 0.007458 3.598 0.0058
const 0.275822 4.783 0.0010
STGE LinR clock -0.005940 -2.759 0.0129
const 0.682875 9.905 0.0000
STHE LinR clock 0.003061 2.491 0.0227
con st 0.195408 4.967 0.0001
SUMM AR(1) AR(1) 0.876326 6.709 0.0000
clock 0.010484 2.842 0.0139
const 0.319701 2.832 0.0141
SUTH AR(1) AR(1) 0.734969 5.010 0.0001
clock 0.009324 4.485 0.0004
const 0.129060 1.895 0.0763
SWSC AR(1) AR(1) 0.560496 3.085 0.0067
clock 0.017132 15.085 0.0000
const -0.323327 -8.852 0.0000
SYDN LinR clock 0.006351 10.611 0.0000
const 0.343004 20.676 0.0000
TABS AR(1) AR(1) 0.799114 5.160 0.0009
clock 0.054213 -2.116 0.0673
const -1.307107 -2.116 0.0673
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TAFE A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.798390 5.797 0.0000
clock 0.008903 2.696 0.0153
c o n st -0.215178 -2.035 0.0578
TART A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.531136 2.577 0.0196
clock 0.009157 2.669 0.0162
c o n st -0.087021 -0.789 0.4410
TCUL A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.907210 10.314 0.0000
clock 0.012746 5.141 0.0001
c o n st 0.018889 0.229 0.8214
TELS A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.857569 6.181 0.0002
clock 0.023924 2.405 0.0396
c o n st -0.261216 -0.930 0.3765
T R A N A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.664103 3.714 0.0026
clock 0.017891 3.703 0.0027
c o n st -0.424755 -2.587 0.0225
UNIC A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.452116 2.091 0.0518
clock 0.009288 3.338 0.0039
c o n st 0.216959 2.429 0.0265
UPPE A R (1) A R (1) 0.351284 1.535 0.1431
clock 0.008222 3.446 0.0031
c o n st 0.235072 3.071 0.0069
W AG G L in R clock 0.011864 6.858 0.0000
c o n st -0.023042 -0.416 0.6824
W EST L in R clock 0.008452 2.370 0.0292
c o n st -0.011644 -0.102 0.9199
W Y O N A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.784004 4.813 0.0003
clock 0.014312 4.532 0.0006
c o n st 0.128926 1.351 0.1998
Y E N N A R (1 ) A R (1) 0.665581 3.997 0.0009
clock 0.010135 5.634 0.0000
c o n st -0.222130 -3.829 0.0013
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A2.2 Diagnostics
Linear Regressions:
F F-statistic
p(F) Significance of F
DW Durbin-Watson statistic
Autoregressive models:
AIC Aikike's Information Criterion
Institu tion F P(F) D W AIC
ACFE -86.2961
A DCU -128.2944
AGRI -91.6022
ALBU -41.3715
AMPE -66.0611
A V IA 2.40400 0.1384 2.4155
B A N A 60.85784 0.0000 1.6135
BA N K -75.6006
BCUL -76.3046
BERR -50.3948
BIGR -60.5924
BLMO -97.7910
BORA -79.4962
BROK -60.4250
BROO 95.89489 0.0000 2.6051
CALA -111.5305
CAPE -43.1207
CAPR -58.5704
CARE 41.13589 0.0000 2.2484
CBOA -65.1267
CITY -60.9851
COAS -58.7005
COMF 0.04188 0.8401 1.5997
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COMP -115.0237
COMT -50.3801
CSRE -59.0199
CW CU 50.14716 0.0000 1.2143
DEPE -109.9725
DUBB -128.3613
ELCO -67.8069
ENDE -93.2434
ESSO -80.7878
EURO -69.2076
FBEC -130.6151
H R S 7.99099 0.0112 1.3540
GIOS -51.8842
GOSF -94.0893
GREA -89.3509
HARD -61.4640
M BE -88.6209
HMCS -58.1362
H O U 4.52619 0.0516 1.1938
HORI -68.1096
H U U N -108.4458
ILLW -128.0915
INTE 49.33257 0.0000 1.4936
LABS -34.1991
LECU -86.7460
LMCU -86.1888
MACO -44.7001
MACQ -117.5394
MARI -122.5999
M A W A -116.7130
MCUL -105.8915
M M CU -119.4127
M ONI -64.5909
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MSBC
MUCL
NBUS
NCIT
NENG
NIND
NOVA
NRIV
NRMA
NSWT
ORAN
ORIO
ORMU
PARK 5.47218
PBBC 3.85423
PCUL
PEEL
PHOE
POWE
PROS
PUNC 4.89843
QANT
RALE
RELI
RESO
ROTH
RTAS
RYDE
RYOM
SCCU
SECU 35.87000
SELE 16.19982
SHEL 99.97207
-71.4374
-65.9360
-53.8672
-113.1213
-71.0794
-79.9678
-54.0319
-40.9712
-79.7654
-129.8736
-113.9247
-80.6234
-141.7716
0.0441 1.4175
0.0973 1.7222
-113.5209
-60.3129
-112.9336
-100.7410
-120.6326
0.0440 1.3443
-138.2007
-86.7387
-37.8487
-43.9211
-60.8063
-47.2579
-74.3045
-62.1724
-117.0435
0.0000 1.9108
0.0024 1.0892
0.0000 1.4870
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SHOA 109.09963 0.0000 2.0062
S N O W -64.7812
STGE 7.61268 0.0129 1.9566
STHE 6.20654 0.0227 1.5449
SUM M -74.9235
SUTH -92.7253
SW SC -106.8873
SYDN 112.58455 0.0000 1.0972
TABS -16.5326
TAFE -80.0694
TART -60.8659
TCUL -105.8649
TELS -36.7569
T R A N -53.0204
U N IC -64.7691
UPPE -65.8105
W AG G 47.02602 0.0000 1.4889
W EST 5.61554 0.0292 1.8795
W Y O N -73.5526
Y E N N -95.6458
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